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This study examines the United States Senate career of Nebraska Populist 
William Vincent Allen (1893-1901). A relatively neglected figure in Populist 
historiography, Allen has been the subject o f widely divergent opinions on the part of 
those historians who have commented on his place in the movement.
The dominant view reflected in the published literature is that Allen, who was 
elected with the help of Democratic votes in the Nebraska legislature, was, ideologically 
and politically, more of a Democrat than a Populist. On this view, Allen’s principal 
policy concern was promoting the cause of free silver coinage, and his primary political 
orientation was to follow the lead of the Bryan wing of the Democratic Party. Historians 
in this camp see Allen as a pseudo-Populist at best.
But several other scholars view Allen as a true Populist. While not denying 
Allen’s emphasis on free silver, a dedication to which Populists shared with Bryanite 
Democrats, or his support of Populist-Democratic fusion, these historians have argued 
that Allen’s detractors have overlooked evidence pointing to his commitment to other 
Populist concerns such as nationalization of the railroads.
The present study, based on the Allen Papers at the Nebraska State Historical 
Society, the Congressional Record, and the relevant secondary literature, attempts to 
answer the question of whether Allen was a real Populist. The focus is on Allen’s Senate 
activities, but it also briefly addresses the Nebraska Senator’s much-maligned political 
positions. It is primarily concerned with how Allen’s thought and efforts matched up 
with the Omaha Platform promulgated at the People’s Party National Convention in 
1892.
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INTRODUCTION 
William Vincent Allen in Populist Historiography
Just what constitutes truth in history is an epistem ological 
problem o f  very great difficulty.
Kenneth Boulding, A  Primer o f  Social Dynamics: 
History as D ialectics and D evelopm ent
Of the seven United States Senators who represented the People’s Party during 
the 1890s, Nebraska’s William V. Allen had the longest tenure.1 Elected in 1893, Allen 
was a particularly energetic legislator, as active perhaps as any contemporary figure in 
the Senate. During his seven years in office he always identified himself as a Populist, 
and rhetorically he continued to express his allegiance to the explicit demands of the 
1892 Omaha Platform of the People’s Party.
Still, historians of Populism have taken relatively little notice of Allen’s 
legislative career, and only a handful have given him more than passing attention. 
Nevertheless they have reached very disparate interpretations of Allen’s relationship to 
the movement, some insisting that he was not really a Populist at all.
The earliest appraisal of Allen was brief but favorable. In 1928, John D. Hicks 
wrote that in the Senate Allen displayed “unusual resourcefulness,” and that some of his
1 The others were William Alfred Peffer o f Kansas (1891-97), James Kyle o f South Dakota (1891- 
1901, the last three years o f Kyle’s tenure were spent as a Republican), Marion Butler o f North Carolina 
(1895-1901), William A. Harris o f Kansas (1897-1903), Henry Heitfeld o f Idaho (1897-1903), and George 
Turner o f Washington (1897-1901). Gene Clanton, Congressional Populism and the Crisis o f the 1890s 
(Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1998), 77, 87, 98, 123, 146, 175-76; Biographical Directory o f the 
American Congress. 1774-1971, document 92-8, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1971), 509.
2• • • • •accomplishments were notable. In his classic The Populist Revolt (1931V Hicks went
further, contending that the “honest” and “incorruptible” Allen was not only a “genuine 
Populist,” but also “the ablest man” of his party in Nebraska.
Subsequently, however, most historians have not shared Hicks’ positive 
assessment of the man. In 1974, in his Populism and Politics, Peter Argersinger viewed 
Allen as a “nominal Populist” who, by at least 1896, had become more dedicated to 
Populist-Democratic fusion and to the “panacea” of free silver than to the principles of 
the People’s Party.4 For him, Allen was an opportunistic politician who in 1896 
exercised his role as permanent chairman of the Populist National Convention at St.
Louis in duplicitous fashion. There he contributed to what Argersinger sees as the 
pernicious success of fusionists in winning the party’s presidential nomination for 
Democrat William Jennings Bryan.5
2 John D. Hicks, “Allen, William Vincent,” in Allen Johnson, ed., Dictionary o f American 
Biography, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928), 214.
3 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party 
(1931; reprint, Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1961), 282-83 (for the “honest” and “incorruptible” 
quotations), 285 (for the “ablest” quotation), 316 (for the “genuine” quotation). Two later, unpublished 
studies saw Allen the same way: Allen was “probably the most capable Populist who was sent to 
Washington. His ability to hold his own in Senate debates against the leaders o f  the major parties brought 
joy to the hearts o f all Populists.” Clarence Nelson Roberts, “A Congressional History o f the Populists” 
(M.A. thesis, University o f Missouri, 1936), 14; “Allen’s debates and voting in the Senate illustrate that he 
was sincere in his convictions, and that he was a genuine Populist.” Richard N. Kottman, “An Analysis o f  
the People’s Party Delegation in Congress, 1891-1897” (M.A. thesis, University o f Iowa, 1954), 40.
4 Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s Party 
(Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1974), 247, 289.
5 Ibid., 112, 264-65. See also 199-200, 202, 204-05, 211, 227-28, 245, 252, 260-61, 292, 310. 
That Allen formally exercised this important function at all was, Argersinger writes, in violation o f the 
party’s Omaha Ordinance o f 1892, which proscribed the involvement o f office-holders in party 
conventions.
3In a more detailed 1976 assessment of Allen’s Populist role, Lawrence Goodwyn 
reached conclusions virtually identical to Argersinger’s. In his influential Democratic 
Promise, Goodwyn alleged that Allen was the “archetype” of a peculiar and novel class 
of politician: the pseudo-Populist. According to Goodwyn, since Allen understood 
neither the logic of the Populist program nor the reasons for its emergence in his own 
state, he never felt particularly committed to the Omaha Platform.6 Thus Allen routinely 
ignored important Populist concerns such as greenbackism and nationalization of the 
railroads; he advocated the orthodox position of the gold advocates on ultimate 
redemption (the practice of basing currency values on redeemable precious metals); and 
he dismissed central Populist tenets such as radical reform of the national bank network,
the duopolistic party order, and the inveterate “system of corporate influence over the
• • • • 1democratic process itself’ as tangential, even irrelevant, to the aims of Populism.
Goodwyn contends that Allen made the promotion of free silver his top reform 
priority, indeed, that he placed it before the needs of his party, because he viewed it as 
essential to his future election prospects. Moreover, since Allen’s ideology was 
indistinguishable from that of reform-Democrat William Jennings Bryan, he advocated 
fusion with the Democracy wherever possible.9 That strategy, Goodwyn suggests, and
6 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976) 392, 426-27.
7 Ibid., 392-93, 400. The political duopoly consisted o f the familiar pattern o f  the dominance o f 
politics by the Democratic and Republican parties.
8 Ibid., 396-401, 426-27.
9 Ibid., 401, 440, 442, 461, 474-75, 477, 480-81, 494, 497, 499, 507, 558. This view o f Allen as 
philosophically tainted Populist is shared by Robert C. McMath, Jr., who refers to Allen as a “Democratic-
4Allen’s corrupt handling of his chairmanship duties at the 1896 People’s Party National 
Convention, did much to bring about the disintegration of the party.10 All of this, as well 
as Allen’s initial election, serves for Goodwyn as conclusive evidence of the shallow 
nature of Nebraska Populism, an “issueless” (save for silver) “shadow-movement” that 
was nothing more than a vague mugwumpish impulse on the part of some passionless, 
uninspired men to create a more honest government.11
In another 1976 study, Western Populism, Karel Bicha explored Allen’s role. 
Unlike Argersinger and Goodwyn, who displayed interest only in Allen’s impact on the 
party organization, Bicha studied Allen’s Senate career in some depth. That difference 
notwithstanding, Bicha’s view of Allen closely matches those of his 1970s 
counterparts.12
Bicha denies that Allen was ever more than slightly enthusiastic about the 
People’s Party or its platform. Rather, Allen was a user of, as opposed to a believer in, 
political trends; a man whose “third party disposition” prior to 1890 “was either latent or 
altogether dormant.” This Nebraskan who called himself a Populist was in fact 
“ideologically and personally...uncomfortable in Populist circles,” where he was
Populist senator” because o f Allen’s emphasis on free silver and his advocacy o f fusion. See American 
Populism: A Social History. 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 199.
10 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise. 485-92.
11 Ibid., 394, 396, 400. For an illuminating assessment o f Goodwyn’s one-sided treatment o f  
Nebraska Populism, see Robert W. Cherny, “Lawrence Goodwyn and Nebraska Populism: A Review 
Essay,” Great Plains Quarterly 1, no. 3 (Summer 1981), 181-194.
12 Karel Bicha, Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism (Lawrence, Kan.: 
Coronado Press, 1976).
1 ^“reserved and aloof toward” other members of the party. Never really a believer, Allen 
was, save “for his role as a theoretician of monetary policy...a non-Populist.”14
By noting that Allen did embrace the “monetary and coinage sections” of the 
Omaha Platform, however, Bicha tacitly admits that Allen was a Populist to the extent 
that he accepted the party’s monetary program. Furthermore, Bicha gives Allen credit 
for being “a competent and thoughtful monetary authority,” and notes that in the Senate, 
his thoughts on the subject “were distinctly well considered and elaborately articulated.” 
Whereas Goodwyn condemns Allen for failing to take up “greenback monetary 
analysis,” Bicha writes that with his “severely instrumentalist view of money,” his 
vehement denial of intrinsic value, his call for an expansion of the money supply, his 
anti-gold stance, and his intellectual debt to monetary theorist Edward Kellogg, whose 
writings had provided the theoretical basis of the Greenback monetary critique, Allen 
“could easily have defended Greenback ideas.” Contrary to Goodwyn, who had likened 
Allen’s monetary views to those of the “gold monometallist,” Bicha explained that 
Allen’s basic position “was a specific repudiation of the monetary orthodoxy of his 
day.”15
According to Bicha, however, Allen’s negative qualities effectively undercut any 
potential he might have had to aid the Populist movement. His pronounced distrust of 
the British, his conspiratorial mind-set, “myopia,” deep-rooted “pomposity,” and
13 Ibid., 43-44.
14 Ibid., 52.
15 Ibid., 44-46; Goodwyn, 15-16, 392.
especially his lack of commitment to “the cause,” represented “a nearly complete 
contradiction” of the principles of the People’s Party. Bicha suggests that, by 1895, 
Allen had tired of his underachieving party and that, as a “powerless representative of a 
declining movement after 1896, Allen was in a real sense a long-term lame-duck.” The 
Nebraskan was, Bicha concluded with a sense of finality, “a rather tragic and certainly 
misplaced figure.”16
Populist historian Gene Clanton has challenged these negative assessments. In a 
highly critical review of Western Populism, Clanton describes Bicha’s portrayal of Allen 
as a “caricature.” To Clanton, Allen is an instructive example of the “diversity” within
• * 1 7the Populist movement as opposed to “the conservative monolith” sketched by Bicha.
In a subsequent article in which he used the behavior of early congressional Populists to 
test the conclusions of both Bicha and Goodwyn, Clanton found Allen to be an authentic 
representative of the Populist reform impulse. Clanton pointed to one specific speech 
Allen gave during the first session of his term and suggested that, “by itself,” it “is a
16 Bicha, 44 (for “contradiction” quotation), 46-48. For all other quotations, see 51-52. That 
Bicha faults Allen for his anglophobia and visions o f a gold conspiracy, apparently suggesting these reflect 
the inauthenticity o f Allen’s Populism, is rather curious. States the Omaha Platform: “A vast [plutocratic] 
conspiracy against mankind has been organized on two continents, and it is rapidly taking possession o f the 
world.” Contemporaries would have understood “on two continents” to mean, more or less, Wall Street 
and Lombard Street, the financial hubs o f New York and London respectively. For the Omaha Platform 
see National Party Platforms: Volume 1 1840-1956. compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1978), 89-91 (quotation on p. 90). For a discussion that casts Populist 
conspiratorial thinking in a negative light, see Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f Reform: From Bryan to 
F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 70-81. For a more sympathetic account see Jeffrey Ostler, “The 
Rhetoric o f  Conspiracy and the Formation o f Kansas Populism,” Agricultural History 69 (1995): 1-27.
17 (iene Clanton, review o f  Western Populism, by Karel D. Bicha, Journal o f American History 64 
(1977), 813. Ronald J. Fahl, a former student o f Clanton’s, also criticized Bicha’s assessment o f Allen.
The Nebraskan, Fahl contends, was both dedicated to Populism and unrelenting in his efforts to advance its 
goals. See Fahl’s review o f Western Populism. Pacific Northwest Quarterly 69 (1978): 138-139.
7revelation and persuasive testimony that Goodwyn all too easily banished Nebraska
1 &Populists from the ranks of genuine Populism.” Elsewhere Clanton has referred to 
Allen as, in language reminiscent of John Hicks, one of three “outstanding” Populist 
senators,19 and as, “arguably, Populism’s most talented and respected advocate on 
Capitol Hill.”20
Clanton’s latest published work reinforces his previous assessments. In his 1998 
Congressional Populism and the Crisis of the 1890s, he observes that Allen was a sincere 
advocate of labor and the poor, and presents evidence that, Goodwyn’s claims to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the Nebraska senator did in fact support federal government
ownership of the railroads, thus meeting one of the important litmus tests for Populist
0 1 • •legitimacy. On this question of “What exactly made one a Populist?,” Clanton writes
that, of the assorted elements involved, “none was stronger” than the conviction that
“people were,” ultimately, “of equal worth.” And on different occasions Allen expressed
this idea “more clearly than others. He especially deplored elitism and notions of
18 Gene Clanton, “’Hayseed Socialism’ on the Hill: Congressional Populism, 1891-1895,” 
Western Historical Quarterly 15 (1984): 139-162. The quotation appears on p. 159. Clanton’s reference is 
to Allen’s fourteen-hour speech given during the October 1893 filibuster against the proposal to repeal the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act o f  1890. That speech is covered in detail in chapter two below.
19 Gene Clanton, “Populism,” in The Encyclopedia o f the United States Congress, ed. Donald C. 
Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, and Morton Keller (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), vol. 3, 1569. The 
other two were William Alfred Peffer o f Kansas and North Carolina’s Marion Butler.
20 Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane Preference in America. 1890-1900 (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1991), 103.
21 Clanton, Congressional Populism. 63, 70-71, 77, 130, 204; on the railroad issue, see 100, 123-
25, 135.
hierarchy grounded on position and wealth, and he never failed to take issue with those 
who implied otherwise.”
Populist historians, then, have been as divided in their perception of Allen’s 
relationship to the movement as were observers who, in the early months of 1893, 
speculated about what course the Senator-elect would take in Washington. As there 
seems to be general agreement that Allen was a significant figure in the party, the 
existing polarization of opinion about him suggests that the question of whether Allen 
truly qualifies as a Populist is an important one.
This study presents a reinterpretation of this basic problem. In doing so, it will 
first trace in detail what Allen did and said as a United States Senator. This is an 
essential first step, for there exists no comprehensive study of Allen’s Senate career.23 In 
addition to providing a solid evidential foundation on which to formulate an 
interpretation, this treatment seeks to correct some of the errors scholars have made 
regarding Allen’s career. Working from this expanded knowledge of the positions he 
advocated, we will compare these to the imperatives of the Omaha Platform in order to 
measure Allen’s Populism.
Because our chief interest is in analyzing Allen’s record as a Populist senator, this 
study is not intended to be an exhaustive account of all of his activities in and outside 
Congress. Instead, it focuses selectively on Allen’s handling of issues germane to the 
Populist reform program. Therefore, although it will summarize Allen’s staunch anti­
22 Ibid., 91.
23 The only effort to detail Allen’s political career is Mittie Young Scott, “The Life and Political 
Career o f William Vincent Allen” (M.A. thesis, University o f Nebraska, 1927).
9imperialism, it will not examine in detail his views and efforts on foreign policy matters. 
Foreign affairs were far from irrelevant to Populism. The United States’ expansionist 
adventures in the 1890s raised questions about not only human freedom—a central 
concern of Populist ideology—but also about the relationship between the international- 
related financial machinations of American and European financiers, the formulation of 
American policy, and the domestic economic ramifications for farmers and laborers. 
Nonetheless, in terms of the stated goals and concerns of the People’s Party, foreign 
affairs were peripheral.
Because Allen’s influence on the shaping of the party’s political approach is 
important to a proper assessment of his performance as a Populist, this study will offer a 
brief assessment of the merits of Allen’s advocacy of fusion politics. However, because 
fusion was chiefly a matter of political strategy, one about which Populists disagreed, 
and as most of Allen’s energies were expended in the realm of legislative policy, this 
analysis will focus on the least-studied aspect of his “Populist” career, his domestic 
policy-related Senate activities. The result should provide a more balanced assessment 
of Allen’s place in America’s most famous third party movement.
CHAPTER ONE 
The Agrarian Revolt and the Nebraska 
Senatorial Election of 1893
[Millionaires...[have accumulated] dangerous aggregations 
of wealth.. .through class laws or the violations of law.. .and 
speculations, so well known to the crafty and unscrupulous, 
while on agriculture and other forms of industry have fallen all 
the losses...
The old parties of rapacious greed... will not afford relief. Is 
it any wonder that society is organizing against this new form of 
tyranny...and that a new political party is rapidly forming for 
defensive purposes?
[The] new party, rising and growing through great public 
exigencies, will build or find a new man as the champion to 
enforce its demands.
Populist Congressman John Davis o f Kansas, “Communism o f  
Capital— The Real Issue Before the People,” The Arena, 
September 1892.
From the achievement of statehood in 1867 until the close of the 1880s the 
Republican Party was the preponderant political force in Nebraska. Apparent economic 
prosperity, the stalwart loyalty of former Union soldiers to the party of Lincoln, incessant 
Democratic factionalism and the party’s earlier opposition to the Homestead Act, all 
worked to ensure Republican dominance at the polls.1
1 James C. Olson, History o f Nebraska (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1974), 208-211; 
Stanley B. Parsons, The Populist Context: Rural Versus Urban Power on a Great Plains Frontier (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 16. On exceptions to Republican unity, see Parsons, 5-6. For 
informative discussions o f the major parties in Nebraska during this period, see See Robert W. Cherny, 
Populism. Progressivism. and the Transformation o f Nebraska Politics. 1885-1915 (Lincoln: University o f  
Nebraska Press, 1981), 1-31; Jeffrey Ostler, Prairie Populism: The Fate o f Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas. 
Nebraska, and Iowa. 1880-1892 (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1993), 72-90; and “Travails o f the 
Democracy: 1868-1890,” chapter two of James F. Pedersen and Kenneth D. Wald, Shall the People Rule?:
11
During this period Republican officials and Democratic leaders alike were much 
concerned with promoting the development of the state’s economy. Consequently they 
focused their efforts on economic stimulus and capital accumulation. As Stanley Parsons
has observed, during the 1880s legislative initiatives, excepting “prohibition and other
* •  •  • • • 2 cultural issues,” dealt primarily with generating an environment for economic growth.
Under the Republicans’ watch there was indeed some economic prosperity. In the
1880s Nebraska’s population more than doubled to just over one million, and the value of
the state’s manufactured goods increased by seven times. Agriculture, which had long
constituted the largest sector of the economy, also grew apace. Food production
increased by 200 percent, owing to the suitability of the eastern lands for corn-growing,
relatively high rainfall levels, and the introduction of improved farm machinery. In the
decade agricultural expansion transformed Nebraska, as historian James C. Olson has put
it, from an unsettled “frontier to a major food producing area.”4 Perceived prosperity,
Olson writes, induced among the people a heady optimism.
Progress was in the air. The good crops, the railroads, the growing population 
all suggested great things. Any town could become a commercial center or a 
great railway metropolis, or both. A score of villages coveted the state capital, 
and not a few believed that in time the greatness of the new West would
A History of the Democratic Party in Nebraska Politics. 1854-1972 (Lincoln, Nebraska: Jacob North, Inc., 
1972) 43-78. For useful overviews o f the parties on the national scene, see Lewis L. Gould, “The 
Republican Search for a National Majority,” and R. Hal Williams, “’Dry Bones and Dead Language’: The 
Democratic Party,” both in The Gilded Age, ed. H. Wayne Morgan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1970), 171-87 (Gould), 129-48 (Williams).
7 Parsons, 4-5.
3 Olson, 195-200.
4 Ibid., 196. During the 1870s and 1880s the Republicans helped Nebraska farmers by passing 
several laws promoting agricultural development. See Chemy, Populism, Progressivism, 13-14.
12
necessitate the abandonment of Washington for a national headquarters on the 
Plains. Raw villages indulged in rosy dreams of greatness, and gas lights 
twinkled where the coyotes should have been left undisturbed.5
Ultimately, however, the farmers of the state recognized that the particles of 
progress were inequitably dispersed. They were thickest in the air circulating through 
Nebraska’s towns and cities, where speculation, commerce, and industrial expansion had 
produced a far greater level of material and financial enrichment than was evident in the 
countryside. During the prosperous 1880s, urban businessmen were generally able to sell 
their wares at a profit, while many farmers, due to low and steadily falling prices for their 
products, found themselves operating at a loss.6
Ironically, during the mid-1880s farming operations themselves were highly 
productive. Nebraska agriculture had profited greatly from vast increases in real estate
n  o
values, and “land was available, money was easy, and crops were plentiful.” Indeed, 
the 1889 bumper crop was “the best in a decade” of successful harvests. But it earned for 
farmers “some of the lowest prices...yet received,” and led them to question seriously the 
fairness of a system whereby higher yields resulted in lower financial returns. Their 
skepticism and anger grew as the incomes of many farmers fell far behind the cost 
demands of production, transportation, taxes and credit.9 The roots of .this disparity
5 Olson, 203. For a corresponding expression o f this point, see Cherny, Populist and Progressive,
38.
6 Olson, 177, 200-204, 207, 211-12; Parsons, 146.
7 Parsons, 22.
8 Olson, 207.
9 Ibid., 220; Parsons, 146.
between the economic position of the farmer and that of other Nebraskans reached as far 
back as the panic of 1873, which spawned a nationwide depression and caused farm 
commodity prices to plummet. Although economic hardship was pervasive and not 
limited to agriculture, by 1880 the crisis had subsided in most parts of the economy. In 
some farming regions, however, including much of central Nebraska, the depressed 
conditions persisted for nearly two more decades.10
One of the bulwarks of the agrarian response to the marginalization and 
depression of much of the farming community was the development of an explanatory 
critique which, while hyperbolic in its premises, pointed toward some of the fundamental 
aspects of the problem. It held that the farmer’s woes could be traced to unreasonable 
interest charges, exorbitant railroad rates, and deflation, factors which, if not so 
oppressive as the farmer professed, nevertheless claimed an inordinate share of his 
income. The precipitous fall in the prices of foodstuffs had left indebted farmers severely 
undercapitalized, and for them the collapse of the land boom in 1888 was disastrous. 
Problems which theretofore had been barely manageable, such as the chattel mortgage 
and other credit burdens, the large expense of sending products to markets both in 
America and Europe, and the adverse effects of monetary appreciation on fixed costs, 
were now intractable in the face of “fiffy-cent wheat...twenty-cent com, and flfteen-cent 
oats.”11
10 George Brown Tindall and David Shi, America: A Narrative History 3rd ed., vol. 2 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 727; Olson, 174-178, 207.
11 Olson, 220. See also Parsons, 22-31, 145-146; David S. Trask, “Nebraska Populism as a 
Response to Environmental and Political Problems,” in The Great Plains: Environment and Culture, eds.
Farmers were responsible for their lot insofar as misplaced optimism had 
prompted many of them to borrow money extravagantly. Whatever their level of 
culpability may have been in generating the crisis, farmers were now faced the stark 
reality of burdensome debt, of prices so low that a number of farmers found it less 
expensive to convert their com into fuel rather than market it, o f a rise in the number of 
abandoned and physically neglected structures, and of a marked increase in farm 
repossessions. To the “harassed little country businessman,” it now seemed that genuine 
recovery would require governmental intervention aimed at curbing the abusive practices
1 9of railroads, moneylenders, and monopolists.
But from the major party politicos no assistance was forthcoming. There was
little difference in the economic philosophies of the Democrats and Republicans, neither
of which produced programs to effectively relieve the plight of the farmer. And, as a
palpable demonstration of the “great consensus” between them on economic thought,
1 ^both focused on maximizing the growth of the economy and investments. Even the
Brian W. Blouet and Frederick C. Luebke (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1979), 61-80. Jeffrey 
Ostler, citing an 1893 U.S. Senate report, notes that at the beginning o f 1890 prices on wheat and com in 
New York were at the lowest January level since the Civil War, and that post-war hog and cattle prices for 
that month had each been lower on only one previous occasion. See Ostler, Prairie Populism. 214, note 5.
12 Chemy, 31; Olson, 207-208, 211-21; Parsons, 22-31. The “country businessman” expression is 
from Richard Hofstadter’s The Age o f Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 
46.
13 Parsons, 21, 4-5; R. Hal Williams, Years o f Decision: American Politics in the 1890s (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 5-7, 10-11; Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion. 1890-1900 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 105-06; Richard F. Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political 
Development, 1880-1980 (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1984), 62-73. The most important 
policy differences, these authors note, were on the tariff (Republicans were staunchly protectionist and the 
Democrats moderately so; the Democracy came to favor free trade and a tariff for revenue only, but not 
until 1887); and on the proper extent of federal power (the GOP was for a centralized, modestly activist 
role; the Democracy for an anti-centralist laissez faire government).
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reformers among them, such as Edward Rosewater, Republican editor of the Omaha Bee, 
were little concerned with farmer interests. Rosewater, a passionate yet myopic reformer, 
shared with the vast majority of Nebraska’s political elite a devotion to commercial and 
industrial expansion that precluded any real criticism of the prevailing economic order.14 
Moreover, the Democrats were less disposed to address the farm crisis than were the 
Republicans, who were dominant in the areas of farm discontent. The Democrats’ 
strength, and that of the Bourbons in particular, was concentrated in the towns and cities, 
including Omaha, and in the state’s “more prosperous” locales.15 Blinded by the status 
quo, major-party adherents in Nebraska were insensitive, and generally unresponsive to, 
the special concerns of the farmer.16
Insofar as farm problems were remediable by government, their solution was in 
the hands of the businessmen and professionals who dominated politics at both the 
county and state levels. While “not militantly antagonistic” to the interests of the farmer,
• • 17these leaders “always evaluated them in the light of village and city needs.” Thus, any 
compassion politicians felt for farmers, and any inclination they had to support the 
agrarians’ reform proposals were moderated by the fear that the benefits of reform would 
not compensate for the detrimental effects likely to result from the alienation of eastern
14 Parsons, 12.
15 Ibid., 14.
16 Ibid., 146.
17 Ibid., 21, 146.
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1 8investors. Not surprisingly then, the state government “basically responded to urban 
and village interests and needs.”19 Lacking an effective political voice, the farmer was 
“often left to complain.”20
If Nebraska farmers were “outmaneuvered, outfought and outwitted by more 
sophisticated” town and city lobbies “who were more in tune with the growing industrial
91and commercial economy,” they nevertheless mounted a serious and increasingly 
militant campaign to promote their common financial interests. The early institutional 
products of this movement, the Grange, or Patrons of Husbandry (1869-1876), and the 
Farmer’s Alliance (1880-1900), were nonpartisan ventures which worked to enhance 
education, stimulate social solidarity and, especially, to ameliorate the financial situation 
of farmers. The Grange attempted to establish a viable network for the cooperative 
purchase and sale of crops and equipment without much success. More effective was the 
Farmer’s Alliance, an interest group which, in addition to forming cooperatives, fought 
for transportation and corporate reform. By 1890 the Nebraska Alliance had hundreds of 
chapters, an active state organization, and an official organ, the Farmer’s Alliance, a
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Ibid., 147.
20 Ibid., 21.
21 Ibid., 145. Fanners faced unique conditions which limited their involvement in the political 
process, including the demands o f “constant husbandry,” the existing limits o f communication, and the 
distances to centers o f political power. See ibid., 146.
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spirited newspaper that would play a role of some import in the political debates of the 
1890s.22
But government still failed to respond, and in the late 1880s some Alliancemen 
began to agitate for independent political action and, as Olson explains, “many people 
joined the Alliance precisely because they expected independent action to be taken.”23 
When the price debacle of 1889 was followed by a severe drought in 1890, the Alliance 
set its ship on a direct course for the turbulent waters of Nebraska politics. In late July, a 
convention of reform groups, dominated by delegates of the Alliance, launched the 
Nebraska “People’s Independent Party.”24
Presently, the People’s party not only demonstrated that it was a force to be 
reckoned with, but also helped to generate a radical transformation of the state’s political 
landscape. In the November 1890 elections, Independents (or “Populists” as they came
22 Olson, 177-78, 216-18; Parsons, 145.
23 Olson, 218.
24 Ibid., 218-223. Why didn’t the disenchanted turn to the Democratic Party? One historian’s 
answer, referring to the national situation but probably just as applicable to Nebraska, explained that 
Cleveland’s first administration (1885-1889) had left the Democracy and the GOP “equally distrusted.” 
Each was thought to be a tool o f eastern financial interests. See Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years o f  the 
Republic: 1885-1905 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1917), 270. Olson (p. 218) notes that in 
Nebraska, Democrats were remembered as having been on the wrong side in the Civil War, and, for 
Protestant farmers, the large proportion o f Catholics and anti-prohibitionists in the party made it an 
unacceptable option. The foregoing suggests that in order to understand the dynamics o f agrarian 
politicization it is necessary to recognize that economics was not the only force directing voter choices. 
Indeed, several historians have argued that ethnocultural and religious factors were dominant. Cherny 
contends that during the 1880s Nebraska’s “Democratic party...was largely a single-interest [i.e. anti­
prohibition] party.” Cherny’s analysis, however, demonstrates that ethnic, cultural, and economic factors 
were inextricably linked. See Cherny, 14-31. On the other hand, to Nebraskans who were angry the 
“Republicans, because o f their treatment o f all who expressed progressive ideas, seemed equally hopeless.” 
See Olson, 218. For an explanation that focuses on party competition, see Ostler, 72-133. For useful 
insights into all o f  these matters, see Ronald Briel, “Preface to Populism: A Social Analysis o f  Minor 
Parties in Nebraska Politics, 1876-1890” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Nebraska Lincoln, 1981).
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to be called) were elected to majorities in both houses of the legislature and won two of 
Nebraska’s three congressional races. Republican losses were even more remarkable than 
Populist gains, as William Jennings Bryan took the remaining congressional seat, and 
James E. Boyd became the first Democrat to be elected Nebraska governor. Although 
in 1892 the GOP regained the governorship and the legislature, the Populist congressmen 
were reelected, and the party continued to enjoy a large following. Despite the recent 
setback the faithful endeavored to continue their efforts to bring more “People’s” 
representatives into positions of influence.
The Populists soon had a golden opportunity to do just that. The most important 
order of business for the newly elected legislature was the selection of a United States 
Senator. In the joint balloting held by the senate and house, the Republicans held a 
plurality of nine votes over the Populists, sixty-two to fifty-three. But with the GOP 
lacking a majority, the Populists could take the election by cooperating with the
97Democrats, who had eighteen members. Ultimately, they succeeded in just that 
fashion.
25 Olson, 226.
26 Ibid., 229.
27 Albert Watkins, History o f Nebraska: From the Earliest Explorations to the Present Time, vol. 3 
(Lincoln: Western Publishing and Engraving Company, 1913), 247-48. Sheldon reports that at the 
beginning o f the session, bicameral membership was as follows: R -63 ,1-53, and D-17. There were, 
however, some changes in the membership during January. Paolo E. Coletta notes that one Populist 
legislator died, and Watkins’ account, which reports a Democratic membership o f 18 at the time o f the final 
voting, appears to be reliable. Parenthetically, Coletta is incorrect when he writes that the Republicans held 
53 seats. In fact, they held 62. See Addison E. Sheldon, “Nebraskans I Have Known,” Nebraska History 
19 (1938): 195; and, Coletta, “William Jennings Bryan and the Nebraska Senatorial Election o f 1893,” 
Nebraska History 31 (1950): 188-189, 197.
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The political composition of the legislature dictated that the Populists select their 
candidate with great care. Party support initially went to “stereotype Populist” John H. 
Powers, a farmer, lay evangelist, and president of the Nebraska Farmer’s Alliance.
After twelve ballots, Powers was dropped in favor of William L. Greene of Kearney. On 
the sixteenth ballot the Populists, in an attempt to draw Democratic support, turned to 
William V. Allen.29
Some students of Nebraska history have seen the Populists’ support of Allen, 
along with their nomination in 1892 of Charles H. Van Wyck for governor, as 
representing an important shift in the party’s political strategy. Van Wyck was an 
antimonopolist and former reform Republican, a friend and political ally of Edward 
Rosewater.30 But in 1890, when Van Wyck was under consideration for the Populist 
gubernatorial nomination, his reform credentials had not impressed party managers. The 
New York native, they thought, was too wealthy and had been in politics far too long to
o 1
serve as standard-bearer of “a common people’s movement.” The nomination went to 
Powers, who in the general election made an excellent showing, but nevertheless came
28 Cherny, 34, 43; Watkins, 248.
29 Cherny, 43; Watkins, 248. According to Cherny, Allen was elected on the 16th ballot, when five 
Democrats “all went over to Allen.” Actually, on that ballot the Populists and all but five Democrats 
switched to Allen. It was on the 18th ballot that the five holdouts gave Allen their support. In addition to 
Watkins, see the Alliance [Nebraska] Herald. 10 Feb. 1893, Allen papers (hereafter AP), Nebraska State 
Historical Society (hereafter NSHS). All subsequent citations o f AP refer to the NSHS collection.
30 Olson, 210, 228-29; Cherny, 7.
31 Olson, 222.
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up short against Boyd.32 As a result, the Populist leadership determined that the party 
was not likely to succeed as a one-dimensional movement; its base of support would have 
to be broadened so as to extend beyond the discontented farmer. As always in politics, 
reaching out meant that the party had to become, or, at least, be perceived as having 
become, more moderate.
Thus came the nominations o f Van Wyck, Allen, and, in 1894, Silas A. Holcomb, 
a somewhat conservative former Democrat and now Populist candidate for governor. 
These moves had both ideological and class dimensions and were designed to expand the 
movement by admitting antimonopolists and other reform elements such as reform 
Republicans and silver Democrats. They were also aimed at eliciting increased support 
from professionals and businessmen of the middle class.
Allen happened to fall into both of these categories. William V. Allen was bom 
on 28 January 1847 at the “village” of Midway, in Madison County, Ohio.34 His father, a 
Methodist minister and, apparently, a missionary to the relocated Cherokee Indians, died
32 Ibid., 222-223, 226; Cherny, 39. Cherny notes that virtually all Populist candidates in 1890 were 
from the Alliance. See p. 50.
33 Olson, 228-29; Cherny, 50. Historian Karel D. Bicha, apparently taking his cue from David S. 
Trask, has a different view on the identity o f Nebraska’s early Populist supporters. The state’s “rural 
Populists,” he writes, “do not seem to have” come “from the ranks o f depression— vulnerable wheat 
farmers.” Bicha does not, however, explain who did support the party in rural Nebraska. See Bicha, 
Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism (Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1976), 82.
34 William V. Allen Pension File, see various documents and affidavits (National Archives, 
Washington D.C.); Biographical Directory o f the American Congress. 1774-1971. document 92-8, 92nd 
Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1971), 509. According to the first source, Midway was later called 
Sedalia. For the “village” quotation, see campaign booklet, n,d, but probably 1917, AP. Contemporary 
newspaper accounts and later biographical sketches o f Allen’s life contain much conflicting and erroneous 
information. There would be no useful purpose in dwelling on the errors and inconsistencies, but a few of  
the more notable ones will be pointed out. Citations to newspapers in the Allen manuscript collection refer 
to often-undated clippings.
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• • 1 C  #when William was ten months old. His death, according to one account, left the family
l/r t
“in poor circumstances.” Within a few years Allen acquired a stepfather, who, like 
William’s father, was also a Methodist minister.37 The stepfather was also a farmer and, 
according to Allen, an active abolitionist who employed the family home as a post on the
• o oUnderground Railroad.
I Q
The family lived what was probably a fairly typical “pioneer existence.” When 
the younger Allen was seven, his family moved to a farm near Nevada, Iowa.40 Owing to 
the stepfather’s occupation, the family moved frequently, but apparently remained in
35 For Allen’s father as a Methodist minister, see Watkins, 494; Ida Hinman, The Washington 
Sketch Book: A Society Souvenir. Supplement (Washington, D.C.: Hartman & Cadick, Printer, 1895), 54. 
This information, along with the timing o f the elder Allen’s death, is in a biographical account o f W.V. 
Allen that ran in a number o f Nebraska and Iowa newspapers, including the Randolph [Nebraska] Times.
10 Feb. 1893, AP. On Allen’s father as a missionary, see Hinman, 5, 54, and the 1917 campaign pamphlet, 
AP. That Allen’s father died when William was ten months old is supported by documents in Allen’s 
pension file, National Archives. According to Mittie Young Scott, an early student o f Allen’s career, 
William’s father, “Samuel Adams” (she had a more famous historical figure on her mind; William and his 
father shared surnames) died on 4 Dec. 1847. Scott lists three sources in support o f this, none o f which 
contain this date. The date, however, may be accurate, for Scott apparently interviewed several members o f  
Allen’s family in the course o f her research. See Scott’s “The Life and Political Career o f William Vincent 
Allen” (M.A. thesis, University o f Nebraska, 1927), 3. Scott’s study is the only effort at a history o f  
Allen’s political career.
36 Randolph Times. 10 Feb. 1893, AP.
37 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1; Allen pension file, National Archives.
38 Albert Shaw, “William V. Allen: Populist. A Character Sketch and Interview,” Review of  
Reviews 10 (July 1894): 32-33; London [Ohio] Times. 23 Mar. 1893, AP; John D. Hicks, “Allen, William 
Vincent,” in Allen Johnson, ed., Dictionary o f American Biography, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s - 
Sons, 1928), 214.
39 Lincoln Call. 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Hicks, “Allen,” 214.
40 Watkins, 494; 1917 campaign pamphlet, AP.
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Iowa. Allen attended various public schools, and at some point, worked as a farm 
laborer.41
In 1861, the fourteen-year old Allen attempted to sign up with the Union army,
but being below the minimum age requirement of eighteen was turned down.42 A year
later however, Allen, then five feet ten inches tall, succeeded in getting into the Thirty-
second Iowa Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Perhaps because of his youth, Allen did not
rise above private. Nonetheless, one of his last assignments, as a “guard and courier” for
his brigade commander, a Brigadier General, was apparently considered something of an
honor.43 Thirty years later Allen told an interviewer that his military service was “the
better part of my education.”44 Whatever else he may have gained from it, his military
experience seems to have inculcated in Allen an enormous measure of self-assuredness,
one of his most conspicuous traits in the Senate. Allen stated that, during the war
I learned to estimate men by what they are, not by what they profess to be. 
Without any boasting or bravado, I can say that no man inspires in me any 
fear or awe. The fact that he may make this or that pretense or profession never 
effects me in the least, and this quality of self-possession and sense of being
41 1917 campaign pamphlet, AP; Sioux City Journal, 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Lincoln Call, n.d. but 
probably 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1; Shaw, 33. In his profile o f Allen, 
Shaw wrote that “it seems that [Allen’s] stepfather did not live very long after the removal o f the family to 
Iowa.” Actually Samual J. Gossard lived until 1900; he died on June 30 at age seventy-eight. See Shaw, 
33; Affidavit o f Mrs. Malvina R. Leach, Allen pension file, National Archives; Stephen Norris Fellows, 
History o f the Upper Iowa Conference o f the Methodist Episcopal Church. 1856-1906 (Cedar Rapids,
Iowa: Laurence Press Co., 1907), 168, volume in the Upper Iowa University archives.
42 Sioux City Journal. 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Shaw, 33; Watkins, 494.
43 Sioux City Journal, 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1 ; 1917 
campaign pamphlet, AP; Allen pension file, National Archives; Shaw, 33; Hicks, “Allen,” 214. The history 
o f the Thirty-second Regiment is told in John Scott, Story o f the Thirty Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers 
(Nevada, Iowa: self-published, 1896). The book contains a reprint o f Allen’s account o f a battle in which 
he took part. See ibid., 156-61.
44 Shaw, 36.
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ready for an emergency is...due to my army experience. Before the war was 
ended the weaklings were sifted out, and I was in contact with men who were 
serious and who were virile. It was great experience for a boy.45
Upon his discharge from the army in August 1865, Allen returned to Iowa, where
he enrolled at Upper Iowa University in Fayette.46 While there, Allen did some public
47school teaching.
But he grew impatient. His ambition since boyhood was to become a lawyer, so 
about one year into his college career, Allen dropped out of school and began his legal 
training 48 At West Union, Iowa, Allen studied law under future congressman L.L. 
Ainsworth and in 1869 was admitted to the bar.49 In 1870 Allen married Blanche Mott, a 
recent Upper Iowa student.50 From 1870 to 1874, he practiced law at Fayette, Oconto, 
Wisconsin, and West Union, Iowa.51 In 1874 Allen returned to Ackley, Iowa where, in
45 Ibid., 36.
46 Allen pension file, National Archives.
47 Shaw, 33. During these years Allen’s places o f residence included Nashua, Iowa (1865-1866) for 
“a few months,” and Fredericksburg, Iowa “the following winter.” See Allen pension file, National 
Archives.
48 Shaw, 33; Lincoln Call, 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Watkins, 494; Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 
1893, 1.
49 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1; 1917 campaign pamphlet, AP; Watkins, 494; 
“Allen, William Vincent,” The National Cyclopaedia o f American Biography, 1st ed., 1907. Ainsworth, an 
Iowa Democrat, served in congress from 1875-77. Guide to Congress. 4th ed. (Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc., 1991), Appendix B, p. 4-B.
50 1917 campaign pamphlet, AP; Catalogue o f the Officers and Students o f  Upper Iowa University. 
editions for 1860-62, p. 16 and 1867-68, p. 15, in the archives at UIU. For a flattering though brief 
discussion o f Mrs. Allen, see Hinman, 5 (supplement). Another brief introduction to her, along with a list 
of the Allen children, is in Winona Evans Reeves, The Blue Book o f Nebraska Women (Mexico, Missouri: 
Missouri Printing & Engraving Co., 1916), 12.
51 “Men o f the Hour,” flyer, n.d., AP; Allen pension file, National Archives; advertisement for law 
firm o f Rickel & Allen, at Fayette, Fayette County Iowa, in Catalogue o f  the Officers and Students o f the
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1878, antimonopolists and Democrats combined to nominate him for congress in Iowa’s
c'y # #  ^ ^
fourth district. It was a nomination that, Allen later claimed, “came to me entirely 
unsought, and was given to me more in a complimentary sense on account of my well 
known anti-monopoly sentiments.” Allen made the race but was soundly defeated by 
his Republican opponent.54
c  c
In 1884 Allen moved to Madison, Nebraska. On one occasion, after he had 
lived in Madison for many years, Allen explained why he had refused numerous job 
offers he claimed to have received from law firms in New York, Chicago, Omaha, and 
elsewhere. “I am of the common people,” Allen said, “and I prefer to spend my days on 
earth among them.”56
He may have preferred to live among common folk, but Allen was also ambitious. 
When he initially planned his relocation to Madison, Allen conjectured that in Nebraska
Upper Iowa University, edition for 1871-1872. According to the foregoing sources, Allen spent two years 
in Oconto and one at West Union.
52 Allen pension file, National Archives.
53 Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. One paper reported that the coalition was composed o f Republican 
antimonopolists and Democrats. See the Lincoln Call, n.d., but probably 8 Feb. 1893, AP.
54 Congressional Guide to U.S. Elections. 3rd ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 
1036. Congressional Directory. 46th Cong., 3rd sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), 22. 
A.E. Sheldon incorrectly refers to this as “a close election.” The Republican candidate received 60.8% of  
the vote, the Greenback candidate 20.4%, and Allen 18.8%. Bicha reports that Allen was “a reform 
Republican congressional candidate.” In fact, Allen was the candidate o f the Democratic Party. Sheldon, 
Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1931), 492; Bicha, Western 
Populism, 44; Scott, 10-11.
JJ Watkins, 494; Allen pension file, National Archives. Allen made Madison his permanent home. 
See the Madison Star-Mail, 25 Jan. 1924.
56 Quoted in Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People, 492.
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57“there is a chance for me to get to the front...where I propose to be before many years.”
In Nebraska Allen set up a law practice, purchased a farm, and became active in the state
co # # #
Republican party. In 1886 Allen was chairman of the Madison County Republican 
convention, and in 1890 served as a delegate to the GOP state convention in which, 
according to one account, he “played a prominent role.”59
Politically, Allen displayed a reluctance to identify with any party. In 1893 for 
instance, Allen claimed that, up to 1878, he usually sided with the Republicans, but that 
he was “always [understood to be] an independent.”60 In the presidential election of 
1876, Allen voted for Democrat Samuel J. Tilden.61 Later, Allen was defensive about his 
place on a Democratic ticket in 1878. When he discussed the matter with a reporter in 
1893, Allen seemed to downplay his prior affiliation with the Democrats, stressing his
57 Golden, Colorado Globe, n.d., AP.
58 Omaha World-Herald. 8 Feb. 1893, 1; Madison Mail. 25 July 1902; Madison Star-Mail 
(Historical Edition), 19 Mar. 1925. After his arrival in Madison, Allen had a brief law partnership with Jim 
Brown. In 1885 Allen entered into partnership with John S. Robinson, who had also moved to town the 
year before. In 1886, Willis E. Reed, a teacher, began his legal training at Allen & Robinson, and in 1888 
the firm became Allen, Robinson & Reed. So it remained until 1891, when Allen withdrew to become 
district judge. Robinson later served two terms in congress (1899-1903) and Reed served two terms as 
Nebraska’s Attorney General. Both men were Democrats. See also the Official Congressional Directory, 
56th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1902), 64; 57-2, 64; 58-2, 68.
59 Sheldon, “Nebraskans I Have Known,” 193-194. Nebraska State Journal. 8 Feb. 1893. See also 
Shaw, 36; Madison Star. 21 July 1899, AP; and the Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. Allen may have been a 
delegate more than once. According to the Sioux City Journal (8 Feb. 1893), Allen “was frequently a 
member o f the state conventions.” On another matter, Bicha writes that, in 1890, Allen “was instrumental 
in the campaign o f the victorious Republican gubernatorial candidate.” There are two problems here. First, 
Bicha’s source for this information does not claim that Allen played a central role in the campaign; the 
word she (Mittie Scott) uses to describe his role is “active.” Second, the Republican candidate was not 
victorious in that election; the Democrat, James Boyd, was. See Scott, 11; Olson, 226.
60 London (Ohio) Times, 23 Mar. 1893, AP.
61 Ibid.; Omaha Bee. 8 Feb. 1893; Lincoln Call, n.d. but probably 8 Feb. 1893, AP.
•  fO  • •  •antimonopolism. As for his former Republican sympathies, in 1894 he told a magazine 
editor that “I was never a radical party man and am not to-day.” He believed that “a party 
should be held no more sacred than a man’s shoes or garments, and that whenever it fails 
to subserve the purposes of good government a man should abandon it as cheerfully as he 
dispenses with his worn-out clothes.” The only good reason to become involved with a 
political party was if its ascendancy to power would bring about improved government. 
Thus for Allen a party had no attraction beyond its utility in facilitating that end. In an 
era characterized by fierce political partisanship and strong party loyalties, this was an 
unconventional attitude.64
Allen’s political views prior to his conversion to Populism are difficult to discern, 
but it is evident that Allen later took pride in his support for antimonopoly. Allen told 
the Omaha Bee that he was “constitutionally an anti-monopolist.” He related, moreover, 
that he was among the reform Republicans who promoted antimonopolist sentiment 
within the GOP, and who worked to “loosen the grasp of the corporation on the” party.65
62 Omaha Bee. 8 Feb., 1893. Allen may have felt a strong need to distance himself from his 1870s 
involvement with the Democrats. On 23 Mar. 1893, Allen was quoted by a newspaper as saying that he had 
run for congress at the behest o f “independent Republicans and anti-monopolists, the one nominating me 
and the other indorsing [sic].” He did not mention the Democrats. It is possible that Allen misspoke or was 
misquoted. See the London [Ohio] Times. 23 Mar. 1893, AP.
63 Quoted in Shaw, 34.
64 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order. 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 27-28; 
Robert D. Marcus, Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880-1896 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), 3-21. As George H. Mayer notes, in the Gilded Age “[p]artisan loyalty was so 
strong that angry voters organized third parties rather than co-operate with the opposition.” See his The 
Republican Party. 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 172.
65 Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. Allen told the Bee that he was among those GOP members, “who with 
General Leese sought to introduce” the party to the antimonopoly concept. William Leese, Attorney 
General during part o f the 1880s, was, like Rosewater and Van Wyck, a “maverick” Republican. See
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But Allen became disenchanted with the Republicans. He opposed the McKinley 
Tariff and Force bills of 1890, and grew increasingly frustrated with the movement of the 
GOP “toward centralization and monopoly control.” 66 Allen quit the organization
fH“When it became evident to me that the corporations had captured the party.”
Sometime between August 1890 and the fall of 1891, Allenjoined the People’s 
Party. When the Populists appealed the 1890 state election results, Allen worked on the 
legal team representing John Powers, the narrowly defeated Independent gubernatorial 
candidate. The exact timing of Allen’s party conversion is not clear, but Nebraska’s 
major Republican newspapers pointed to Allen’s affiliation with Powers as a central 
factor in precipitating his turn to Populism. It is told, wrote the Nebraska State Journal.
Olson, 215-16. For newspaper references to Allen as part o f the anti-“machine,” antimonopoly faction o f 
the party see the Lincoln Call, n.d. but probably 8 Feb. 1893, AP; Sioux City Journal. 8 Feb. 1893, AP; 
Alliance Herald. 10 Feb. 1893, AP.
66 New York Times, 8 Feb. 1893, 4; Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893 (for quotation). The Force bill, a 
Republican effort to enfranchise southern Blacks, called for increased governmental supervision o f federal 
elections in the South. The bill passed the House but died in the Senate. The reason for Allen’s opposition 
is not known, but it is probable that the sectional politics o f silver was a factor. Like other western silver 
inflationists, Allen may have seen the measure as, among other things, an attempt by the Republicans to 
expand support in the South for their ideology o f a gold-centered and relatively contracted money supply. 
See Jeannette Paddock Nichols, “The Politics and Personalities o f Silver Repeal in the United States 
Senate,” American Historical Review 41 (Oct. 1935): 32. See also Donald R. Matthews, Yeas and Nays: 
Normal Decision-Making in the United States House o f Representatives (New York: Wiley, 1975), 112-13; 
and Mayer, 227-30. Moreover, as Allen was, as will be shown in chapter four, quite racist, it is reasonable 
to assume that he was, like most northern whites, indifferent, or perhaps even hostile to the idea o f Black 
political equality. The 1892 national platform of the People’s Party (the Omaha Platform) denounced the 
protectionist tariff, and a resolution passed by the Omaha Convention read that “we demand a free ballot 
and a fair count in all elections, and pledge ourselves to secure it to every legal voter without federal 
intervention.” John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s 
Party (1931; reprint, Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1961), Appendix F, 439-44 (quotation is on 
443).
67 Ibid.
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that it was during the Powers-Boyd appeal battle that Allen “drank the drink that made 
him a Populist.”68
He rose quickly in the new party. In the fall of 1891 Allen was elected, on the 
Populist ticket, Judge of Nebraska’s ninth judicial district.69 In 1892 he chaired the
70People’s Party state convention at which the party moved to broaden its appeal. Allen 
was still on the bench when, in January 1893, his party summoned him to Lincoln and 
made him its newest senate hopeful.
With the Republican plurality in the legislature, and the determination of the 
major parties to elevate one of their own to the senate, the Populists would not get their
71 • • •  • • •man elected easily. The battle led to frenetic political maneuvering within the older
68 Nebraska State Journal. 8 Feb. 1893. See also the Alliance Herald. 10 Feb. 1893. AP; Omaha 
Daily Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. For claims that Allenjoined the Populists “in 1890,” or during the 1890 
“campaign,” see Hicks, “Allen,” 214; Sioux City Journal, 8 Feb. 1893, AP; World-Herald, 15 Feb. 1893, 4 
(quote by C.J. Rundell); Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893; The Commoner, n.d. but during Feb. 1983 (interview 
with M.O. Reed, brother o f Allen's ’former law partner), AP. Allen himself was inconsistent when 
recounting his party change. On 8 Feb. 1893 he told the Bee it had occurred “four years ago.” On 23 Mar.
1893, he explained to the London [Ohio] Times that it happened “about three years ago.” In his July 1894 
interview with Albert Shaw (p. 34), Allen stated that he made the move during “the campaign o f 1890.” 
Addison Sheldon did not write, as Lawrence Goodwyn claims, that Allen switched to the People’s Party in 
1891. Sheldon may have meant what Goodwyn understands him to say, but one cannot be sure o f that, 
given Sheldon’s phraseology: “The Farmers’ Alliance revolution o f 1890...caught” Allen “up in its reform 
wave.. .and elected him” to the bench as a Populist in “the November election o f 1891.” Karel Bicha writes 
that Allen did not become a Populist “until late in 1891.” However, the source to which he credits this 
information points to 1890 as the year o f Allen’s political conversion. Goodwyn and Bicha use the timing 
of Allen’s conversion as evidence for what they see as his minimal devotion to the cause o f reform. See 
Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 668; Bicha, 44, 136; M.Y. Scott, 11-12.
69 World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1; Watkins, 494; Biographical Directory o f the American 
Congress, 509.
70 Madison Star-Mail, 12 Jan. 1924; Sheldon, “Nebraskans,” 194-95; Biographical Directory o f the 
American Congress, 509; James [London, England] Gazette, 15 Oct. 1893, AP.
71 The Nebraska Senate Journal, 23rd sess., 1893, p. I l l ,  and the Nebraska House Journal, 23rd sess., 
1893, pages vii-ix, list the total membership o f the legislature as 62 Republicans, 53 Independents, 17 
Democrats, and one “Ind. Democrat.” See also note 27 above.
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organizations and fruitless negotiations between them. The scrambling on the 
Democratic side was, in retrospect, rather pointless, for given their lack of unity, success 
would have required a near-miracle. But the extraordinary seemed possible for leading 
Democratic contenders such as Governor Boyd and Congressman William Jennings 
Bryan, both of whom had a respectable following among Populists, and for J. Sterling 
Morton, who hoped that the Republicans might be induced to support a conservative in 
order to prevent the election of a Populist radical. But after four weeks of balloting, the 
Republicans and the Populists remained firmly committed to their own candidates, 
thereby shutting out the Democrats, who, characteristically, remained hopelessly divided 
for the duration of the proceedings. Any possibility of a Republican-Populist coalition 
was obviated three weeks into the balloting, when the Republicans, who had been unable 
to unite behind incumbent Senator Algernon S. Paddock, abandoned him in favor of John
79M. Thurston, lead attorney for the Union Pacific Railroad.
Circumstances made for Populist-Democrat cooperation. In addition to their 
common antipathy toward the GOP, the two organizations were compatible on the 
important currency issue. Bryan, a rising star among silver spokesmen, controlled eleven 
Democratic legislators, all of whom were probably pro-silver. A friend of Allen’s, Bryan
70
endorsed his candidacy and appealed to Democratic legislators to support him. On
72 Watkins, 248; Sheldon, “Nebraskans,” 195-96; Coletta, “Bryan and the Senatorial Election o f 
1893,” 189-99.
73 Coletta, 188-91, 198, 200-01.
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February 4, three days prior to the final vote, the Omaha World-Herald, the state’s 
leading Democratic newspaper, came out for Allen, describing him as “able, honest and 
distinguished.” More to the point, his election would prevent the Republicans from
• 1A. • • • •taking the seat. Two days later, the Democratic National Committee, hoping to ensure 
a Democratic plurality in the United States Senate, also called for Allen’s election. On 
February 7, after a month of wrangling and seventeen ballots, five intransigent Cleveland
• 7 ^  • •Democrats finally capitulated. Their votes made Allen the first non-Republican to be
7 fselected United States Senator from Nebraska.
As the Omaha Bee’s Edward Rosewater observed, Allen’s election inspired “a 
general expression of satisfaction.” Adherents of the major parties, of course, wanted 
one of their own, and, the editor admitted, the businessmen among them in particular 
were likely to lament the Populist victory because of the new party’s “radical and
74 World-Herald (Eve.), 4 Feb. 1893, 4. Years later, Richard L. Metcalfe related that, as a young 
reporter for the World-Herald, he had convinced editor Gilbert Hitchcock to give Allen the paper’s 
endorsement. At the time Metcalfe, sensing that Allen would ultimately prevail in the election, told his 
boss that their paper “might just as well get the credit.” Given that Metcalfe was a Bryanite, as well as a 
future editor o f the World-Herald and Bryan’s Commoner, his utilitarian view o f the election dynamics is 
understandable. That said, it should be noted that Metcalfe always greatly admired Allen and later assisted 
his campaign for a district judgeship in 1911. See comments by Sheldon and Metcalfe in Sheldon’s 
“Nebraskans,” 204-06. See also Metcalfe’s “A Glowing Tribute to Senator Allen,” unidentified newspaper 
article, 4 Oct. 1911, AP. That many prominent Democrats were in favor o f Allen’s election is indicated in 
the World-Herald for 5 Feb. 1893, 1. See especially the comments o f Governor Boyd, J.S. Robinson 
(Allen’s former law partner), state Representative G.A. Luikart o f Madison county, and former state 
committeeman T.F. Memminger.
75 Coletta, “Bryan and the Senate Election o f 1893,” 198-99; Watkins, 248; Randolph Times, 10 
Feb. 1893, AP. See also the Nebraska House Journal, 23rd sess., 1893, p. 362; Nebraska Senate Journal, 
23rd sess., 1893, pp. 245, 254, 266, 290-92.
76 Olson, 143, 209; New York Times. 8 Feb. 1893, 4, After the seventeenth ballot, Allen, with 65 
votes, was one vote shy o f a majority (the legislature had 133 members, 2 o f whom -  one Democrat and 
one Republican -  did not vote). The final total was Allen 70, Paddock 59 (the GOP had returned to him as 
a courtesy), and others 2. See the Nebraska State Journal, 8 Feb. 1893; Sioux City Journal, 8 Feb., AP; 
Alliance Herald, 10 Feb., AP; Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People, 728.
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eccentric views...on the currency and other economic issues.” But according to 
Rosewater, such “apprehension” was unwarranted. Nebraska’s newest senator was no 
“hare-brained visionary or wiid-eyed revolutionist.” Rather, Allen was not only judicious 
and patriotic, but also “well balanced, broad-minded and conservative.” Perhaps even 
more impressive in Rosewater’s view was the fact that Allen had won “without incurring 
any obligation to corporations or special interests.” Thus, the GOP should in no way
• • • 77consider his election “an irretrievable disaster.”
Although some Republicans expressed their antipathy toward both rival parties, 
as well as concerns over the cooperation between the two, most agreed that Allen was a 
good senatorial choice. The editor of the O’Neill Frontier thought that Allen, despite his 
misguided party allegiance, was in all respects a “a good man,” the best possible choice 
among the Populists. If the new senator had to be a Populist, the paper was “most
7 0
awfully glad it is Judge Allen.” The Crete Vidette felt the same way and opined that 
Allen was “so much better than the general run of [Populist] leaders that the Vidette
• 70 • •marvels how they came to select him.” The paper emphasized Allen’s erstwhile 
Republicanism, as did the Lincoln News, which before the election had staunchly 
opposed Allen, but now editorialized that a former Republican “cannot be altogether 
wrong.” Although Allen was a Populist, he was “not a cracked brain calamity howler,” 
but “a man of more than ordinary intelligence” who would make an “honest” effort in his
77 Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893.
78 O’Neill Frontier, quoted in the Omaha World-Herald, 13 Feb. 1893, 4.
79 Crete Vidette. quoted in the Bee, 11 Feb. 1893.
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new position.80 The Ashland Gazette praised Allen in terms that were already quite 
familiar when it judged him “a fair minded man” who “is not a partisan politician.”81 
Church Howe, a prominent representative who had once sponsored an anti-Alliance 
resolution in the state senate, called Allen the “best” choice among the Independents, and 
prophesied that he would assume “a prominent position” on Capitol Hill.82
On the Democratic side, some complaints were heard from anti-Populists, 
unreconciled partisans, and the Cleveland wing, but most comments about Allen were 
akin to those of the Wayne Democrat. Its editor had no use for “radical populists,” but 
saw in Allen a “conservative” who was “incorruptible and honest,” the “peer of any man” 
previously elected to the senate from Nebraska. Most of the praise heaped on Allen by 
the Democratic press was effusive and unqualified. The Plattsmouth Journal thought
80 Lincoln News, quoted in the Omaha Bee. 10 Feb. 1893. The News had, prior to the election, 
condemned Democratic-Populist fusion and added charges o f an evil “conspiracy” concocted by Allen and 
Boyd. See the Lincoln News for 6 Feb. 1893, AP.
81 Ashland Gazette. See additional positive commentary by the Madison Chronicle and Niobrara 
Pioneer, all quoted in the Omaha Bee, 11 Feb. 1893.
82 Quoted in Nebraska State Journal, 8 Feb. 1893. On Howe, see Olson, 218. For Republican 
commentary which denounced Populism but did not express disapproval o f Allen, see the Milwaukee 
Sentinel, quoted in the World-Herald, 13 Feb. 1893, 4; the Minneapolis Journal, from which distinct 
quotations appear in the World-Herald, 10 Feb. 1893, 4; and Nebraska State Journal, 13 Feb. 1893. For 
papers that disapproved o f Allen because he was a Populist, see the Sioux City Journal and the Chicago 
Journal, both quoted in the Nebraska State Journal, 10 Feb. 1893. For opposition to Allen because o f  the 
coalitional basis o f his support, see the half-dozen Republican newspapers which condemned fusion and are 
quoted in the World-Herald, 10 Feb., 4; and the Omaha Bee, Feb. 10 and 11.
83 Wayne Democrat, quoted in the World-Herald, 13 Feb. 1893, 4. For another expression o f this 
sentiment see George L. Miller to Arthur Pue Gorman, 14 Feb. 1893, AP. For an instance in which Allen 
was disapproved o f because he was not Democratic enough, see the Nebraska City Press, quoted in the 
Omaha Bee, 12 Feb. 1893. For a mixed but mostly favorable opinion see the Nebraska City News, quoted 
On 10 Feb. in both the Bee and the World-Herald, 4. At least one Democratic paper staunchly opposed 
Allen. The Plattsmouth News dismissed him as a political opportunist who made a habit o f  switching 
political parties whenever it would advance his political career. Quoted in the World-Herald, 10 Feb. 1893, 
4.
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Allen “as sound a man as” could be found in Nebraska,84 a figure widely known for 
“ability and rectitude of character, who enjoys the confidence and respect of men [of] all 
parties to an unusual extent.” Not to be outflanked by the Republicans, some of whom 
had pointed to Allen’s earlier affiliation with the GOP, the Journal noted Allen’s 
“democratic antecedents.” Allen’s victory was “most gratifying,” and promised to 
provide the common people with “renewed hope and courage in their battle against
or
monopoly and the money god.”
On the night of the election, the Omaha World-Herald, whose earlier support of 
Allen probably aided his victory, called him “a splendid specimen of physical and 
intellectual manhood,” and reported that “All who meet him are strongly impressed with
o/*
his many excellent traits of character and his modest and manly demeanor.” Three days 
later the paper denounced the Republican party as corrupt and lawless and charged that it 
was controlled by “a gigantic ring” in the interests of the corporations. The World- 
Herald maintained that it was “doubtful if any other state in the union has suffered as 
Nebraska has from corporate rule and ‘peanut’ politics.” But in recent years the people 
had begun to make some political headway against the GOP, and Allen’s election marked 
the “crowning victory of the great reform crusade.” “It means,” the paper continued,
84 Plattsmouth Journal, quoted in the Omaha Bee, 10 Feb. 1893.
85 Plattmsouth Journal. 7 Feb. 1893, AP (also quoted in the World-Herald for 10 Feb., 4). For 
statements that Allen’s political background was primarily Democratic, see the comments o f G.B. Pray to 
the Des Moines Leader, quoted in the World-Herald for 10 Feb. 1893, 4; the reaction o f the Leader itself, 
quoted in the Nebraska State Journal for 10 Feb.; and the criticism o f Allen by the Plattsmouth News, 
quoted in the World-Herald for 10 Feb., 4.
86 Omaha World-Herald. 8 Feb. 1893, 1.
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“that the toilers have one more and the corporations one less representative in 
the...American house of lords.”87
Populists were ecstatic. They believed that in Allen they had, as John Hicks put 
it, a “symbol of that unimpeachable respectability they craved for themselves and their 
party but could scarcely hope to attain.” In the opinion of one independent state 
representative, Allen “towers above his fellowmen both intellectually and physically, as
on
the giant oak above the surrounding forest.” Editor Thomas H. Tibbies, who would be 
the Populist vice-presidential candidate in 1904, wrote that Allen “will walk into the 
millionaire club” at the nation’s capital “from the midst of the common people without a 
stain on his name, and [will be] the peer in intellect of the very best of them.”90 S.C. 
Fairchild, state lecturer for the National Farmer’s Alliance and Industrial Union, 
characterized the senator-elect as “an honest man, the noblest work of God.”91
87 Omaha World-Herald. 11 Feb. 1893, 4. Four other Democratic papers sharing the World- 
Herald’s high opinion o f Allen are quoted in the Omaha Bee for 10 Feb. See also the comments o f John T. 
Lindsay (a Bryan supporter) in the World-Herald (Eve.), 10 Feb. 1893, 4. Much positive commentary is 
also found in the statements o f over thirty Democrats and Republicans in the World-Herald for 5 Feb., 9. 
See the articles titled “They Favor Judge Allen,” and “What Omaha People Say.”
88 Hicks, The Populist Revolt 283.
89 Nebraska State Journal. 8 Feb. 1893. In his profile o f Allen published the following year, editor 
Albert Shaw wrote that Allen “measures about six feet and three inches, and weighs two hundred and thirty 
pounds, not an ounce o f  which appears superfluous. He has a broad and massive frame that supports a 
large Websterian head, and he stands as straight as a pine tree....His spectacles add something o f a benign, 
professorial aspect to a countenance that otherwise might seem severe in repose.” Shaw, 32.
90 Omaha World-Herald, 11 Feb. 1893, 4; Sheldon, “Nebraskans,” 202.
91 Omaha World-Herald. 6 Feb. 1893, 4. See also the comments o f the “Hon.” S.M. Elder in the 
World-Herald for 5 Feb., 1. This Clay County resident is identified as a Democrat, but his remarks suggest 
that he was an Independent.
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The independent press was just as effusive in its praise o f Allen’s mental and
Q9moral stature. One paper described him as “brainy, honest and honorable.” Another
AT
insisted that “as a man of honor and integrity he stands in the front ranks.” In O’Neill, 
Nebraska, where Allen was well known among local lawyers, the Sun called him “an 
exemplary fine man” and reported that townspeople spoke of Allen’s legal and juridical 
skills “in the most flattering terms.”94 In the estimation of the Oakland Independent it 
would have been difficult to top Allen as a choice for senator. He was “quiet and 
unassuming, but dignified and firm.” According to the paper, Allen was a superior 
“presiding officer and parliamentarian,” a judge who was held in high esteem by court 
participants on all sides, “while the ‘common people,’ for whom he ever has a good word 
and a pleasant smile, almost worship him.”95 And the Alliance-Independent, the state 
party organ, noted Allen’s “large and well stored brain,” and agreed with those observers 
who touted him as the best alternative from within the Independent fold.96
Most Populists undoubtedly agreed with Tibbies, who saw Allen’s election as a 
glorious triumph in the war against political corruption, and with the independent 
legislator who asserted that it marked “the greatest victory of the people over the
92 Holdredge Progress, quoted in the Omaha Bee for 11 Feb. 1893.
93 Auburn Granger, quoted in the Bee, 11 Feb. 1893.
94 O’Neill Sun, n.d. but during Feb. 1893, AP.
95 Oakland Independent, quoted in the Omaha Bee, 10 Feb. 1893.
96 Alliance-Independent, 9 Feb. 1893. See also the Beatrice Tribune, excerpted in the World- 
Herald, 10 Feb. 1893, 4; Madison County Herald, n.d. but during Feb. 1893, AP.
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corporations” in Nebraska’s history.97 Quoting Wendall Phillips, who, two decades 
earlier, remarked that “the brush of Jay Gould’s coat tail would knock over the whole 
Nebraska legislature,” Tibbies maintained that the unceasing depravity of the latter had 
caused Nebraskans to carry a burden of “shame” ever since. But the Populists’ senate 
victory obviated the need for such feeling. “Now we can stand up and face the world 
while we say that all the wealth of all the corporations cannot bribe the Nebraska 
legislature.” A different sort of political creature untainted by pestilent corporate 
influence, Allen would be able to devote all of his energies to lawmaking. After all, 
Tibbies speculated, he would have no control over federal appointments, and “no banks,
QO
no railroads, no syndicates, no trusts to manage.”
At a time when many people were convinced that the United States government 
was evolving into a puppet of big business, and as one writer has put it “that Congress 
was filled with corporate agents—’railway Senators’ and Trust representatives,” the 
widespread perception that Allen secured his new office by honest means was of no small 
import.99 On the day Allen was elected, the World-Herald commented that as a man of 
rather small means whose material possessions were worth “no more than $5,000,” it was 
“simply astounding” that he had emerged victorious against the combined forces of
97 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 11 Feb. 1893, 4; Nebraska State Journal, 8 Feb. 1893 (For 
quotation).
98 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.). 11 Feb. 1893,4.
99 Peck, 268.
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powerful corporate and seasoned political opposition.100 Allen was, according to the 
Bee, a rarity, having become a senator “without scrambling for the office, without 
expending a dollar, and without incurring any obligation to corporations or special 
interests.”101 The Independent Madison County Herald, suggested that Allen’s election
1 09was “a case of [the] ‘office seeking the man.’”
In addition to the pride they felt in their new senator’s political and personal 
virtue and the long-overdue victory over electoral corruption, Independents heralded 
Allen’s election for yet another reason: it marked, in their estimation, the start of a 
brighter future for the oppressed common man. As one Independent legislator 
confidently explained, “better” times lie ahead.103 Tibbies predicted that Allen would 
become an important force “in the organization of that great industrial army that will 
make the homes of these vast plains more prosperous than the pen of Bellamy can 
depict.”104 C.J. Rundell of Wayne advised fellow Populists that, with the election 
victory over “corporation henchmen” in hand, they should now seek “greater 
achievements.” Rundell called for the conversion of more men like Allen to the Populist
100 Omaha World-Herald. 8 Feb. 1893, 1.
101 Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. A contemporary reported that Allen spent “$74.25” on the election, 
and speculated that it most likely was the “smallest sum by which a” current place in the senate was 
procured. This may refer to an election registration fee. See Frank Basil Tracy, “Rise and Doom o f  the 
Populist Party,” Forum 16 (Oct. 1893): 247.
102 Madison County Herald, n.d. but during Feb. 1893, AP. See also the Norfolk News 
(Republican), quoted in the Omaha Bee. 10 Feb. 1893; the selected comments o f state legislators in the 
Nebraska State Journal, 8 Feb. 1893; and Omaha World-Herald, 5 Feb. 1893, 9.
103 Nebraska State Journal. 8 Feb. 1893.
104 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.). 11 Feb. 1893,4.
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cause, so that “control of the republic” could be reclaimed from big business. “Then,” 
wrote Rundell, “like the abolitionists who lived to behold a former slave of Jefferson 
Davis occupying the arch-traitor’s seat in the United States senate, we can all say 
amen.”105
Allen saw his election as proof that Nebraskans wished “to inaugurate a new 
order of things.” His basic mission, as he interpreted it, was to work for “certain 
reforms” demanded by the citizenry. Although in the immediate aftermath of the 
election, Allen did not explain what changes he had in mind, he promised to toil 
scrupulously for the realization of needed reforms.106
Some of Allen’s other comments, however, doubtless suggested to 
contemporaries that his commitment to reform was weaker than the standard Populist 
line. In a brief acceptance speech to the legislature, Allen pledged to act “with caution 
and care, and the conservatism” appropriate to his new position.107 Later the same day he 
told a public audience that, because his actions would be connected in some measure to 
“the peace and welfare o f ’ Nebraska, he would do “nothing radical.” To each issue with
105 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 15 Feb. 1893, 4. See also Rundell’s comments in the same paper 
for 5 Feb. The latter issue identifies Rundell as a Democrat, but his quoted statements in the former suggest 
that he was a Populist. In addition, see the comments o f William L. Greene— who was, as was noted earlier 
in the text, the second o f three choices by the Populists during the election contest, and who later served 
two terms in congress (1897-1901)— quoted in the World-Herald. 8 Feb., 1; and, the opinion o f the 
Madison Reporter, quoted in the Omaha Bee for II Feb.
106 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1.
107 Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893.
39
which he would grapple, Allen intended to devote the “conservative thought that its 
magnitude requires.”
While Allen’s specific policy views prior to the beginning of his term are 
impossible to discern, two things are clear. First, Allen saw no contradiction in claiming 
that he was both a dedicated Populist and a political moderate. If he meant to legislate 
conservatively, he also reaffirmed, at least rhetorically, his commitment to Populism. On 
the very day of his election, Allen professed to be in complete accord with the Populist 
program, and, more specifically, with the party’s demands for free silver and an income 
tax.109 Ten weeks later, Allen remarked that his policy positions were most effectively 
articulated “in the words of the Omaha platform.”110
Second, Allen was, interestingly enough, somewhat pro-Cleveland. He felt 
“strong admiration” for the Democratic president, with whom he agreed in principle on 
the need for tariff reduction. In Allen’s view, tariff reform should not be radical, for if it 
were, he thought the American people would probably reject it. Allen even announced 
that, in everything pertaining to the structuring of the Senate, as well as in ratifying 
presidential appointments, he would act with the Democratic Party.111
108 Omaha World-Herald (Eve.), 8 Feb. 1893, 1.
109 Omaha Bee. 8 Feb. 1893.
110 London [Ohio] Times. 23 Mar. 1893, AP.
111 Ibid.; Omaha Bee, 8 Feb. 1893. While Allen favored incremental lowering o f tariff duties, he 
nevertheless wanted to see greater reductions than did Cleveland. How Allen initially handled the 
organization matter is not known, but in the 54th congress (1895-97) he joined his Populist senate 
colleagues in abstaining on the related votes. See Peter Argersinger, The Limits o f Agrarian Radicalism: 
Western Populism and American Politics (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1995), 216-217.
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Many newspaper editors thought that, as senator, Allen would ally himself with 
the Democrats on policy. Their reasoning was shaped by more than the fact that Allen 
liked Grover Cleveland. To begin with, there was Allen’s announced intent to approach 
his new duties conservatively. In addition, Democratic votes had helped Allen to victory. 
Many in the press therefore assumed that, in return for Democratic support, Allen had 
pledged to cooperate with the Democrats, at least on major issues.112 Moreover, Allen’s 
support for free silver and his friendship with Bryan suggested to many that Senator
i i i
Allen would act with the silver Democrats.
Allen would hold fast to his pro-silver convictions, but for those who hoped the 
new senator would be an ally of the Democratics, Allen would prove to be a huge 
disappointment.
112 Council Bluffs Globe, in Omaha World-Herald, 10 Feb. 1893, 4; Sioux City Journal, in World- 
Herald. 13 Feb., 4; Keamev Hub, in Nebraska State Journal. 10 Feb.
113 Chicago Mail and Chicago Inter Ocean, both excerpted in the Omaha World-Herald, 10 Feb. 
1893, 4; Norfolk Journal, in Omaha Bee, 11 Feb.; Boston Daily Globe, in World-Herald. 13 Feb., 4. Other 
observers did not believe that Allen had pledged himself to the Democrats. See the New York World, in 
the Omaha World-Herald, 13 Feb. 1893, 4; Lincoln Call, n.d. but during Feb. 1893, AP; Beatrice 
Democrat, in Omaha Bee, 11 Feb. According to Cherny, upon his nomination by the Populists Allen 
conferred with leaders o f the Bryan wing o f the Democratic Party, and assented to “work closely” with 
Bryan. Once elected, Allen expressed to Bryan his awareness that he owed his election to Bryan’s 
assistance “and that he would repay the debt in the future.” Robert W. Cherny, A Righteous Cause: The 
Life o f William Jennings Bryan (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), 43.
CHAPTER TWO 
The Special Session of the Fifty-third Congress: 
Repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 1893
Coming from the ranks of a new party ... the pious of the [old 
parties] drew upon their Bible treasures for, "What will this 
babbler say?" But it was immediately evident that he came not 
to "sit at the feet of Gamaliel," but to "tread upon his toes." 
Thomas W. Tipton, former United States Senator from 
Nebraska (1867-1875), commenting on William V. Allen's 
early weeks in Congress.1
William Allen's swearing-in took place in the Senate on March 4, 1893. As was 
customary, the assumption of a new presidential administration on the same day brought 
forth the concurrent start of a brief, introductory Senate session (five weeks in this case), 
the main business of which was the consideration of cabinet nominees. During the
1 Thomas Weston Tipton, Forty Years o f Nebraska: At Home and in Congress (Lincoln: Nebraska 
State Historical Society, 1902), 362. For useful observations on congressional Populists’ antipathy for 
elitist snobbery, see Peter H. Argersinger, “No Rights on this Floor: Third Parties and the 
Institutionalization o f Congress,” in Argersinger, The Limits o f Agrarian Radicalism: Western Populism 
and American Politics (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1995), 213-45. See specifically 231-32.
2 Congressional Record (hereafter CRT 53rd Cong., special sess., 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 1; 
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Congress, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1991), 135A. The session ran from 4 March until 15 April. Allen chose Democrat Thomas F. Memminger 
to be his private secretary in Washington. Memminger lived in Allen’s hometown o f Madison, to which he 
had migrated in 1884 along with his friend John S. Robinson (Allen’s law partner, 1885-1891). 
Memminger, who had served two terms as Madison county treasurer and had been for two years a member 
o f the Democratic State Committee, was described as one o f Nebraska’s most loyal and dedicated 
Democrats. He had staunchly supported Allen during the election battle in the legislature; at least, he did 
so during the period after it became obvious that a Democrat would not be chosen. He later served as 
Madison’s mayor from 1902-1903. Madison County Herald, n.d., Allen papers (hereafter AP), Nebraska 
State Historical Society (hereafter NSHS). See also Omaha World-Herald, 5 Feb. 1893, and 12 Feb. 1893; 
Madison Mail. 25 July 1902; Madison Star-Mail: Historical Edition. 19 March 1925. Addison Erwin 
Sheldon notes that two Alliance-Independent staff members, S. Edwin Thornton and C.H. Pirtle, gained 
“salaried positions at Washington” because o f Allen’s election. It is unclear whether these men worked for
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abbreviated session Allen received his committee assignments. Given that the Senate's 
Populist contingent comprised only three members (William A. Peffer of Kansas and 
James H. Kyle of South Dakota entered the upper chamber in 1891) and because they 
declined cooperation with the other parties in organizing the Senate, Allen, like his 
Populist colleagues, was selected for what were generally viewed as relatively minor 
committees: Claims, Indian Affairs, Public Lands, the Select Committee on the 
Transportation and Sale of Meat Products, and, as chair, the Select Committee on Forest 
Reservations.3
Meanwhile economic depression, which continued unabated in the agricultural 
parts of the West and the South (which in Nebraska was exacerbated by a continuation of 
the drought begun in 1890), began to infect the nation's manufacturing and finance 
sectors. Several factors led to the trouble: inadequacies in the private banking structure, 
superfluous expansion of the railroad network, a shrinking of the domestic market for 
industrial goods, widespread and reckless speculation in real estate and other ventures, 
the effects of European financial panics, a reduction of exports and the agricultural 
depression itself. The panic-induced failure in late February of the giant Philadelphia
Allen himself. See Sheldon’s Nebraska: The Land and the People, vol. 1 (Chicago: Lewis Publishing 
Company, 1931), 743.
3 CR, 53rd Cong., special sess., 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 16-17. On the subject o f Populists’ access to 
choice committee assignments, see Argersinger, “No Rights,” 217-19. As Peffer put it in his history o f 
Populism, Populist senators were denied membership on major committees as well as those whose tasks 
were within the sphere o f “party politics.” William A. Peffer, Populism. Its Rise and Fall, ed. Peter H. 
Argersinger (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1992), 91. On the large workload required by, and the 
low prestige associated with, the Claims Committee, see David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The 
United States Senate. 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 53-54.
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and Reading Railroad was followed in the spring by other business failures, an escalation 
of the panic in the stock market and a crisis in the banking industry. In the ensuing 
months several other major railroads fell into receivership, and the country slipped into a 
full-fledged economic depression. By the end of the year, six hundred banks and about 
fifteen thousand businesses went bankrupt, and perhaps as many as three million workers 
were unemployed. Hard times would not pass quickly; what most contemporaries 
defined as prosperity did not return until 1898.4
Since the first five years of Allen's Senate career would transpire within the 
context of severe economic calamity, the significance of the depression warrants brief 
discussion. Historian R. Hal Williams, author of a survey of the decade's national 
political scene, calls the depression the "decisive event" of the 1890s.5 Its destructive 
effects on the American people were "enormous, even among the prominent." Many 
Americans began to question previously held beliefs, especially on economic matters. 
Among some of the disaffected, there was even "talk of revolution and war and 
bloodshed."6
The devastation and conflicts of the middle 1890s, along with the effect of the 
depression in drawing attention to the interconnectedness of processes within the
n
economy, "shifted the country's focus from the local to the national." As Gene Clanton
4 Harold U. Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1959), 52-54, 141-46, 161; R. Hal Williams, Years o f Decision: American Politics in the 1890s (New  
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 74-77.
5 Williams, 77.
6 Ibid., 77-78.
7 Ibid., 78.
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has pointed out, the Populist reform program was, for the most part, a "national one" that 
could not be effectuated at lower levels of government. Therefore it was imperative for
o
the Populists to establish a "national power base." Capitol Hill, "Populism's one and 
only true national stage," became, perhaps inevitably, the location of that base, and it was 
there, according to Clanton, that "the clearest indication" of Populism's goals were 
repeatedly expressed.9 These facts, when considered in conjunction with the late 
nineteenth-century prominence of the Senate, indicated that, however formidable the 
institutional barriers to the enactment of their legislative agenda, the contentious little 
band of Populist senators could reasonably expect that their demands would receive 
national attention.10
While there was considerable disagreement as to both the causes of and proper 
solutions for the deteriorating economic situation, President Cleveland focused on the 
status o f the federal gold reserve. During the first two months of 1893, nervous investors 
rapidly dumped stocks and other investments in exchange for gold from the United States 
Treasury, resulting in what the investing class saw as an alarmingly rapid depletion of the 
reserve. It was generally held that the minimum required reserve was $100,000,000. But
8 Gene Clanton, Populism : The Humane Preference in America, 1890-1900 (Boston: Twayne 
publishers, 1991), 118. Includes both quotations. John D. Hicks raises the same point, noting that an 
independent political entity had become necessary in order to enact “national measures o f reform that the 
states were powerless to effect.” John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f  the Farmers’ Alliance 
and the People’s Party (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1931), 185.
9 Clanton, 125.
10 During the last three decades o f the century, according to historian Oscar Handlin, the Senate 
developed into the “pivotal political institution o f the republic.” Handlin, forward to Rothman, vii. 
“Contemporaries,” Rothman writes, perceived the Senate to be the superior force within the federal 
government, and it played the predominant role in the crafting o f important bills. Rothman, 3. See also 
248.
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much gold was now being purchased, as Williams explains, with silver money,
greenbacks, and the Treasury certificates (or notes) issued to purchase silver under an
important but highly controversial law.11
That law was the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890. It mandated that the
Treasury buy 4,500,000 ounces of silver each month and to pay for it with newly printed
legal tender Treasury notes. The act was, as Williams notes, a compromise between the
free silver forces, who demanded unlimited free silver coinage, and gold monometallists,
•  •  12who would have preferred to demonetize silver altogether. In the early months of 1893 
Cleveland agreed with many observers who saw the Sherman Act as the primary cause of
• i othe financial panic, and he began a concerted effort to bring about its repeal. In a 
message to congress on June 30, Cleveland blamed the crisis on "unwise laws" and 
directed the congress to meet in special session to consider remedial legislation.14 The 
President launched that session on August 7 with a lengthy message on the pernicious 
results of the Sherman Act and the dire necessity for its repeal.15 In one respect the fight 
that ensued was just one part of a long string of controversies over the currency during 
the post-Civil War period. As David Rothman has written, during the Gilded Age "the
11 Williams, 75.
12 Ibid., 35-36. Quotation is on p. 35. The official title o f the Sherman law was the Treasury Note Act 
o f 1890. See Richard H. Timberlake, “Repeal o f Silver Monetization in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 
Journal o f Money, Credit, and Banking 10 (1978): 29.
13 Ibid., 75, 79; Faulkner, 147; Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years o f the Republic: 1885-1905 (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1917), 335-36.
14 D. Appleton and Company, Appleton’s Annual Cyclopaedia and Register o f  Important Events o f the 
Year 1893 (New York, 1894), 222.
15 Ibid., 224-26.
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need to stabilize" the country's monetary system may very well have been the most 
significant and complicated problem with which the Senate grappled.16 But that does not 
lessen the significance of what Williams calls "the great repeal battle of 1893," an
•  •  17episode "that would reshape the politics of the decade."
When the Senate convened in August, its deliberations were not confined strictly 
to the Sherman Act, though, in varying degrees, most of the items had some relevance to 
it. One of these was a much-debated bill that called for adjustments in the terms under 
which the federal government redeemed its bond issues through the national banks. 
Democratic Senator Daniel Voorhees of Indiana, who reported on the bill from the 
Finance Committee and was a principle advocate for repeal, described the bill as a 
modest attempt to aid the American people by increasing the volume of currency in 
circulation.18
The People's Party platform of 1892, better known as the Omaha platform, was 
very explicit as to the party's position on both the circulating medium and the national 
banks. It called for an expansion of the money supply to at least "$50 per capita," and 
insisted on a "national currency...issued" solely by the federal government "without the 
use of banking corporations."19 According to the document's preamble, these
16 Rothman, 76-77.
17 Williams, 83. “This important session,” Clanton writes, “merits closer study than it has received. 
Concerning the views o f the Populists, it yet remains a missing chapter in the nation’s history.” See 
Clanton, Populism: The Humane Preference, 135. Also, see Clanton, “Hayseed Socialism on the Hill: 
Congressional Populism, 1891-1895.” Western Historical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Apr. 1984), 158-59.
18 CR. 53rd Cong., 1st sess. (hereafter 53-1), 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 330; Appleton’s Cyclopaedia. 222.
19 National Party Platforms: Volume 1 1840-1956. compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1978), 91.
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corporations had assumed an inappropriate role as a source of the money supply and used 
that authority to advance the interests of those who possessed interest-bearing bonds. 
Furthermore, it charged that government bond issues, redeemable in gold, were financed 
through the creation of "a vast public debt" which compounded the financial "burdens of
90the people." As expressed in one of the platform's financial planks, Populists believed 
that money "should be kept as much as possible in the hands of the people," and 
consequently they demanded “that all state and national revenues shall be limited to the
9 1necessary expenses of the government, economically and honestly administered."
Less than two weeks into the session, Allen, speaking on the Senate floor for the 
first time, offered an amendment to the Voorhees bill. The first part of the proposal was 
an attempt to ensure that government bonds would earn interest only when treasury notes 
used to pay for them were in the possession of the government. The second part 
stipulated that the bill was not to be understood to obligate "the Government to the policy 
of a permanent national debt," or to hinder it from meeting its contractual loan-
99repayment schedules.
In the debate that followed, Allen forcefully spoke out against the privileges and 
power of the national banks. The banks had for some time exercised control over the
20 Ibid., 90. For a discussion o f how the national banking system “posed the heart o f the American 
Farmers’ dilemma throughout the Gilded Age,” see Paolo E. Coletta, “Greenbackers, Goldbugs, and 
Silverites: Currency Reform and Policy, 1860-1897,” in The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1963), 111-139. Quotation is on 112-13.
21 Ibid., 91.
22 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 446-47. The designation “Voorhees” bill will be used here, 
although it might actually have been sponsored originally by some other senator. Allen and other senators 
seemed to think it Voorhees’s creation. See 330, 447. In the CR. debate on the legislation appears under 
the heading “Increase o f National-Bank Circulation.”
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money supply, Allen argued, and that ought not be allowed to continue. It was 
"dangerous" to allow the banks this authority which, according to the Constitution, was 
supposed to be the province of the federal government. If corporations were to be 
granted "special privileges" such as this, he satirically suggested that any ordinary citizen 
might as well be allowed "to deposit bonds ... and to procure an issuance of notes." The 
solution, Allen believed, was to employ "radical steps" to dissolve the present banking
• •  •  99system "as rapidly as safety to our commerce will permit."
Allen opposed the Voorhees bill because he thought it would do nothing to 
diminish the power of the national banks and other corporations to direct the future 
course of the nation. He was convinced those institutions would use that power to the
94-detriment of the general population. He could see no particular benefit in the bill
9Saccruing to the "laboring people." Allen contended, moreover, that if the object of the 
bill was to increase the money supply, the government could accomplish that by fiat
9 r
through the simple issuing of greenbacks.
In his final comments on the bank bill, Allen charged that Senate advocates of 
national bank interests were utilizing undemocratic means to achieve their goals. In 
particular, he pointed to their response to Senator Peffer's call for an investigation of 
illegal activities in the banking industry. Allen perceived that opponents of the measure
23 Ibid., 447. On these points see also CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, p. 2185.
24 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 447, 1002.
23 Ibid., 450.
26 Ibid., 989, 1002. When Senator Francis M. Cockrell, a Missouri Democrat, offered an amendment 
to increase circulation further than the Voorhees bill would, all three Populists voted yea. The amendment 
was voted down. See ibid., 330, 990.
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sought to keep the existence of suspicions about the banks from becoming public. These 
senators advocated "the strange doctrine" that the American people should not be
97allowed full information about the activities of their representatives.
Allen thought such an attitude especially egregious in the face of widespread 
misery among the American people. The multitude who are distressed because of “evil 
legislation may appeal" for relief, he charged, but their plight fails to “arouse a 
sympathetic chord” in Senate discussions bearing on the welfare of the banks and the 
corporations that “bleed the life out o f' the people. Even worse, the Senate endeavors to 
quiet its internal critics “for fear that" candor would send "some of them into chaos."
In mid September, Senator William M. Stewart, a Nevada Republican, introduced 
a resolution calling for the creation of a Senate committee to look into whether any 
members of the Senate held stock or had other pecuniary interest in the national bank 
system. In a speech in support of the measure, Allen continued his criticism of the 
national banks. He charged that in New York the banks were illegally withholding 
money from depositors, a crime made worse by the Senate's earlier refusal to approve 
Peffer's request for an investigation, which, Allen noted, would at least have compelled 
the Senate to issue a report on the matter. In addition, based in part on information given 
him by the Secretary of the Treasury, Allen accused the banks of breaking the law by
27 Ibid., 1002-1003. The quotation is on 1002.
28 Ibid., 1003. More o f Allen’s comments on the bank bill are on 451-52. Allen’s August 18th 
amendment was voted down overwhelmingly; all three Populists voted yea, but only eight other senators 
supported it. See ibid., 457. On 31 August, the Senate voted thirty-five to twenty-one in favor o f sending 
Peffer’s investigation resolution to the Finance Committee, a move tantamount to killing it. Allen, Kyle, 
and Peffer were in the minority. See ibid., 1103. For the commentary o f another senator that helps to place
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dispersing clearing-house certificates. He supposed, moreover, that the government 
knew of these statutory violations. Citing the Constitution of the New York Clearing­
house Association (1892), Allen noted that one of its members was the Assistant 
Treasurer of the United States. The government, Allen thought, was surely "particeps 
criminis."29
In a foreshadowing of his stance in the upcoming Sherman Act repeal battle,
Allen charged the New York banking interests with undermining the status of silver as a 
legitimate component o f the nation's circulating medium. He argued that these bankers 
were interested only in acquiring gold (or gold coin or treasury notes, which were 
assumed to be redeemable in gold). Other, lesser forms of money were for the "common 
herd." "The man who stands at the plow ... the man who stands at the forge or in the 
factory performing valuable labor and creating wealth, may have the inferior kind of 
money." The banks, on the other hand, could "discriminate against" a legally recognized 
part o f the money supply. It is "a sad spectacle," he stated, "that a great nation should" 
legislate to enable vested interests to benefit from favoring a select part of the money
30supply over another, which "is not good enough for these gentlemen at New York."
If Stewart's proposal suggested the possibility of senatorial corruption, Allen's 
views on venality in government echoed the certainty of the Omaha Platform. The
Allen’s final speech in a fuller context, see the remarks o f Senator John M. Palmer (Democrat, Illinois), 
ibid., 1001.
29 William V. Allen, National Bank Interests (Washington, 1893), 3, 6-7 (quotation on 7), reprint of 
CR, 53-1, pt. 2, p. 1435-38.
30 Ibid., 7-8. Final quotation is on 7, the remainder on 8.
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platform's preamble declared that "corruption dominates" both "the ballot box," and
o  1
every branch of state and federal government, including the Senate. Allen asserted that 
perhaps "millions" of Americans were convinced that a good deal of the laws emanating 
from congress were formulated in accordance with the "personal interest" of the men
• 32serving therein.
Allen rejected the claim of Senator David B. Hill (Democrat, New York) that 
senators could be counted on to vote in a disinterested manner in cases where their own 
financial interests were likely to be effected. While he agreed that the law did not 
proscribe senators their investments in corporations and banks, Allen asserted that no law 
"among English speaking people” had ever expressly allowed it, and that no English 
parliament had ever permitted a member to vote on legislation affecting his personal
o o  . . . .  •financial interest. Although he would like to believe it conceivable for the ordinary 
"man to rise above his prejudices" and private interests, Allen saw it as axiomatic that 
most men would not have the ethical fortitude to vote in the interest of the general 
welfare in cases where it seemed likely that their own financial interests would be 
damaged. For that reason, information about potential conflicts of interest should be 
made available to the public.34
31 National Party Platforms. 89. Pro-repeal observers o f the Senate were often themselves displeased 
with the state o f  the institution. For two examples o f criticisms by conservatives, see H. von Holst, “Shall 
the Senate Rule the Republic?” and, unsigned, “The Senate in the Light o f History,” both in Forum 16 
(Nov. 1893): 263-81.
32 Allen, 3.
33 Ibid., 8-9. Quotation is on 8.
34 Ibid, 9.
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Responding to Hill's sarcastic suggestion that, in light of such concerns the Senate 
might as well extend its probe into how senators' personal pecuniary interests effected 
their actions on tariff legislation, Allen declared that "it would be preeminently the thing 
to do." Legislating for their own parochial interests, Eastern capitalists and those who 
did their bidding in the Senate had for three decades clutched the general public "by the 
throat" on the tariff issue, forcing them "to pay tribute" to "New England and the Eastern 
states." Allen was certain, furthermore, "that nine-tenths of the men who have fattened 
upon the industries of this nation through" the banking system and through tariff duties 
"religiously and conscientiously believe" themselves entitled to the privilege. Having 
"fattened at the public crib so long," he explained, these beneficiaries of government 
largesse could "stand up and honestly profess that they believe it is for the public good
or
to" maintain the status quo.
Allen did not want his position to be taken as radical. He emphasized that he was 
not opposed to the existence of banks per se; indeed, they were a necessary component of 
a commercial society. In fact the People’s Party, Allen declared, sought to protect the 
rights not only of the masses, but those of the banks, both state and national, as well as 
those of "corporations and property." Still, he made it clear that he was "unalterably 
opposed to farming out the sovereign power" of the state to private concerns where it was
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 10.
37 Ibid., 5, 13. Quotation appears on 13.
53
to be used for private aggrandizement. If Populists recognized the rights of the 
capitalist, they also insisted that he should receive no special treatment, for, as Allen put 
it, "the rights of the hod-carrier are as sacred under the Constitution ... as the rights of 
corporations."
Rather than cater to special interests or to big business, Allen thought the Senate's 
duty was to promote the welfare "of the humblest citizen of this land as well as the most 
exalted." He contended that the major parties and their Senate representatives had long 
ignored the privileges of the common people, and in so doing had not only allowed 
"special interests" to achieve preponderant status but had precipitated the current 
"stringency and distress" evident across much of the nation.40 This perspective had a 
parallel antecedent in Ignatius Donnelly's preamble to the Omaha platform. In it, 
Donnelly, a longtime political activist and Populist from Minnesota, charged that for a 
generation the Republicans and Democrats had fought "for power and plunder, while 
grievous wrongs [had] been inflicted upon the suffering people."41 Seeing little to 
indicate that the old parties were about to reform themselves, Allen admonished Senate 
Democrats to switch their affiliations to the People's Party: "There is no other place for 
you. You must either go there or you must go over to the gold bugs."42 In addition he 
warned that until "the people" determined to "rise up in their might" to effect legislative
38 Ibid., 5.
39 Ibid., 13.
4U Ibid., 4, 11. Quotations on 4.
41 National Party Platforms. 90.
42 Allen, 11.
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reform and a "change of complexion" in the congress, there was "no hope" for improved 
conditions for the people.43
One of the themes that would recur often in Allen's rhetoric was the proposition 
that much, and perhaps most, economic legislation enacted by congress served a class 
function by promoting the interests of financial elites to the detriment of working people. 
On September 18, during a debate on how the federal government ought to respond to 
the problem of train-robbing, Allen blamed congressional actions for what he perceived 
as a rising crime problem. It was, he stated, unrealistic to think "that class legislation, 
such as has emanated from Congress, will not produce lawless bands of men."44
In rationalizing his response to congressional legislation, Allen frequently cited 
the Constitution. This corresponds with historian Norman Pollack's observation that 
"[i]n making governmental responsiveness the linchpin" of their preferred form of 
capitalism, Populists "necessarily emphasized a constitutional perspective." Populists 
depended on the Constitution to delineate "the state's powers and responsibilities, to 
adduce proofs for its sovereign capacity," to justify its activism, and to formulate “a 
statement of rights originating from the literalist application of American political 
tenets.”45 When during the train-robbing debate some senators suggested that a
43 Ibid., 10.
44 CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, p. 1562. The legislation under debate was a resolution calling for an 
Interstate Commerce Committee investigation o f the train-robbing problem. See 1558. For the debate on 
18 September, see 1558-1564.
45 Norman Pollack, The Just Polity: Populism. Law, and Human Welfare (Urbana: University o f  
Illinois Press, 1987), 7. For Populists the Constitution was, Pollack explains, a “preeminent symbol.” (67) 
This point is worth emphasizing, for it suggests that if  the Populists were not exactly radicals (that is, they 
did not seek to change fundamentally the federal governmental structure or the competitive capitalist 
economic system), they did seek to transform the current aims and processes o f  government by discrediting
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committee determine whether congress possessed authority in the matter under the 
Constitution’s interstate commerce clause, Allen remarked that “it would be about as 
proper to refer to some committee the question of whether the sun shines or not.” The 
issue was clear-cut: since congress had authority under the Constitution to regulate 
interstate commerce, and since crimes against interstate railways affected interstate 
commerce, the Senate need not hesitate in considering legislative solutions.46
On still another topic o f concern to Populists, the welfare of the urban laborer, 
Allen showed strong signs of a Populist orientation. The Omaha Platform had affirmed 
that “the interests of rural and civic labor are the same; their enemies are identical,” and 
lamented that the pay of workers in the cities was held down by “imported pauperized
A n
labor.” On October 11, Allen reproved the captains of industry and the federal 
government for routinely employing force in dealing with labor unrest. In his lengthy 
remarks on the subject, Allen pointed to Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, where federal troops were 
used to put down a peaceful demonstration by employees of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad. He recounted the “disgraceful affair” at the Homestead Steel Works in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where Pinkerton agents hired by Andrew Carnegie initially 
failed, but state militia ultimately succeeded in busting the union there. He cited 
developments in New York, where, he said, the New York Central Railroad had unfairly 
discriminated against members of the Knights of Labor, and in Buffalo, where a
the prevailing political ethos, which they viewed as a perversion o f American constitutionalism, properly 
understood. See Pollack, 108-113.
46 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, p. 1564
47 National Party Platforms. 89, 91. The first quotation is on the latter, the second on the former.
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corporate executive (a “tin soldier”) had commanded the state militia in a cruel and 
unwarranted attack on “organized and honest laborers.” All of this had occurred despite 
the fact that the workers’ grievances—unfair employment practices and wage decreases— 
were legitimate, and even though they were the “natural outgrowth of vicious 
legislation.”48
Allen believed that, so long as laborers did not infringe on the property rights of 
others, they could legally assemble to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
Capitalists, Allen reminded his colleagues, enjoyed the right to cooperate with each other 
to further their goals. In fact, whenever a group of "money sharks" met in New York to 
formulate strategies designed to bring them great profits at the expense of the people, it 
was respectfully referred to as "a consultation of financiers." Yet, when "honest" 
workingmen, compelled by "desperation" and lacking other options, conducted public 
protests, they were pronounced "a mob" and confronted by policemen and soldiers.49 On 
November 3, the last day of the special session, Allen introduced a resolution aimed at 
eliciting the aid of State Department officials in temporarily curbing immigration as a 
countermeasure to the high unemployment rate.50
48 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), p. 337-338. The “vicious legislation” quotation is on 
337, the remainder on 338.
49 Ibid., 338.
50 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3, p. 3112-13. Earlier, during the national-bank debates (Sept. 13),
Allen charged that the Republicans had maintained the tariff, which had originally been implemented on a 
large scale as a temporary expedient (under the Morill Tariff Act o f  1861) to finance the Union military 
effort during the Civil War, in order to extract "tribute" from the country's working class. Presumably, he 
referred here to farm, as well as industrial, workers. See Allen, 9. On 2 Sept., Labor Day, Allen offered a 
resolution directing the Senate, as a way o f  honoring both workers and their employees, to shut down for 
the holiday. Including Allen and Peffer only eight senators voted for the measure. See CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 
25, pt. 2, p. 1187-1188. Some who voted against it were not opposed to a gesture o f respect for labor, or at
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Of course the special session's raison d’etre, and Allen's foremost concern, was 
the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. As Williams points out, during the years 
1894-1896 the effort to expand silver coinage became not only a "social movement," but 
"one of the largest in American history."51 Allen's preoccupation with promoting silver 
grew to full force in 1893, the year after the Omaha Platform had called for the "free and
• •  •  • •  ounlimited coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio o f 16 to 1." On June 14, 
lecturing in Beatrice, Nebraska, Allen criticized the notion that additional gold was the 
answer for the current financial crisis. Prophetically—and correctly, as later events would 
prove—he pointed out that the large bond issues to which the government had resorted to 
maintain its gold supply would require further issues down the road in order to replenish 
the treasury reserve. Allen averred that there was insufficient gold "on earth or in the 
bowels o f the earth" to meet the future demands for currency.54
During the first week of August, Allen gave a well-received pro-silver speech at a 
congress o f the American Bimetallic League in Chicago. The object of the silverites, 
Allen explained, was to ensure that the supply of currency was adequate to meet the
least did not want to admit that they were. Voorhees, for example, supported Allen’s intent, but preferred 
to assist the working man by remaining in session for the purpose o f working toward alleviating his duress. 
See Ibid., 1187.
51 Williams, 106.
52 National Party Platforms, 91.
33 Faulkner, 154-57; Davis Rich Dewey, National Problems. 1885-1897 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1907), 267-76.
54 Daily Times (Beatrice), n.d., AP.
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commercial needs of the people.55 Unfortunately, however, the money supply had been 
so decreased that "the bankers and brokers" held total sway over it.56 To the often-heard 
charge that silver mine-owners were the primary force behind the free-silver campaign, 
Allen countered that, while the mine-owners were indeed concerned about the repeal 
issue, the people were "infinitely more" interested in it, as it touched on the well being of 
everyone.57
Allen held that gold bondholders had the greatest interest of all in the repeal 
issue. This was because the elimination of silver, which comprised "half of the money of
r o
the world," would double the payments owed by those indebted to them. They were 
responsible for what he perceived as the contrived quality of the financial panic earlier in 
the year. "The metropolitan bankers," he alleged, had directed the urban newspapers to 
frighten the citizenry into believing that the Sherman law was causing the withdrawal of 
American gold and its transfer overseas. The people were then told that the country 
faced an extreme financial crisis, the necessary solution for which was the abrogation of 
the Sherman Act. Unfortunately for the bankers, this strategy failed because the citizens 
of the prairie and plains states, maintaining their faith in both the system and their 
countrymen, remained calm, which in turn caused the financial managers themselves to
55 Ackley World, n.d., AP; Hicks, 313.
56 Clipping from unidentified (Madison, Nebraska) newspaper, 11 Aug. 1893, AP.
57 Ackley World, n.d., AP.
58 Ibid.
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panic. According to Allen the latter subsequently implored "congress to restore their 
confidence and disabuse their minds" concerning the economy.59
In his address to the Bimetallic League, Allen embraced a theme he would return 
to often during the next few years: the domination of American financial processes by 
British investors. Americans were encouraged to believe, Allen stated, that "we cannot 
breathe properly except as we breathe through the lungs of old England." But the 
American people were "no more" approving "of British control of America[n] finances 
than they are in favor of British soldiery camping upon our people."60 It was long past 
time, he insisted, for Americans to break the influence of England on their financial 
circumstances.61
Finally, apparently alluding to the Constitution's allowance for the use of silver as 
money, Allen equated support for silver coinage with patriotism and with proper regard 
for the Constitution. In propagating the cause of free silver he assured the convention 
that, while Senate Populists were not as adept at "political and parliamentary 
manoeuvering" as were their old-party colleagues, they would "keep in sight of the fox 
all the time."62
The halls of congress may have served as a den for this pernicious predator, but to 
Allen, the native habitat of this fox was New York City. On August 22, he told reporters
59 Unidentified (Madison) clipping, 11 Aug. 1893, AP.
60 Ibid.
61 Ackley World, n.d., AP.
62 Unidentified (Madison) clipping, 11 Aug. 1893, AP. Article I, Section 10, o f the Constitution 
stipulates that “No State shall...make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a tender in Payment o f Debts.”
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that "New York has ceased to be an American city." The republic's largest metropolis 
was not in accord with the remainder of the nation; its people comprised "an aristocracy," 
and the city was evolving into a kind of "money despot." New Yorkers, Allen thought, 
had a higher regard "for the beauties of the Alps than for the grandeur of the Rockies." 
Westerners considered the eastern section of the union overbearing and would transfer 
the federal capital "to St. Louis in fifteen minutes if we had the votes." Allen was certain 
that Americans' economic success required the demolition of New York's perilous 
influence over the rest of the nation. To these factors Allen attributed what he perceived
/ro
as the growing rift between the western and eastern parts of the country.
Two days later, Allen gave the first of his two lengthy speeches on the silver 
question during the special session. In it, he elaborated on the necessity of his 
amendment, introduced two days earlier, calling for the free coinage of silver (at 16:1) 
"under the same conditions" governing the mintage of gold.64 In a general sense, such 
positive government action was a necessary intervention on behalf of the people “from 
the ranks o f ’ which Allen came, who experienced and understood acutely “the effects of 
evil legislation.” Although, as he explained, “they do not profess to have found a 
panacea for our national evils, or to have explored the depths and ramifications of
63 Norfolk (Nebraska) News. 24 Aug. 1893. For a criticism o f  Allen’s remarks on the growing East- 
West sectional drift, see the editorial titled “An Absurd Prophecy,” in the Kansas City (Missouri) Star. 7 
Nov. 1893, AP.
64 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 783. See also p. 584.
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economic learning,” they were bright enough to determine whether, and to what degree, 
particular legislation was in their interest.65
Allen complained that it was the interests of the people that seemed to get the 
least consideration in the debate over repeal. At times partisanship debased the 
discussion of the problem in the Senate.66 Always, the possibility of resolution was 
prevented by the “selfishness” of vested commercial interests such as mortgage holders,
investors, and the mining companies. Were this factor eliminated, Allen thought, the
•  • •  •  ( \1currency problem could be resolved with relatively little difficultly. But the earnest
appeals of the people had been disregarded, and the country had deviated “from its 
original constitutional moorings into the shallow and treacherous waters of unchecked 
power.” Their very survival at stake, the people had thus formed the People’s Party, 
“founded upon Jeffersonian simplicity, and imperatively demanding a return of the
Z 'O
nation to first principles of government.”
Regarding the currency problem, the best that could be said of the two major 
parties was that, historically, each had some record of officially advocating bimetallism. 
The Democratic Party, as Allen pointed out by citing numerous examples, had 
continuously expressed its support for the concept since as early as 1836, while the 
Republican Party platforms of 1888 and 1892 boasted of the allegiance of the GOP to
65 Ibid., 784.
66 Tbid.
67 Ibid., 789.
68 Ibid., 784-85. All quotes on 784.
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bimetallism. In 1892, however, both parties deceived the American people by declaring 
themselves for bimetallism, while their presidential candidates (Cleveland and Benjamin 
Harrison) were completely dedicated to establishing a gold-based currency no matter 
what its effect on the commonweal.69 Allen was likewise unimpressed by the professed 
interest of the major parties in realizing an international agreement for bimetallism. It 
was widely believed, he reported, not only that an agreement would not be achieved, but 
that talk of it was “mere subterfuge,” a stalling tactic designed to allow “the money
* 70power...time to reduce the masses to subjection” and muffle their dissent.
Similarly, the Sherman law was “a miserable makeshift” meant to placate the
people while, at the same time, unlawfully denying them their right to a true bimetallic
standard. The effect of withholding from Americans, as Allen put it, “one-half of their
constitutional money,” was to largely expand the financial burden on debtors by
decreasing the worth of their assets and labor, while expanding the fortunes of the 
11
wealthy. He insisted, however, that the Sherman law itself was not responsible for “the
77evil that confronts us.” Allen expressed his general attitude on the matter in dramatic, 
almost apocalyptic, terms. The Sherman law, he affirmed
69 Ibid., 784-85. For the major-party statements on bimetallism in 1892, see National Party Platforms, 
88, 93.
70 CR. 788.
71 Ibid. The preamble o f  the Omaha Platform includes the assertion that the purpose behind the 
demonetization o f  silver was the lowering o f the “value o f all forms o f property as well as human labor, 
and the” volume o f money was “purposely abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise, and enslave 
industry.” See National Party Platforms, 90.
72 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 784.
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is the last feeble barrier that stands between the patriotic and industrious masses 
of our people and that horde of insolent, aggressive, and ravenous money­
changers and gamblers of Lombard street and Wall street, who for private gain 
would, through a shrinking and contracted volume of money, turn the world back 
into the gloom of the Dark Ages with all its attendant evil and misery. We 
cannot suffer this to be done; we must stand like a wall of fire against its 
accomplishment.
Although the Sherman law was flawed, its retention was essential, Allen argued, until
nn
such time as it was replaced by improved legislation.
Allen defended his position by way of a thoughtful analysis of what he saw as the 
fundamentals of the money problem. First, he emphasized the universality of the use of 
silver as money. From ancient times to the present, silver had been utilized as currency 
across the “civilized world.”74 In the early years of the American republic, he contended, 
silver was considered to be a more important form of money than gold. In addition to 
citing the reference to silver in the Constitution, Allen reported that, in the enactment of 
dozens of distinct “statutes and resolutions” during the past century, congress had
nr
acknowledged silver “as the money of the Constitution.”
Second, Allen stressed the point that the Constitution granted Congress the 
authority to “regulate the value” of the currency. Here, however, an important 
qualification had to be recognized. Congress, he explained, had been given the authority
73 Ibid., 788-89. Quotation is on both pages. In judging the relative merit o f bimetallism and the 
Sherman Act, Allen contended that “It may quiet the fears o f the weak and lull the thoughtless into” a false 
sense o f “security, but [bimetallism] is merely the song o f the siren calling the nation to destruction.” As 
“base, ignoble and cowardly as the Sherman act is and ever has been, it is infinitely better than this limp, 
meaningless, and useless” professed commitment to resurrecting the bimetallic standard. See ibid., 789.
74 Ibid., 787. “Silver,” read the Omaha Platform, “which has been accepted as coin since the dawn o f  
history, has been demonetized to add to the purchasing power o f gold...” See National Party Platforms. 90.
75 Ibid., 785. The exact number o f such statutes, according to Allen, was sixty-one.
76 Ibid.
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to control the “value of money as money, thus distinguishing clearly between money and
<7 <7
the metal upon which it is stamped.” In agreement with one of the cardinal tenets of 
nineteenth-century Greenbackism that money was merely an instrument and that the 
inherent worth of the material used for currency should matter less than its legally
78ascribed monetary value, Allen viewed money as “a medium of exchange.” While the 
belief that money had to possess intrinsic value was widely accepted, Allen argued that if 
the value of money is governed by “natural” rather than man-made laws, then the 
Founding Fathers had wasted their time in granting to Congress authority over currency 
values.79 The framers o f the Constitution intended for Congress to regulate “a thing 
called money;” that is, unless their aim was to control the “commercial value” of the 
material used as currency, a notion “as absurd as the Pope’s bull against the comet.” 
Congress need only exercise its regulatory power and silver would assume its rightful
QA
position alongside gold as full legal tender.
77 Ibid., 786.
78 Ibid., 789. On Greenbackism, see “The Influence o f  Edward Kellogg Upon American Radicalism, 
1865-1896,” chapter four in Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism. 1865-1901: Essays and 
Documents (New London: Connecticut College Press, 1946), 50-77, especially 52; Walter T. K. Nugent, 
“Money, Politics, and Society: The Currency Question” chapter six in The Gilded Age, ed. H. Wayne 
Morgan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970), 109-27, especially 119-20. For Greenbackers, “good 
money,” Nugent writes, “is anything people think is good money.” See 126. For brief but useful 
summaries o f Greenback ideology, see Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State: A Study 
of Conflict in American Thought 1865-1901 (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1956), 304-309; 
and Edward R. Lewis, A History o f American Political Thought: From the Civil War to the World War 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), 267-73.
79 CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 785. See also Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The 
Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 21.
80 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 786 (for quotations), 789. In Democratic Promise. Goodwyn 
writes that the Populist Party was “the final and most powerful assertion of the greenback critique o f the 
American monetary system.” But denial o f the necessity o f intrinsic value as an ingredient o f legitimate 
money does not certify one’s status as a Populist. Goodwyn points out that like gold, silver was still 
“hard” (that is, bullion-based) money, and not “soft” (that is, “fiat,” or irredeemable) money. Goodwyn,
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Allen’s third point on the money problem was that, since congress is charged 
with the responsibility for regulating the nation’s money, it had a “duty” to exercise that 
power on account of the present economic hardship. Demonstrating a certain flair for 
hyperbole, he alleged that “commerce, industry, and labor lie prostrate and bleeding at
Q I
every pore throughout the length and breadth of the” country. The narrowing of the 
money supply, moreover, generated more of the current economic distress than “all other 
causes” together. His research into the matter led Allen to believe that the constricted 
money supply was a leading cause of the widespread bank failures, and compelled him to 
ask: when many bankers lacked enough money to conduct their routine business, how 
were wage-workers and farmers to stave off economic ruin? Despite the banking crisis, 
credit, he argued, was overabundant, while real money was too scarce. All of this 
contributed to Allen’s inference that, of all the fields of research, “the science of finance” 
had progressed the least. He marveled at the idea that, with all of man’s scientific and
15,21. A proposal for issuing fiat money was part o f the Omaha Platform in the form o f the subtreasury 
plan (under which farmers could store nonperishable crops in government warehouses, borrow legal-tender 
paper money—printed expressly for loans under the program— at low interest against the value o f their 
crops, and delay sale o f the crops until market conditions were more favorable), although it was presented 
as one possibility for expanding the money supply. See Goodwyn, 52-53; and National Party Platforms,
91. One of the other financial demands, the call for silver coinage, was included in the 1880 and 1884 
platforms o f the Greenback party. See Fine, 308.
81 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 787.
82 Ibid., 788. Allen emphasized that he had no great love for silver per se. He announced that, were 
anyone to persuade him that the world’s gold supply was enough “to do the money work o f the world 
with,” he would accept a gold standard. Ibid.,787. Were the government to circulate an amount o f money 
commensurate with the needs o f the economy, it would move “surplus cash” out o f banks and “into 
productive industries.” Ibid., 456. Internationally, however, there was insufficient silver money to meet 
the needs o f the 900 million people (o f a total world population o f 1.2 billion) who, Allen claimed, relied 
on silver for money.(789-90) No nation, Allen contended, had ever suffered from an excess o f "sound" 
money, but history was "replete with instances o f nations whose civilization has been lost or turned back 
for centuries" due to a decreasing money supply. Ibid., 788.
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technical achievements, some could deny the possibility that methods existed which 
could be employed to hinder “the recurrence of financial panics and depressions and the” 
conveying of the wealth “of the many into the hands of the few.”
Allen advised that currency-regulation should be placed on a “sounder and more 
scientific basis.” It was significant then, that his speech had a somewhat social- 
scientific character. In making his case Allen did not merely state his opinions but, in a 
fashion that was to be characteristic of his entire Senate career, he buttressed his 
positions by frequently citing historical and statistical evidence. Through the course of 
this single speech, Allen cited statistics from two government reports, repeated specific 
phrases in the Constitution three times, he drew on passages from a business journal, 
quoted from six national or state party platforms and referred to about a dozen others. In 
addition, he quoted liberally from the opinions of eight specific court cases, recounted 
the recent comments of two Senate colleagues, and read from the Congressional Record
or
excerpts of speeches by Senators Daniel Webster (1836) and John Sherman (1868).
This is not to say that Allen’s marked reliance on authorities and his persistent 
historical references were necessarily indicative of sound reasoning. Nevertheless, these 
seem to be demonstrative of Pollack’s observation that “Populism sought to combat 
vagueness.” “This,” he writes, “helps to explain Peffer’s statistics, [1892 Populist 
presidential candidate James B.] Weaver’s extensive case studies, the detailed editorials
83 Ibid., 799.
84 Ibid., 788.
85 Ibid., 784-88.
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in literally hundreds of agrarian newspapers” and “the interminable speeches, three and
86four hours long,” based “on the body of information patiently gathered and circulated.” 
Allen began the peroration of his first major anti-repeal speech in dramatic 
fashion, stating that “millions” of Americans, now enduring “ineffable misery” as a result 
of “this unholy warfare waged upon their rights,” were watching the Senate, uncertain 
whether its actions would “enslav[e]...them and their children for generations to come,” 
or release them from “financial bondage.” He finished with a euphonic metaphor: “If we 
act wisely and patriotically,” he predicted, and provide the people of the nation enough 
“sound and scientific money to enable them to set all .the energies of nature and man at 
work producing wealth,” then “once more the sunlight of prosperity, like the natural sun 
that dispels the mist and the dew, will kiss away the clouds of doubt and fear, and we
07
will witness an era of prosperity more wonderful than the world has ever known.”
A few weeks later a leading Populist newspaper praised the speech and reported 
that, from all parts of the country, “scholars, writers, economists, lawyers, judges and 
men of learning” were asking for transcripts. “It is a fact,” the paper proclaimed, that 
Allen’s address “is being studied by many of the brightest minds in the United States.”88 
For the next six weeks Allen continued to speak out on the Senate floor against 
unconditional repeal of the Sherman Act. He introduced resolutions for the purpose of
86 Pollack, 68.
87 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. l ,p . 790.
88 American Nonconformist (Indianapolis), clipping with a tile-date o f 18 Sept. 1893, AP. "Being a 
poor man," the paper stated, Allen initially planned an order for "only a few thousand copies" to be 
delivered to constituents so as to keep them abreast o f his attempts "to do his duty in defending populist
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obtaining information about the government’s handling of monetary affairs, and he 
offered yet another free silver amendment. He discussed various nineteenth-century 
developments in international finance and their relationship to shifts in monetary policy 
in countries such as England and Prussia.89 To those who blamed the Sherman Act for 
causing the finance-hysteria, Allen objected that there was undoubtedly no “boy in this 
nation fifteen years of age, who has studied this question, who honestly believes that.”90 
He continued to insist, however, that the Sherman law needed replacement and that the 
constricted money supply was wreaking havoc on the country. He railed against the 
increasing influence in Washington of “the money power,” and warned that the proposed 
repeal would place Americans in “servitude.” He talked about poverty and hunger in 
America, o f the “brutal” police response to bread riots in New York City, and 
condemned congress for its inaction. Things would get still worse, Allen argued, with 
the enactment of unconditional repeal, for that would bind the laborers and farmers of 
America “to the chariot wheel of the plutocrat now and hereafter.”91 He suggested that 
Democrats could demonstrate their commitment to reform by dropping out of their party 
and enlisting in the People’s Party, which he confidently asserted would achieve
Q9supremacy in the 1896 election.
principles." For some basic information on this important Populist paper which was originally published in 
Winfield, Kansas, see Goodwyn, 99-100; and Clanton, Populism: The Humane Preference, 25, 73.
89 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, pp. 1188, 1209, 1568, 1671,2060,2185, 2259, 2460.
90 Allen, 10.
91 CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, pp. 1833-35. For quotations: "brutal" on 1834, "servitude" on 1835, 
the remainder on 1833.
92 Allen, 11.
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Overcoming the spirited opposition of Congressman Bryan and other silverites, 
the House of Representatives passed its repeal measure overwhelmingly on August 28,
1893.93 The next day pro-silver senators, most of them from the South and West (the 
division on repeal was regional rather than partisan), initiated a filibuster. That 
obstructionist tactic was still in progress when, on October 7, Allen took the Senate floor 
to give the second of his major anti-repeal speeches. He began with an indirect criticism 
of Senate protocol. He recalled that on the occasion of his first address in the Senate, he 
had sensed that “I ought to apologize” for violating the custom “that a new member shall 
listen rather than talk.” Moments later, when Allen declined an offer to call for a quorum 
and a colleague responded that other members would benefit by being present at Allen’s 
speech, his pompous answer demonstrated another facet of his personality that was 
sometimes evident: “I will make them hear me,” Allen swore, “whether they are here or
93 Jeanette Paddock Nichols, "The Politics and Personalities o f Silver Repeal in the United States 
Senate," American Historical Review XLI, no. 1 (Oct. 1935): 26-29; Peck, 339-45; Donald R. Matthews, 
Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House o f Representatives (New York: Wiley, 1975), 
113. For a broad outline o f how the legislation moved through the House, lengthy excerpts from the 
debate, and the votes o f House members, see Appleton’s Cyclopaedia, 226-39.
94 For Allen quotations see CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), pp. 289. By Senate standards 
Allen’s behavior was atypical: “Freshmen were...intimidated by their surroundings.” Custom prescribed 
“that newcomers not deliver any speeches in their first session, but they were usually too frightened in any 
case.” Rothman, 145. In this regard Allen consciously or not followed the precedent set by Senator Peffer 
who, upon taking office, declared that he would not observe tradition concerning speechifying by 
freshmen. Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s Party 
(Lexington: University Press o f  Kentucky, 1974), 108. By Populist lights what was perceived as Allen’s 
(and Peffer’s) presumptuousness was, properly understood, simply the expression o f a populistic, 
egalitarian, sensibility. “Populism...is unambiguously committed to the principle o f  respect... [and] has 
always rejected...the politics o f deference....It is unimpressed by titles and other symbols o f social rank.” 
Christopher Lasch, Revolt o f the Elites: and the Betrayal o f Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1995), 106. On the filibuster and the sectional nature o f  the coinage debate, see “Silver Coinage 
Controversy,” in Andrew C. McLaughlin and Albert Bushnell Hart, eds., Cyclopedia o f American
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Such episodes occurred only sporadically, however. Allen was usually serious 
and assertive on the floor of the Senate and courteous to his colleagues. Allen began the 
address by tracing the historical development of coinage laws in the United States, 
paying particular attention to the demonetization of silver in 1873 and the reinstatement 
of silver money on a limited basis in 1878. The Bland-Allison Act of that year 
authorized signatories to contracts to designate the exact form of money they would 
accept for debts due them, thus allowing financiers to virtually annul the silver laws.95 
The insistence by many senators that the resumption of silver coinage would, as a 
practical matter, require an international monetary agreement was “mere subterfuge.”
Past monetary conferences had not only been wholly unproductive, but had also been 
dominated by those who sought to put an end to the use of silver as money and thereby 
decrease the wealth of working people. Allen found the very idea that the United States 
could not unilaterally implement free silver coinage “a monstrous proposition.”96
Allen devoted most of his attention, however, to a criticism of “that chief of 
heresies,” intrinsic value. As he had done earlier in the session, Allen argued that 
monetary values were established by law. He backed up this contention by discussing 
the varied materials which had been used as money in the history of Western and Near 
Eastern Civilization and by quoting liberally from the works of economists Henry 
Dunning MacLeod, Henri Cemuschi, and Jean Baptiste Say. One legal-tender dollar was
Government (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), 309-12; Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 58-62; and Nichols, 30-38.
95 CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), pp. 289-90.
96 Ibid., 296.
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as good as the next one, Allen contended, which is precisely why the "Shylocks" and the 
"money lords" who possessed most of the gold supply favored monometallism. The 
concept of intrinsic value ought to be abandoned so that the vocation of the "money
07
changer, like the occupation of Othello," would disappear.
Allen was unable to complete his speech on October 7 because of its considerable 
length, and he waited for his next opportunity to address the Senate and resume his 
remarks. On the same day, Senator Voorhees, chairman of the Finance Committee and 
chief representative for Cleveland in the battle for repeal in the Senate, announced that 
on October 11 the Senate would be held in continuous round-the-clock session. The
intent was to wear down the minority, thereby ending the filibuster and allowing for a
98vote on repeal.
Thus when Allen took the Senate floor on October 11, he was a principal figure 
in an intriguing and somewhat tense political drama. When he began speaking at 5:15 
p.m., the visitors’ galleries of the Senate chamber "were packed to overflowing," and
97 Ibid., 290-94. For quotations: "heresies" and "money changer” on 290, others on 294. MacLeod 
(1821-1902) was a Scottish lawyer, banker and economic theorist who argued that value does not inhere in 
objects but is ascribed by thought. Ludwig H. Mai, Men and Ideas in Economics: A Dictionary o f World 
Economists Past and Present (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1975), 144-45. A quite obscure 
figure today, Italian Enrico Cemushi (1821-1896) was a classical political economist, monetary theorist 
(who may have originated the word bimetallism), agitator exiled in the revolutionary upheavals o f 1848- 
1850 and currency director o f the Bank o f Paris. Century Cyclopedia of Names. 1954; Grand Larousse 
Encvclopedique. 1960; Murray Rothbard, Classical Economics: An Austrian Perspective on the History o f  
Economic Thought. 2 vols. (Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar Pub., 1995), 2: 268. Say (1767-1832) was the 
founder o f the classical .school o f political economy in France, businessman, college professor, and the 
most important popularizer o f Smithian doctrine in Europe. John Fred Bell, A History o f Economic 
Thought (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1967), 277-85.
98 Ibid., 296; Burdette, 62; Nichols, 37-38.
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nobody knew for sure how many nights senators would be confined to the chamber and 
adjacent rooms within the capitol."
Allen picked up his speech precisely where he had stopped four days earlier.100 
Continuing his critique of intrinsic value, Allen offered additional historical information 
on the use of silver as money, and again quoted Say on the instrumental function of the 
latter. But if money was nothing more than "a medium of exchange," if the value of 
money did not inhere in the commercial value of the metal which served to represent it, 
whence came that value?
The wellspring was work. Thus labor was the criteria for determining value, and 
was, as Allen quoted from David Ricardo, "the ultimate price that is paid for everything." 
In constructing a theoretical basis for his argument, Allen made the fundamental point 
that a “perfect measure of anything," necessarily begins with “something absolute and 
invariable.” Rather than an absolute, value is a “relation,” the constant measure of which 
is indeterminable.101
That "relation" was labor and the volume of currency. The economic force of 
money is determined by the amount "in circulation against the quantity of business
99 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), p. 296; clipping, unidentified Middletown, New York, 
newspaper, n.d., AP. See also Washington Star (Eve.), 12 Oct. 1893, AP.
100 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), p. 296. The day before, Oct. 10, Allen submitted another 
resolution o f  inquiry into the government’s handling o f its finances. See pt. 2, p. 2361.
101 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), pp. 296-98, 315, 334. Quotations on 297. Ricardo 
(1772-1823) was an English political economist and Member o f Parliament. Allen also relied here on the 
writing o f American laissez-faire economist Arthur Latham Perry (1830-1905). For short biographies o f  
these men, see Mai, 177, 189-90.
1 (Y)[which included labor] and property in the country.” Therefore, after supporting his 
argument with lengthy readings from works of political economy, including Edward 
Kellogg’s Labor and Other Capital, Allen counseled: "Let us now cease to worship the 
golden calf of money as a measure of value and give the praise and credit to labor where 
it justly belongs." He went on: "Labor, and the law of supply and demand, a child of 
labor, measure values."103
For Allen there existed two other major fallacies about money. The first was the 
fallacy of contraction, the idea propagated by gold advocates that shrinking the money 
supply would not lessen the cost of labor or property. Allen thought the proponents of 
this view hypocritical, for they were against increasing the amount of money in 
circulation because, ironically, they expected it would raise the prices of both. He also 
thought them misinformed or misguided because, he asserted, each financial panic in 
American history had coincided with pronounced currency deflation.104
In fact, in the past quarter-century, the contraction fallacy had caused more harm 
"than all other" ideas about money put together. Currently, in addition to the hardship it 
visited upon agriculturalists, contraction and its effects were causing an increase in crime
102 Ibid., 299.
103 Ibid., 297-98. Quotations on 297. Kellogg (1790-1858) was an American businessman turned
financial theorist whose "producers1 philosophy" had a substantial influence on Gilded Age labor 
reformers, Greenbackers, and agrarian radicals. See Destler, "The Influence o f Edward Kellogg," 50-77. 
For quotation see 76. The full title o f Kellogg’s book (which Allen called “Labor and Capital”) is Labor 
and Other Capital: The Rights o f Each Secured and the Wrongs o f Both Eradicated. Or. an exposition o f  
the cause why few are wealthy and many poor, and the delineation o f a system, which, without infringing 
the rights o f  property, will give to labor its just reward (1849). Destler, 51.
104 Ibid., 299, 309,312,337.
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as well as a marked rise in business failures. Moreover, in Allen's view, if  the historical 
record and the treatises o f political economists demonstrated anything axiomatically, it 
was that constricted currency yielded expensive money and cheap property and labor. If 
continued, it would cause "the centralization of the wealth of a nation into the hands of a 
few, the ultimate debasement of labor, and the destruction of liberty itself."105
And there was now so little money in the country, Allen said, that “eight or ten 
thousand men” (of a population of almost sixty million) exercised command of it. In this 
regard the United States was following the lead o f the British Empire, where contraction 
had led to an oligarchy in which thirty thousand men owned all of the land and where 
“not one” person “out of...a thousand ever ownfed] a foot of soil upon which their feet 
stand.” Allen was amazed that, nevertheless, England was routinely characterized as an 
admirable society.106 In America, Allen explained, the amount o f currency in circulation
105 Ibid. As an example o f Allen’s use o f history to support his arguments, he cited a relationship 
between the supply o f money and both the fall o f  ancient Rome and the end o f medieval feudalism. He 
read an excerpt o f a quotation by Archibald Alison from N.A. Dunning’s Philosophy o f Price, which 
asserted that the demise o f the Roman Empire resulted from “the decline in the silver and gold mines o f  
Spain and Greece.” In the sixteenth century, according to Dunning, discoveries o f gold and silver in the 
New World brought about no less than the overthrow o f the last vestiges o f European feudalism. See 311- 
12, quote on 311. In addition to Perry, Ricardo, the American politician Henry Clay (1777-1852) and other 
authorities, Allen read, sometimes rather copiously, from works by Scottish philosopher and economist 
Adam Smith (1723-90), English utilitarian philosopher and classsical economist John Stuart Mill (1806- 
73), English utilitarian political economist William Stanley Jevons (1835-82), English free trade economist 
Henry Fawcett (1833-84), and English economic historian Thomas Doubleday (1790-1870).
Demonstrating a readiness to align himself with at least some o f the views o f radical theorists, Allen 
quoted the French economist and Saint-Simonian Michel Chevalier (1806-79), about whom Allen asserted 
that “no greater authority on money has ever lived,” (301), as well an economist identified only as “Prof. 
Thompson,” possibly Irish socialist William Thompson (1775-1833), but probably the British utilitarian 
“philosophical radical” and “class-alliance” chartist Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783-1869). See ibid., 
299-301, 303, 309, 312. For biographical sketches o f the Thompsons, see Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, 
eds., The Dictionary o f National Biography. 22 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921-22), 19:704- 
06 and 22 (Supplement): 1252-54; and John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New  
Palgrave: A Dictionary o f Economics, 4 vols. (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1987), 4:631-33.
106 Ibid., 300.
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was only $25 per capita, or one-half of its 1865 level. Worse still was the generally 
overlooked reality that, for common laborers, those who “earn their living by toil” rather 
than those who managed “gold and money as an occupation,” the figure was less than 
$15.107
The third major fallacy was the idea that silver suffered in comparison to gold 
because there was simply too much of it. In all of history, Allen contended, there had 
never been “a ranker fallacy” than this notion of overproduction. It had been rejected, he 
said, by every “respectable” political economist since James Mill (1773-1836), a point he 
illustrated by reading, often at great length, from the works of ten different economic 
theorists, one of whom was the contemporary American reform advocate and Populist
1 AO
sympathizer Richard T. Ely. In fact, Allen explained, the opposite of overproduction 
was true: as with all other elements of the economy, supply automatically created a 
demand for itself. On a global level the lessening demand for silver was the result of 
“concerted action” by the money power. By converting to a single gold standard, the 
advanced countries had arbitrarily created the prepotency of gold over silver; 
overproduction had had nothing to do with it. Allen added weight to this argument by
107 Ibid., 303, 309. Quotation on 309. The precise per-capita figure for the volume o f money in 1865, 
Allen reported, was forty-seven dollars.(303) Later in his speech Allen cited a different figure for current 
per-capita currency volume in the United States: $18.19. He compared this to the $38.74 figure for France, 
whose citizens he called “typically prosperous.”(321) On Allen’s views on contraction, see also ibid., 302, 
304-06.
108 Ibid., 313. Allen also gave lengthy statistics from reports o f the United States Mint and the Census 
Bureau. See 318, 321, 327-29. Mill was a British historian and economist. In addition to Mill, Perry, Say, 
and J.S. Mill, other economists Allen cited included American businessman and monetary theorist Amasa 
Walker (1799-1875), German historian and economist Wilhelm G. F. Roscher (1817-94), and Scottish 
economist James Ramsey McCulloch (1789-1864). (313-17) Mai, 152-53, 195, 235. On Ely, see 
Benjamin G. Rader, The Academic Mind and Reform: The Influence o f Richard T. Ely in American Life 
(Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1966), especially 89-90, 135.
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citing a treasury department report showing that, since 1792, the production of gold had 
actually exceeded that of silver.109
Being under no obligation to operate on the same monetary standard as Europe, 
all the United States need do, Allen argued, was unilaterally declare silver equal to gold 
as a material for use as money. In so doing, silver would definitely acquire its full status 
as money in the United States, and, quite probably, in the rest of the world as well, 
where, Allen claimed, widespread sentiment existed for an enlargement of the money 
supply through silver coinage.110
Allen was still speaking when the Senate galleries began to thin out at two 
o’clock the next morning (October 12).111 But he gave no indication that he was ready to
109 Ibid., 315, 318-19, 329. Quotation on 329.
110 Ibid. See also 320, 322-25. Allen also discussed three other "fallacies," which, if judged by the 
amount o f time he devoted to them, were o f lesser import than the others. The first two were closely 
related to the three already discussed. The fallacy o f the "double standard" was the notion that, because 
government policy reflected the biases o f the gold lobby, silver and gold represented a dual monetary 
standard. In asserting that there existed a single standard with two coinage materials, Allen was really 
describing what he thought ought rightfully to be the case rather than current reality.(298-99, 339) The 
fallacy o f "natural parity" was the idea that the demonetization o f  silver was necessary in order to establish 
parity between it and gold. But because no "natural" parity existed between the two metals, it was 
necessary to achieve it through legislation and the rejection o f intrinsic value.(329) The remaining fallacy 
was "the balance o f trade," which Allen defined as the belief that gold ought to be acquired through a 
"favorable" trade balance without regard to its effects on labor. In the "industrial war" it had to fight in its 
quest for profit, the money power sought "to industrially enslave" American workers.(329) The nation that 
acquires the most gold, Allen later explained, will be that which inflicts the worst economic degradation on 
its workers. But if  the economic status o f American laborers was to be reduced to that prevailing in 
Europe, then "what," Allen asked, "becomes o f the glory o f living under a republican form of 
government. "(3 3 3) Not surprisingly, Allen maintained that the pursuit o f  gold was certainly an 
unquestionable evil if  it required injuring "civilization itself'(Quotation on 329; see also 315, 331-32, 334).
In addition to his list o f  fallacies surrounding monetary theory Allen attempted to refute a charge 
that had been made in the Senate concerning the Sherman law: that it was principally responsible for the 
massive gold exports o f recent years. Noting that most gold had returned to the United States and that the 
rest under proper conditions would return, Allen argued that if  the Sherman Act had driven gold out o f the 
country, it had also caused its retum.(329-30)
111 Washington Evening Star, 12 Oct. 1893, AP.
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stop, and he continued to develop his argument against the repeal act. Allen spoke out in 
defense of the nation’s poor, who suffered from both the evils of deflation and the 
indifference of the well-to-do. The latter group of citizens were probably more or less 
synonymous with the “money power,” for which, in the interest of clarity, Allen 
provided a definition: that segment of the population in the United States and Europe 
who had power over, and who gained their enormous wealth from, passive 
investments— loans, securities, bonds—and whose members wanted, because they 
benefited financially, a contracted money supply. In other words: “That body of men, 
small though it may be ... who are combined against the prosperity of the farmer and 
laborer throughout the civilized world.” Allen quoted at length from the Populist 
newspaper, the American Non-Conformist, which he praised for its reporting on the
1 1 9purposes and plots of the financial community.
Finally, Allen took up the subject of England. He recited a long historical list of 
that country’s crimes against the American colonies and the United States, recounted its 
record of large-scale investments in American enterprises and lamented the influence the 
mother country exercised on account of its vast American holdings. England promoted 
the gold standard, Allen alleged, because her colonies produced large amounts of that 
metal, while, in contrast, they mined relatively little silver. Mixing the image of 
Shakespeare’s ruthless usurer with allusions to Greek mythology, he declared that repeal 
of the Sherman Act was “a Trojan horse” that concealed “two monster Shy locks, like 
Argus, hundred-eyed, and, like Briareus, hundred-handed.” These were the financial
112 CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), pp. 330, 335. Quotations on 330. See also 331, 336-39.
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houses of Wall and Lombard streets, “both alike reaching out their long, bony, and 
merciless hands for their pounds of flesh,” without regard for the well-being of the 
masses, concerned only with advancing their own interests. Will the Congress watch as 
the people are “crushed beneath the wheels of this modem Juggernaut,” Allen asked, or 
will “we strangle the Laocoon before it strikes our people and our homes? Let those who 
answer yes go read the Declaration of Independence and answer to the people.” England 
had done nothing, he argued, that should make congress want to “strengthen the sinews 
of the harpy hands of this colossal Shylock that has the debtors of the world by the 
throat.”113
Again interposing classical references between references to the Bard of Avon’s
pitiless moneylender, Allen ended his speech in a grand, if rather histrionic, rhetorical
style. For his part, he would
ask no favors and wear the collar of no man; and when the Shylocks of England, 
Wall Street, and the East, and their coadjutors, ask that the rights of the people 
be surrendered, my answer, so far as I am concerned, will be that not one jot or 
tittle of these rights shall be surrendered while life lasts, if I can prevent it; we 
will meet them in Boeotia before they proceed to Attica, and we will not permit 
them to put their shirt of Nessus upon the back of American labor. We bid the 
Shylocks and money lords, here and hereafter, open and bitter defiance.114
Allen had talked all night (until 7:45 a.m., October 12), and in so doing he had 
made bit of history. At fourteen consecutive hours, his was the longest continuous
113 Ibid., 339-40. Quotations on 339. Because o f the syntax here, it may appear that Allen believed 
Laocoon, the Trojan priest o f Apollo who had attempted to convince his fellow citizens to disallow the
entry o f the wooden horse into the city, and who later was killed by serpents, to be an evil. The guess here 
is that it was a metaphor for the Populist, and perhaps for anyone else, who warned against the money 
power.
114 Ibid., 340.
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speech ever given in the Senate.115 As such, and due to the surrounding circumstances, 
Allen’s performance prompted commentary from newspapers all across the United States 
and England. An initial examination of editorial response suggests that opinion fell 
along ideological lines (pro versus anti-silver), and that even supporters of repeal were 
impressed by Allen’s determination and stamina.116
115 Unidentified newspaper clipping titled "Our Own Allen," n.d., AP. For comments on Allen's 
speech as a record-breaker, see the Evening News (Washington, D.C.), 12 Oct. 1893, AP; The Wall Street 
Journal, 12 Oct. 1893, 1:2; Washington, D.C. Post, n.d., clipping, AP; Albert Shaw, "William V. Allen: A 
Populist. A Character Sketch and Interview," Review o f Reviews, July 1894, 36; Madison Star Mail, 12 
Jan. 1924. During the 1800s lengthy speeches were common in the Senate and occasionally ran for 
"several days." The duration o f those addresses however, cannot be discerned from the Congressional 
Record. Accurate records o f speech lengths were not kept until the twentieth century. See Byrd, 477.
116 Excerpts from the Silver Knight (Washington, D.C.), n.d.; Washington D.C. Post, n.d.; Hartford 
(Connecticut) Telegram, 13 Oct. 1893: Derrick Oil City (Pennsylvania), 17 Oct. 1893; Fort Wayne 
(Indiana) Journal. 13 Oct. 1893, all in "William V. Allen," campaign pamphlet, n.d., AP; Butler County 
(Nebraska) Press. 20 Oct. 1893, clipping, AP; unidentified Montana newspaper, n.d., clipping o f article 
titled "Senator Allen's Reward," AP; Weekly News, (Savannah, Georgia) 21 Oct. 1893, clipping, AP; 
Dakota Farmers Leader (Canton, S.D.), 09 Feb. 1894; Hicks, 312. For the reaction of some papers in the 
British Isles, see excerpts from the St. James Gazette (England), 15 Oct. 1893; Westminster Gazette 
(London), 13 Oct. 1893; Glasgow Herald (Scotland), 14 Oct. 1893, all in "Allen" pamphlet; Eastern Daily 
Press (Norwich, England), 14 Oct. 1893, clipping, AP; The Leeds Mercury, 11 Oct. 1893, clipping, AP; 
Newcastle Daily Chronicle (England), 14 Oct. 1893, clipping, AP. The authors o f the few surviving letters 
responding to Allen's speech were very pleased with it. See Alexander Athey to Allen, 17 Oct. 1893; J. 
Adam Snider to Allen, 10 Mar. 1894; E.H. Woodruff to Allen, 20 Mar. 1894; A.G. Wolfenbarger to Allen, 
2 Apr. 1894; G.S. Trowbridge to Allen, 14 Apr. 1894, all in AP. For the parliamentary record o f Allen's 
speech, see the CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, pp. 2391-96. As the special session wound down Allen 
received what was probably his first exposure in national publications. The Nation was singularly 
unimpressed with Allen's long anti-repeal speech, which it thought "mostly wind." The Nation, 2 Nov. 
1893, 1). Another observer wrote that although Allen was "a Populist, with a head filled with wrong 
financial notions," he was also "a conservative, pure, incorruptible man who won renown as an eminent 
attorney and a just, upright judge, whose acts o f kindness and charity are legion." Frank Basil Tracy, “Rise 
and Doom of the Populist Party,” Forum 16: (Oct. 1893): 247-48. See also the brief reference to Allen in 
Review o f Reviews. Nov. 1893, 499. One paper that expressed high praise for Allen’s speech was the 
Sioux City (probably Iowa) Journal. In rejecting intrinsic value, the Nebraska senator “really went to the 
root o f the money question.” “He got back,” as a Journal writer put it, “to the fiat doctrine, which really is 
the basis upon which the populist theory rests, whether they all know it or not, and to which they must 
come.” In the writer’s view Allen was “bold, vigorous and radical, yet cool and self-contained.” Senators 
Kyle and Peffer, Allen’s Populist colleagues, “have suddenly been dwarfed by the abler and more forceful 
new senator.” Excerpted in Omaha World-Herald, n.d., AP.
It should be noted here that Allen denied favoring “an unlimited issue o f  irredeemable paper money.” 
Yet his position was ambiguous, perhaps even contradictory. On one hand, Allen railed against intrinsic 
value, voted for a fiat money amendment offered by Peffer (voted down fifty-eight to seven), and stated 
approvingly that on occasion limited amounts o f legal tender fiat money had been issued in both the United
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The continuous session that began with the start of Allen’s speech (the October 
11-12 installment) went on for almost forty hours, ending at 1:45 a.m., October 13, when 
the physically exhausted pro-repeal majority gave up, a real but minor victory for the
117 ♦ ♦silverites. The filibuster continued, however, and Allen not only remained foursquare 
against repeal, but grew increasingly defiant as the majority edged toward victory. On 
October 16, when Senator John M. Palmer, an Illinois Democrat, accused Allen of 
deliberately wasting the Senate’s time with his lengthy speechmaking, Allen, alluding to 
the influence o f President Cleveland on pro-repeal Democrats, belligerently responded 
that “I am not here with a brass collar around my neck, as some Senators are in this 
chamber.”118
The denouement was on October 24, when a group of farm-state Democrats, 
under intense pressure from the President, gave up resistance, thereby ending the 
filibuster.119 During the next week Allen expressed disappointment with the outcome, 
calling repeal the “most iniquitous” legislation ever passed in Congress. Even when it 
had become evident that the cause was hopelessly lost, he proclaimed his willingness to 
fight until the battle could be won, a sentiment he demonstrated by introducing two
States and Great Britain. On the other hand, he denied that he sought such an issue o f money, and at one 
point stated that, in point o f  historical fact, paper money printed and used “in civilized countries has been a 
redeemable paper money.” CR. 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3 (Appendix), p. 292 (includes quotations). See 
also 299, 330. Information on the Peffer amendment is in Clarence Nelson Roberts, “A Congressional 
History o f the Populists” (M.A. thesis, University o f Missouri, 1936), 39. A sympathetic overview that 
contains numerous excerpts o f Allen’s Senate speeches during the special session, with special emphasis 
on his Oct. 7 and 11 marathon effort, is in Tipton, 362-80.
117 Nichols, 39-40.
118 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 2, p. 2541.
119 Burdette, 66-68; Nichols, 50-51.
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190foredoomed amendments providing for silver coinage. On October 30 the Senate
* 191passed the repeal bill by a vote of forty-three to thirty-two. On November 3, the last 
day of the session, Allen spoke in favor of postponing adjournment. The Senate, he 
stated, should begin work on tariff reform and on legislation to mitigate the harmful
129
effects of the repeal bill, which he asserted were already becoming manifest.
After the session Allen told a public audience that the federal government was
199quickly evolving into an aristocracy. The next day he and the rest of the Populist 
congressional bloc, with Senators Stewart and John P. Jones of Nevada, released a 
lengthy statement to the American people condemning repeal of the Sherman Act in 
particular and the movement for gold monometallism generally. The struggle between 
the few favoring “gold oligarchy,” and the people, fighting for “constitutional liberty,” 
was, the silverites asserted, “momentous and irrepressible.” They called on their fellow 
citizens to crush the gold conspiracy, participants of which, they claimed, during the 
repeal debate had filled the mail of opponents with “intimidation and threats of personal 
violence.” Subsequent elections, the address contended, would determine “whether this 
is a government o f caste or a government o f the people, whether gold shall be king and
120 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3, pp. 2889, 2920, 2925. Quotation is on 2889.
121 Ibid., 2958; Matthews, 113.
122 CR, 53-1, 1893, vol. 25, pt. 3, pp. 3112-13. The New York Sun (4 Nov. 1893), reported that on 3 
November the Populist senators briefly tried to initiate a filibuster in order to extend the session. Clipping, 
AP.
123 Clipping from unidentified newspaper, titled ‘“ Senator Allen Heard’ an Account o f  a ‘Populist 
Rally at Washington Hall,”’ AP.
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the people subjects, or whether” the people would assert their constitutional prerogatives 
and recapture the government.124
Looking back on the special session, the Sioux City Journal, which was already 
speaking favorably of Allen for president in 1896, held that he was the foremost 
exponent of Populist principles in the Senate.125 Perhaps so. What was probably far less 
debatable at the time, however, was that, with the depression showing no signs of 
abating, there would be in the upcoming regular session much reason to further elaborate 
on those principles.
124 New York Tribune. 5 Nov. 1893, AP. Another paper, dated 6 Nov., referred to the statement as a 
"Manifesto." Unidentified clipping, AP.
125 Sioux City Journal, clipping, n.d., AP.
CHAPTER THREE
Legislation and the Commonweal: “Omaha Populism” in the Depths of Depression,
1894-1895
“We were always under the impression that the supreme test of 
Populism was the acceptance of [the Omaha] platform . . . ”
Charles X. Matthews, editor of the Populist newspaper 
The American Non-Conformist February, 18951
Commenting on the dim view Karel Bicha takes of Senator Allen in Western 
Populism, historian David Trask, while concurring that Allen was not a Populist, took 
Bicha to task for using the Omaha Platform of 1892 as the standard for substantiating 
Populist commitment. Formulated as a national campaign manifesto designed to appeal 
to diverse constituencies, the platform was meant to “establish a loose sense of common 
purpose” rather than to state an essential doctrine that required complete devotion. At 
the time of Allen’s election, Trask remarked, it is likely that few Populists adhered to the 
whole platform. “Only later,” he wrote “did the splinter, middle-of-the-road faction” 
demand allegiance to all elements of the Omaha document.
1 Quoted in Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s 
Party (Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1974), 208.
2 David S. Trask, review o f Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism, by Karel 
Bicha, Nebraska History 59 (1978): 152. Beyond the fact that Allen was elected with the help o f  
Democratic votes, Trask offered no analysis or evidence to support his dismissal o f  Allen’s Populism. 
Allen’s reliance on Democratic votes for his election has also been emphasized by Peter Argersinger, who 
suggested that the Democrats’ support o f Allen is indicative o f the latter’s illegitimacy as a Populist. 
However, given that Allen was an announced Populist and that he insisted he embraced the party’s 
principles, and with the Nebraska legislature that elected him having sixty-two Republicans, fifty-three 
Populists, and eighteen Democrats, we ought to ask: (1) What were the Democrats, eleven o f whom were 
Bryanite liberals supposed to do, remain firmly committed to one o f their own, none o f whom stood any 
chance o f winning? Throw their support to the Republicans, for whom Bryanism was radical nonsense?
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Trask was correct in recognizing the diversity within Populism, but his rejection 
of Bicha’s criteria for measuring the movement was misguided. While Populists had 
various concerns and commitments, the Omaha Platform, as Robert McMath has written,
• •  •  •  iwas “the clearest and most unadulterated expression of Populist political thought.” At 
the Omaha Convention it was drawn up swiftly and with “little controversy.”4 As John 
Hicks observed, over time Populists gave it “a sort o f religious sanction” and its demands 
achieved the status of “a sacred creed.”5 As Populist Senator William Peffer put it, the 
principles expressed in the platform were to Populists “what the Apostle’s creed is to 
Christians--a compendium of their faith.”6 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most of 
what Gene Clanton calls “the bible of the movement” had the support of at least a
n
majority of Populists. Given that, and in the absence of a better alternative for gauging
And moving to the heart o f the matter (2) What were the Populists supposed to do, decline to have one o f  
their own elected until such time as it could be done without the aid o f either o f  the other parties? That it 
was impossible for Allen to be elected outright by Populists, as Senator William Peffer had been in Kansas, 
is not justification, by itself, for questioning his commitment to the Populist reform agenda. See 
Argersinger, 199. On the progressive politics o f  Bryan, which had considerable overlap with Populist 
ideology, see Robert W. Cherny, A Righteous Cause: The Life o f  William Jennings Bryan (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1985) and Louis W. Koenig, Bryan: A Political Biography o f  William Jennings 
Bryan (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971).
3 Robert C. McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1993), 167.
4 Ibid., 168. The exception to party harmony at the convention was the debate on woman
suffrage.
5 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party 
(1931; reprint, Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1961), 232.
6 William A. Peffer, Populism, Its Rise and Fall, ed. Peter H. Argersinger, (Lawrence: University 
o f Kansas Press, 1992), 176.
7 Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane Preference in America, 1890-1900 (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1991), 82.
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Populist commitment, the Omaha Platform is the best (though not the only) yardstick for 
assessing a given individual’s Populist bona tides.
Historian Peter Argersinger believed that if Allen was a Populist at all, he was no 
more than a “Silver Populist,” that is to say, one who had little or no dedication to the
o
principles of the Omaha Platform aside from its demand for unlimited silver coinage. 
Because of his focus on and antipathy to Allen’s party activities, Argersinger may have 
assumed that, as a silverite, Allen must have been a single-plank Populist with a 
monothematic agenda precluding any loyalty to what Argersinger calls “Omaha 
Populism”: an adherence to the comprehensive whole of the principles and demands of 
the Omaha Platform in which silver was held to be a minor element.9
The picture looks quite different however, when we train our lens on the 
legislative arena, where Allen conducted most of his Populist-related activities. This 
chapter will examine Allen’s Senate work during the regular sessions of the fifty-third
8 Argersinger, Populism and Politics. 252. For a fuller context o f how Argersinger saw Silver 
Populists, and to whom among Populist leaders he thought the phrase applied, see ibid., pages 192-275 
(chapters 7-8).
9 For Argersinger’s employment o f the phrase “Omaha Populism,” see ibid., 192, 223, 234, 270, 
313-14. I will use “Silver” and “Omaha” Populism as ideological terms, and “fusionist” and “mid-roader” 
as strategic-political terms. Argersinger usually conflates these two classifications, with Silver/fusion and 
Omaha/mid-road Populists each constituting a coterminous pairing (“There remained o f course some 
original Populists who continued to reject the demand for Silver Populism and its accompanying 
predilection for fusion.”) 231. From this reductionist perspective, even if  a fusionist can be shown to have 
supported most or the entire Omaha Platform, it would not follow that he or she was an Omaha Populist. 
However, I proceed on the view that party politics and policy politics are two sets o f means, to each of 
which we may separately apply normative judgment in terms o f the principles by which they are inspired 
and which they seek to advance. Although on occasion Argersinger does make the distinction I advocate 
here (The 1896 St. Louis Populist convention delegates “were well prepared to acknowledge silver and 
fusion as the only major goal and acceptable strategy o f the party.’5) for him all exercises in fusion 
“subordinated principle to politics.” It strikes me as conceivable that, at times, fusion might not have 
constituted such subordination, and that in some instances, strange as it may sound, anti-fusion might itself 
have been a betrayal o f Populist principle. For “strategy” quotation see ibid., 264; for “subordinated” 
quotation see ibid., 265.
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Congress, focusing particularly on how he responded to issues bearing on “Omaha 
Populism.” It will explore whether a staunch silverite (as distinguished from “Silver 
Populist”), who had gained his position with the aid of Democrats, could also be an 
“Omaha” Populist.10
These first two regular Senate sessions in which Allen sat more or less coincided 
with the trough of the depression. By the end of 1893, 642 banks had failed, including 
sixty-nine national banks, and between April and December wages fell by more than nine 
percent.11 For the year prior to July 1, 1894, roughly two-thirds of all railroad stock paid 
no dividends, and at the end of this period nearly 200 railroad companies were in 
receivership. In 1894, business investment continued to fall, overall economic activity 
dropped to roughly 20 percent under capacity, and the gross national product declined 3 
percent.12 Agriculture remained depressed. In the fall of 1894, to cite one indicator, the
1 3price of wheat was fifty cents a bushel, the lowest of the century.
10 The dates o f the second and third sessions were 4 Dec. 1893 to 28 Aug. 1894, and 3 Dec. 1894 
to 2 Mar. 1895.
11 Douglas Steeples and David O. Whitten, Democracy in Desperation: The Depression o f 1893 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), 34 (on the banks); and Charles Hoffman, The 
Depression o f the Nineties: An Economic History (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing 
Corporation, 1970), 67 (on wages). Hoffman notes that during this period the hardship on workers was 
lessened “somewhat” due to a reduction in the cost o f  living.
12 Hoffman, xxxii, 63, 276. R. Hal Williams, Years o f Decision: American Politics in the 1890s 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 86. Nationally, wealth grew by 48 percent for the decade, in 
contrast to eighty percent during the 1880s. Hoffman, 11.
13 Matthew Josephson, The Politicos: 1865-1896 (1938; reprint New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1966), 589. The price o f farm products overall declined by 56 percent between 1869-1896. 
Hoffman, 30. In a sign o f the times, Allen’s home state had gained 600,000 residents in the 1880s; in the 
1890s the increase was 3,600. Steeples and Whitten, 87.
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Labor was hit hard too. In the winter of 1893-1894 unemployment rose to nearly 
18 percent.14 The approximately 1400 strikes in 1894 were the fifth highest yearly total 
theretofore. The number of both strikers (505,049) and strike-engendered job losses 
(660,425) were new highs in American history.15 Historian Allen Nevins called the year 
beginning 1 July 1894 the United States’ annee terrible of the period between 1877 and 
the First World War.16
Despite the worst economic slump in American history to that time, or perhaps 
because of it, Allen was optimistic concerning the political prospects of Populism, which 
were “very flattering indeed.” He told a reporter that the People’s Party would presently 
overtake the old parties, because Americans would soon understand that the paramount 
issue, which upon “scientific and just” resolution will eliminate ninety percent of “the 
evils afflicting society,” is the money question, “its issuance and control, its use and 
abuse.” The people will continue “to agitate” this issue, until it is eventually and fairly 
settled in the interests of everyone, rather than the small number o f men and corporations 
that have long directed the activity of all branches of the government to their own ends, 
and who lack “the slightest concern for the welfare of the humble and poor.” Populists 
insisted on improved “social conditions” for all ranks of society and the victorious
14 Hoffman, 109-10. Hoffman, recalling that repeal o f  the Sherman Silver Act had been sold as a 
sure generator o f prosperity, notes, interestingly, that one o f the “direct effects” o f repeal was the loss o f  
thousands o f mining jobs, increasing the expanding “army o f unemployed.” Ibid., 111.
15 Harold U. Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1959), 169.
16 Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 
1948), 649.
People’s Party would eliminate all special advantages “incompatible with public safety
17and the general welfare.”
The most prominent financial debate of the regular session was the perennial 
question of the tariff The Omaha Platform had charged the major parties with ignoring 
the nation’s most important reform needs, and with seeking “to drown the outcries of a 
plundered people with the uproar of a sham battle over the tariff.” Such artful dodging
10
obscured the multiple means by which the privileged elite oppressed the people.
Allen agreed. Relative to the pressing issues facing the country, the tariff was “a 
mere bauble” which for purposes of public manipulation was “the subject of repeated 
sham battles” between the mainstream parties.19 Because its main political function was 
to distract the people from the most crucial issues, it was ceaselessly “thrown before the 
people.. .like a ball of yam to a kitten, that it may jump at it from time to time to amuse 
itself.”20
While Allen concurred with the Omaha Platform concerning the politics of the 
tariff, he was unable to ignore the issue for two interconnected reasons. First, although 
less important than the money question in every respect, to him the tariff was
17 “Senator Allen Speaks o f the Outlook in Politics,” Deseret News Bureau unidentified 
newspaper clipping, 12 Feb. 1894, Allen papers (hereafter AP), Nebraska State Historical Society 
(hereafter NSHS).
18 National Party Platforms: Volume 1 1840-1956. compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1978), 90.
19 The first quote is from Congressional Record (hereafter CR). 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., 1895, vol. 
27, pt. 2, p. 975; the second from “Senator Allen Speaks.”
20 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 975.
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0 1“important” because its tangible economic effects were considerable. The platform 
itself acknowledged this, although in elliptical fashion, in a plank that stated that the 
nation’s money should be retained “as much as possible in the hands of the people,” and
therefore demanded that all federal and state revenues be confined to the essential
00“expenses of the government, economically and honestly administered.” Second, 
because in 1892 the Democratic Party had made tariff reform one of its major campaign 
promises, in 1894 the tariff was the subject to which congress most devoted its 
attention.23
Philosophically, Allen was opposed to protectionism. As he saw it, other than the 
special and infrequent cases of temporary protection sanctionable under the constitution, 
tariffs were valid for revenue purposes only.24 The protective tariff, Allen insisted, ought
21 “Senator Allen Speaks.” Probably the tariff, about which farmers were, according to Harold 
Faulkner, “confused,” was a more important phenomenon than many Populists realized or than most 
Populist historians have appreciated. See Faulkner, 56. As John Hicks observed, the rigged 
macroeconomics that had farmers buying in protected markets, and selling in open ones, had an 
“oppressive nature.” This reality was fully understood by Southern farmers. Plank five o f the Southern 
Alliance Platform formulated in 1890 at Ocala, Florida states: “Believing in the doctrine o f equal rights to 
all and special privileges to none, we demand— a. That our national legislation shall be so framed in the 
future as not to build up one industry at the expense o f another, [and] b. We further demand a removal o f  
the existing heavy tariff tax from the necessities o f life, that the poor o f  our land must have.” Hicks, 80-81, 
431. Thus, as a former Republican from the Midwest, Allen’s work on the tariff bill ought rightfully to be 
viewed as prudently pragmatic. That Allen saw the tariff as economically significant is based on his 
various critical comments concerning the special-interest nature o f most contemporary tariff lobbying and 
legislation.
22 Johnson, 91.
23 Faulkner, 157-161; Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President. Congress and Legislation (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 89-94.
24 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, pp. 4865-67; pt. 6, p. 5920. Albert Shaw, "William V. Allen: A 
Populist. A Character Sketch and Interview," Review of Reviews 10 (July 1894): 39.
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rightfully to be called the “prohibitive tariff,” as its purpose was to prevent the natural 
functioning of the free market.
* 7(\ •In practice the tariff was a “legalized system of larceny.” Though lawful, it was 
an unconstitutional and confiscatory transfer of wealth in which a few are made very rich
' J ' lwhile the masses continue to suffer poverty. On the Senate floor in May 1894, Allen
explained the distasteful irony of the situation:
It is a little bit singular that Senators who stand in this Chamber from day to day 
and denounce paternalism and put it all on the Populist party.. .will stand here 
and advocate the most notorious act of paternalism of which this country can be 
guilty. What is it but paternalism for a government by legal enactment to put its 
hand into the pocket of one citizen, like a pickpocket, take his money by force of 
law and put it in the pocket of another?28
Denouncing protection as “rapine and robbery,” he accused its advocates of seeking to 
construct “colossal private fortunes ... at the expense” of farmers and “industrial 
interests.” Of such paternalism the “wildest-eyed, the longest-haired Populist of the 
West never dreamed ... He believes in working honestly for his livelihood, living under
29honest laws with equal opportunities.”
25 William Vincent Allen, “The Prohibitive Tariff,” unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d., AP.
26 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4867.
27 Ibid.; “Senator Allen Speaks.” Allen was adamant about the unconstitutionality o f 
preferentialism: “[T]he Constitution... marks out the line o f  taxation ... so plainly that almost a blind man 
can read it; but I believe the spirit o f  avarice which has existed in this country so long ... and is manifested 
here [in the Senate] daily, has overridden the plain language o f the Constitution ... and so far as it has any 
practical effect upon this question it is a mere rope o f sand ... because men who desire to make money out 
o f their brother men unlawfully have overridden the Constitution in this Chamber and in the other end of 
the Capitol.” Pt. 6, p. 5466. See also pt. 5, pp. 4862-66. On Populists’ devotion to the Constitution, see 
chapter two above.
28 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4867.
29 Ibid. See also 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 975, 981.
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Allen seemingly did the best he could with the tariff legislation (the Wilson-
O A
Gorman Bill), which was the focus of Senate debate for five months. He endeavored to
have the duties removed on various items important to westerners, particularly those
•  •  ^1basic to shelter and energy such as coal, lumber, and other building materials. He
o A
argued against favored treatment of luxury items. He crafted an amendment aimed at 
eliminating proposed features of the sugar schedules beneficial to the “sugar trust.” In 
accordance with a resolution approved by the 1892 Omaha Convention, he voiced 
opposition to federal corporate bounty subsidies.34 Allen charged the Senate with failing
or
to solicit the opinions of labor organizations concerning tariff reform. He pointed to 
the tariff as a principal cause of the wage reductions leading to the current violence on 
the part of coal miners in Pennsylvania.36 He submitted what Senator William Peffer 
(Populist, Kansas) Called a “very important” resolution, directing the Treasury 
department to provide data to the Senate showing the number of workers whose wages 
were or would be affected by the tariff, and whether under the tariff alien workers were
30 Faulkner, 158.
31 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 6, pp. 5213-19, 5463-65, 5468-69, 5501-04, 5472-73; pt. 7, p. 6454- 
57, 6562-65, 7111-15, 7125-26.
32 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6523-27, 7124.
33 Ibid., 7070-71.
34 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 3, pp. 2763-64, 2771-72. The resolution stated “[t]hat we oppose 
any subsidy or national aid to any private corporation for any purpose.” Hicks, 444.
35 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 3, p. 2506.
36 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6454.
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•  • •  ' X ldisplacing United States citizens in protected industries. Returning to a Populist 
concern he had addressed during the special session, and which now informed his 
critique of President Cleveland’s bond-issuing policies (see below), Allen offered an 
amendment to the tariff bill requiring that all surplus revenue collected under the new 
legislation be administered as a “sacred trust fund” to finance payments covering the 
national debt “as rapidly as it matures.”
The tariff debate included one other notable aspect, one of immense interest to 
Populists. The Wilson-Gorman Act included the first national income tax provision (two 
percent annually on incomes above four thousand dollars) to be enacted since the 1872 
repeal of the Civil War income tax. The Omaha Platform had explicitly called for a 
graduated income tax.39
37 Ibid., pp. 6147, 6496-97, 6802-03, 6863-64; pt. 5, p. 4797, 4798 (for the Peffer quotation),
4799; pt. 6, pp. 5374-77, 5398, 5403-06. Peffer told his Senate colleagues that “The people are very much 
interested in acquiring this particular class o f  information.” (4798)
38 CR. 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 7012-13. See also ibid., 6716. In his concern about federal 
debt Allen was probably influenced, or at least emboldened, by the National (Northern or Northwestern) 
Farmers’ Alliance. The third plank o f  its 1889 platform reads, in part: “We favor the payment o f  the public 
debt as rapidly as possible.” Fred A Shannon, American Farmers’ Movements (Princeton: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 148. Allen voted for the final Wilson-Gorman bill, which reduced duties 
from an average 49.5 percent to 41 percent, because he saw it as an improvement over the McKinley Tariff 
Act o f 1890. The bill was not as “radical” a reform o f  the tariff as Allen wanted, but he remarked that it 
would provide some financial relief to the poor while shifting a larger share o f the tax burden onto the 
under-taxed wealthy. See p. 7134; unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d. (15 Sept. 1895 dateline), AP; 
Donald R. Matthews, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House o f Representatives 
(New York: Wiley, 1975), 114. For more o f Allen’s work on the tariff, see CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 3, 
p. 2507-08; pt. 4, 3410, 3611; pt. 6, pp. 5764-65, 5873-5876, 5911-12, 5915-19; pt. 7, 6053, 7052-56, 
7127-28.
39 Matthews, 114; John F. Witte, “Taxation,” The Encyclopedia o f the United States Congress. 
vol.4, ed. Donald C. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson and Morton Keller (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 
1925. Johnson, 91.
93
In the Senate Allen and his Populist colleague James H. Kyle (South Dakota) 
were the leading advocates for approval of the new tax.40 Although Allen did not attempt 
to explain how the tax would rectify the problem, he emphasized what he saw as the 
unjust and contrived imbalance in wealth among the nation’s people, implying that the 
income tax would partially correct the disparity. In a long speech on the income tax 
amendment, Allen argued that the Government had a duty to promote equal opportunity 
and insisted that it would be unacceptable for it not to try to change the circumstances 
responsible for allowing—as he said was the case—twenty percent of the nation’s 
population to possess eighty percent of its wealth. Allen cited statistics on wealth 
concentration from several sources, including one from a scholarly journal showing that 
nine percent of American families owned nearly three-quarters of the country’s wealth.41 
This could not be attributed to “improvidence” of the people on one hand, or the talent of 
a few in the business world on the other, but to “vicious legislation” favoring a privileged
42few. Before long, he suggested, “a very few thousand men” would own all of the 
wealth, while the common people would “become a vast agricultural and mining 
peasantry, practically slaves.”43
40 Witte, 1925; Gene Clanton, Congressional Populism and the Crisis o f  the 1890s (Lawrence: 
University o f Kansas Press, 1998), 76-78.
41 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6714, 6716. The journal article, written by an official o f  the 
Census Bureau, was from the Dec. 1893 issue o f The Political Science Quarterly. According to Steeples 
and Whitten (20), in 1890 in the United States (population 63 million), two hundred thousand citizens 
“controlled” seventy percent o f the nation’s wealth.
42 Ibid., 6716.
43 Ibid., 6714.
94
An income tax, Allen thought, would increase the level of fairness in the tax 
system overall. He asserted that many well-off people sought to avoid paying their fair 
share of taxes, and that the laws were written so that the higher one’s income, the more it 
was shielded from taxation. Responsibility for funding the government increasingly and 
disproportionately fell to the nation’s poorer citizens.44 Responding to a Senator’s 
complaint that the income tax constituted a prosperity tax, Allen wondered: If the tax 
burden were not placed “ratably upon the prosperous, in God’s name where would you 
rest it?” To put it on the poor, he suggested, was not the proper answer.45
Allen was careful to explain that he did not begrudge the wealthy their fortunes so 
long as they were honestly and honorably acquired, but he insisted that what was being 
asked of them was perfectly reasonable. During his long income tax speech Allen 
presented a recent list published in the New York World showing the calculated tax bills 
for dozens of New York millionaires under the proposed amendment, revealing, for 
example, that the obligation of the top income-eamer on the list (William W. Astor) 
would be $178,000 on an annual income of $8,900,000.46 In accordance with his party, 
Allen would have had the tax be progressive, for he maintained that a man ought to 
support the government in proportion to his ability to pay.47 Thus, when Senator Peffer
44 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 971.
45 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6715.
46 CR. 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6703, 6706, 6711-12. Allen, observing the presence on the 
list o f two “preachers o f the gospel” with $250,000 annual incomes, commented: “They are preaching the 
gospel o f Christ; they are preaching the doctrine o f peace on earth and good will to men, and yet they enjoy 
princely fortunes. Should they not pay an income tax?” (6714)
47 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 971; Shaw, 40. It is instructive, by way o f assessing Allen’s 
political ideology, to note that the graduated income tax had been one o f the demands o f the Greenback
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introduced an amendment to make the income tax graduated, Allen voted for it, one of
48only five senators to do so.
At bottom, the income tax debate was for Allen a Manichean struggle pitting the 
forces of fairness and opportunity against those o f covetousness and unpatriotic special 
privilege. Concerning the assortment o f objections to the income tax put forth by its 
opponents in the Senate, Allen averred that it is “the argument of avarice.. .of cupidity ... 
o f the man who loves his lucre more than he loves his country,” who desires to throw the 
burden of financing the government “upon the poor and distressed and those least able to 
bear it.”49 Reflecting on the comments made by some that the implementation of an 
income tax would induce a good many people to leave the country, Allen told the Senate 
that to any American citizen whose sense of patriotism is so slight that he would rather 
depart than shoulder his fair share of taxes, “I say, may his flight from the United States 
be speedy and his stay be perpetual.” He continued: “We do not need men of that kind in 
this country. We do not want them here. They are a curse to this country, and the sooner 
they leave and the longer they stay [away] the better off we shall be.”50
Party. See Elmer Ellis, “Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900” in Historical Vistas: Readings in 
United States History vol. 2: 1865 to the Present, eds. Robert Wiebe and Grady McWhiney (Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, Inc., 1964), 121, reprinted from Mississippi Valiev Historical Review, 37 (1940), 225-42.
48 Clarence Nelson Roberts, “A Congressional History o f the Populists,” (M.A. thesis, University 
o f Missouri, 1936), 95-96; Clanton, Congressional Populism. 77. In addition to Allen and Peffer, the other 
supporting votes came from Kyle and Republicans Henry Teller (Colorado) and Watson Squire 
(Washington).
49 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6716.
50 Ibid., 6709.
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Allen argued for a different perspective on taxes. Embracing a level of civicism 
that probably stunned many of his Senate colleagues, he reflected that “Taxation is 
spoken of in this chamber as a burden. It is spoken of in our law books as a burden. But 
it occurs to me that every patriotic citizen ought to look upon it as a privilege to pay his 
just proportion” of state and federal taxes, one that “every.. .citizen ought to rejoice that 
he enjoys.” A civil government lacking the power of taxation is unimaginable, he 
concluded, “and without the application of this sovereign power from time to time to 
maintain our Government it could not exist.”51
The Omaha Platform contained four specific financial demands in addition to 
revenue restraint and the income tax. These were a government-issued national currency 
with a “just” and “equitable” means of distributing it that did not involve banking 
corporations, free silver at a 16:1 ratio, an increase in the available money supply to fifty
52dollars per capita, and the creation by the government o f postal savings banks.
That Allen was committed to the first three of these had been clearly evident 
during the special session, and he continued now to advocate the Populist position on 
each. He called emphatically for phasing out the money-issuing power of the national 
banks, whose usurpation of a fundamental public function was inimical both to the
51 CR. 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 971. For Allen’s defense o f the constitutionality o f the income 
tax, see 971-72; 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6707, 6709. For his charge that the “money power,” through 
its machinations aimed at defeating the income tax, were poised to gain control o f the Supreme Court (the 
sole department o f the Federal Government “left to the people”), see pp. 6707-09. For a brief and 
interesting account of the national debate over, and legislative and judicial disposition of, the income tax 
during the 1890s see Ellis, 125-32.
52 Johnson, 91.
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freedom of the people and the “perpetuity of republican government.” He submitted a 
variety of pro-silver resolutions, as well as a bill to rescind all laws concerning the 
coinage of silver enacted since 1 January 1 S /13 and to reenact all laws pertaining to silver 
in effect at the end of 1872.54 He arraigned the “pernicious” policy of monetary 
contraction, submitted at least one bill for the specific purpose of expanding the money 
supply, and contended that through prudent management based on population and 
macroeconomic data, the money supply could be periodically adjusted to make the 
currency of nearly equal value at all times.55
But what type of money should the government issue? As in the special session, 
Allen’s statements on the matter could be taken as inconsistent. Government-issued 
paper currency, he asserted in a July 1894 interview, ought to be backed by and 
redeemable for gold and silver. He would not begin “with fiat money, as you people in 
New York call it. The Western men do not want a period of wild inflation either now or 
in the future.”56
Six months later, on the other hand, he argued for silver coinage, “supplemented 
by a sufficient volume of sound paper currency of full legal tender power issued directly
53 CR. 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974 (for the quotation), 975-76, 978, 1564; Shaw, 38.
54 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, p. 1925; pt. 3, pp. 2337-38, 2775-76, 2838, 2904; pt. 8, 7982,
8144, 8212, 8219-20, 8367; 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, 974, 1407; Shaw, 38-39.
55 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6774 (for quote); pt. 1, p. 519; 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p.
974; Shaw, 39. The policy o f contraction, Allen claimed, had to some degree “paralyzed” Nebraska 
industries. Ibid., 6774.
56 Shaw, 39.
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by the Government.”57 He went on: “Let us retain the greenback and the different forms”
of government-issued paper currency. The People’s Party “stands for honest money----
the money of the Constitution.”58
Despite his vehement rejection of intrinsic value in money and his periodic 
support for fiat currency (see Chapter Two above), on the whole Allen’s rhetoric 
evidences no great enthusiasm for fiat money. Regarding this, two guesses seem 
reasonable. First, doubtless aware that achieving a fiat standard was politically hopeless, 
Allen pragmatically opted to champion silver as a remedy for the evils brought on by 
contraction and deflation. As Gretchen Ritter writes, financial conservatives had won 
their struggle with the proponents of greenbackism—with its fiat-money philosophy—in 
1879. As in the case of some fiat-money Populists, various aspects of greenbackism still 
had their advocates. But in the years after finance became controversial again in 1886, 
most financial reformers sought to further bimetallism, and the public “generally 
accepted the need for a bullion-based monetary standard.”59
Second, having passionately argued during the special session against the 
intellectual underpinnings of bullionism, but apparently never having even attempted any 
substantial criticisms of fiat currency, Allen was probably favorably inclined toward fiat 
money and would have promoted it if  he thought that doing so could accomplish 
anything. Rightly or not, Allen felt eager, perhaps even desperate, to get more money
5/ CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974. (italics mine)
58 Ibid., 976.
59 Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics o f  
Finance in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37-38, 113, 158 (for quotation), 160.
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circulating in the economy.60 His position was no different than that of Senator Peffer, 
who explained: “Populists demand gold, silver and paper money, all equally full legal 
tender ... It is evident that we must have more money.”61
During the special session Allen had also taken the Populist position concerning 
the government’s bond issues. His later response to this issue merits some detailed 
observation because it was something of a confluence of the national bank, silver coinage 
and currency volume issues, and because it was as large a concern to Allen in 1894 as the 
silver issue had been to him the year before. In its preamble, the Omaha Platform had
60 Several historians insist that true Populists demonstrate an unyielding fidelity to fiatism. But 
given Allen’s emphasis on the need for an elastic and publicly controlled currency, it is difficult to see how 
the difference between his position and that demanding currency-inconvertibility could disqualify Allen as 
a genuine Populist.
It must also be noted here that nowhere does the Omaha Platform demand a fiat currency, 
although it proposes a plan to create it in the form o f the subtreasury. Like most northern farmers, Allen 
(who was himself a part-time farmer) opposed it, for reasons that are as yet unknown. Perhaps he would 
have agreed with the Kansas suballiance president who saw the proposal as a breach o f the Alliance motto 
“Equal rights to all and special privileges to none.” Maybe he noticed the disturbing similarities between it 
and the national bank system. Or perhaps his reaction was similar to that o f fellow Nebraskan and Alliance 
member Jay Burrows, who, according to Jeffrey Ostler, considered a program that would expand and 
contract the money supply by more than a billion dollars twice annually to be “too hair-brained for even 
patient criticism.” Whatever the case, Allen’s opposition to an idea that the Omaha Platform did not insist 
on, that had as its object the establishment o f a form o f currency that the platform never explicitly 
demanded, and that had relatively little support among Populists after 1892, lends no support to the charge 
that Allen was not a true Populist. CR. 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 971; Jeffrey Ostler, Prairie Populism: 
The Fate o f Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas. Nebraska, and Iowa. 1880-1892 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1993), 103 (for Burrows quotation), 105 (for “Equal rights” quotation); Hicks, 190-91, 200-204; 
Johnson, 91; Shaw, 36. A fascinating account o f the contemporary arguments for and reaction to the 
subtreasury proposal is in Hicks, 186-204. On the non-radical character o f the subtreasury plan, see 
Norman Pollack, The Just Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare (Urbana: University o f  Illinois 
Press, 1987), 219-26.
On a related note, Allen incorrectly assured the Senate that no Populist had ever advocated the 
subtreasury in Congress. It is true that on the whole, Populist congressmen showed little enthusiasm for 
the scheme, but Congressman John Davis (Kansas) had supported it, Tom Watson (Georgia) had 
introduced legislation in the House, and Senator Peffer backed it, although in 1895 he proposed an 
alternative in the form of a public banking system. CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 974, 978, 980; 
Roberts, 122-24; Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 26, 193-94, 225; C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: 
Agrarian Rebel (1938; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 203-05.
61 From the North American Review, quoted in “The Mission o f the Populist Party,” The Review 
o f Reviews, Jan. 1894, 76.
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charged that the federal government’s power to issue money “is appropriated to enrich 
bond-holders; a vast public debt payable in legal tender currency has been funded into 
gold-bearing bonds, thereby adding millions to the burdens of the people.”  ^ In order to 
relieve the public o f the interest burden occasioned by bond issues, it was necessary to 
reclaim public control of monetary policy.
Allen was the embodiment of Populist anti-bond sentiment. He saw the 
government’s bond issues as part of an unfolding conspiracy formed by European and 
American financial elites thirty years earlier, the purpose of which, he told the Senate, 
was to “enslave the laboring and industrial classes of the world,” and establish “a golden 
shrine at which all must worship.” Much of the conspirators’ aims had been achieved 
through the demonetization o f silver by way of the various post-war silver laws. These, 
Allen lamented, “stabbed the legitimate industries of the honest masses to the vitals.
ATEach blow brought sweat and toil from the poor.” Aided by their allies and hirelings, 
the conspirators were “ever vigilant and active in the prosecution of their nefarious and 
infamous scheme to centralize capital, make high-priced money and low-priced products 
and labor.”64 The failure of the Treasury department to meet the silver-coinage 
requirements set by law and the initiation of bond-issues by Secretary of the Treasury 
John G. Carlisle constituted the latest and decisive blow against the power of Congress to 
control the issuance of money and to maintain a significant currency role for silver. So
62 Johnson, 90.
63 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, p. 1379.
64 Ibid., 1379-80. See also pt. 1, pp. 566, 751-52.
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the fa it had become accompli: “silver was stricken down, and the foul conspiracy in each 
scene of the criminal drama was marvelously successful ... The people have fallen.”65
How to account for the rise and power of such “damnable” intrigue? Allen saw it
thusly:
Since the time when the gentle voice of the lowly Nazarene was heard preaching 
mercy and justice on the lonely shores of Galilee, man’s selfishness has been so 
strong that he has been willing to enslave and rob his brother. Slavery has 
existed throughout all ages, and exists today.
The conspirators, were “[ajctuated by such a base and sordid motive,” and in working to 
realize their designs had sought and, Allen strongly hinted, succeeded in acquiring the 
influence necessary to have their way in Congress.66
He saw their footprints in the executive branch as well, and he endeavored to 
undo some of the damage they had caused there. Allen forcefully argued that Secretary 
Carlisle’s bond issues had no sanction in law and sought to get the Senate on record as
f t lagreeing with him. In January 1894, he served on the legal team representing the 
Knights of Labor in their suit against Carlisle seeking an injunction to prevent him from 
issuing $50,000,000 worth of bonds redeemable in gold coin.68 Citing the public’s right
65 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, p. 1380.
66 Ibid. On Populist conspiratorial thought see Jeffrey Ostler, “The Rhetoric o f Conspiracy and 
the Formation o f Kansas Populism,” Agricultural History 69 (1995): 1-27.
67 Ibid., 1375-78, 1679-81; pt. 1, pp. 973-74; pt. 4, pp. 3463, 3539; pt. 7, p. 6773; Shaw, 37. 
Allen’s main line o f argument concerned what he interpreted to be Carlisle’s misreading o f  the Resumption 
Act o f 1875.
68 “To Avoid a Bond Issue,” Chicago Times. 30 Jan. 1894, newspaper clipping, AP; Alexander 
Dana Noyes, Thirty Years o f American Finance: A Short Financial History o f the Government and People 
o f the United States Since the Civil War, 1865-1896 (1900; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 
Publishers, 1969), 210-12. The injunction request, which was denied, was heard on January 29, in federal 
district court in Washington, D.C.
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to know to whom it is indebted, he strongly urged the passage of a resolution submitted
by Peffer directing the Secretary of the Treasury to announce the names of bidders and
purchasers of government securities.69
He even denounced the immediate justification for conducting bond sales in the
first place. Rejecting the sacrosanctity with which corporate liberals held the
$100,000,000 gold reserve, Allen argued that, like the Treasury Secretary’s supposed
bond-issuing authority, the reserve fund had no legal basis. All the funds in the reserve
could be spent, Allen claimed, without breaking any laws or contracts. The reserve fund,
he colorfully explained,
[i]s one of the instruments used in a gigantic system of buncoing the people. It is 
used as the occasion and pretext for the unnecessary issuance and sale from time 
to time of Government bonds, with which to stop the clamoring of Lombard and 
Wall street sharks, as the dismal bark of Cerberus, the triple-mouthed dog that 
stood guard at the gate of Hades, was stopped by being fed with victims destined 
for the weird and waste land of Pluto.70
The worst aspect of the people’s victimization was that while the reserve fund 
provided the opportunity for large investors “to invade and loot” the Treasury, the bond
71sales that propped up the fund saddled the people with burdensome interest payments. 
Through a perpetual public debt, the “idle money classes” would make themselves
no“pensioners upon the people.” Moreover, the naturally intimate link that existed
69 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, pp. 1801-02; pt. 3, p. 2024.
70 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, p. 1379. See also ibid., 1682, 1761.
71 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6716. See also ibid., 1379, 1682-83; 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 3,
2481.
72 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 1564. See also pp. 1563, 1565.
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between bond-holders and the government insured that the former exercised a corrupting 
influence over the latter, as in the case of the government’s implementation of 
deflationary policies that were good for creditors but damaging to commodities 
producers.73 And, as if all this were not enough, the debt would make “bond slaves” of 
future generations.74
Debt, then, was the bete noire. It was to be assiduously avoided both in personal
75finance and in government, where its incurrence was injurious to the commonweal.
While many leaders of the old parties had become “bond crazy,” it was, Allen observed, 
“a part of the Populist faith,” that a government, “like a prudent husbandman, must be 
without debt.”76
The evidence at hand for the fifty-third Congress is only suggestive concerning 
Allen’s position on the final financial plank, which called for the establishment of 
government-run postal savings banks to furnish secure and accessible banking services to 
farmers in outlying areas.77 Nevertheless, that Allen supported the idea was made
73 Shaw, 40.
74 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 1564.
75 Shaw, 40; “Tinged with Populism,” The Butte Miner, 3 Sep. 1895, AP.
76 CR. 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 2481 (for the first quote); pt. 2, p. 981 (for subsequent quotes). 
For high praise o f Allen’s performance in debate with Senator John Sherman (on bond issues) from a 
Populist newspaper see “Senator Allen’s Future,” [Washington, D.C.] National Watchman, excerpt from 
unidentified newspaper clipping, AP.
77 Johnson, 91. The indirect evidence: In a long Senate speech on Populism given in January 
1895, Allen, responding to a colleague’s question about the subtreasury plan, avowed that the subtreasury 
proposal “is the only defect in the Omaha platform.” CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 978. Information on 
Populism and the postal savings plan is hard to come by. The general histories o f  the movement have 
almost nothing to say about it. For a brief introduction to the plan, which during the 1890s went nowhere, 
see Ritter, 177, 194-96. For an interesting account o f the idea’s revival during the Taft administration, see
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evident in his speech to a Populist audience in Boston in 1896 when he listed postal
n o
savings banks among the “cardinal principles” of the People’s Party. In 1900, he 
offered a bill to institute postal savings “departments,” to promote personal savings, to 
provide the people a “safe and reliable place to deposit their idle funds, and to put into
70 * * • • •actual use the money of the country.” Given his distrust o f private bankers and his 
solicitude for the needs of farmers and small producers, it is probably safe to assume that 
he had supported the postal savings plan since at least 1892, when it was adopted as a 
platform plank at the Populist national convention.
The Omaha Platform presented a triparted reform program, of which “Finance” 
was the first category and “Transportation” the second. The latter consisted of two 
demands: first, that the government own and operate the railroads “in the interest of the
on
people,” and second, that it do likewise with the telephone and telegraph systems.
Here Allen began cautiously. When asked about government ownership of 
railroads in a magazine interview published in July 1894, he expressed some doubt as to 
its feasibility in the United States. “I am not very sanguine, nor especially eager for any 
large venture into the field of governmental railroading.” Were it to be attempted, Allen 
recommended it be entered into carefully and gradually. He suggested the possibility of 
the government assuming control of one of the Pacific railroads as an experimental study
Elizabeth Sanders, Roots o f Reform: Farmers. Workers, and the American State. 1877-1917 (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1999), 232-36.
78 “The Cause o f Labor: Senator W.V. Allen’s Great Speech in Boston,” Journal o f the Knights o f  
Labor, 4 June 1896, p. 1, col. 2, AP.
79 CR, 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 1, p. 667.
80 Johnson, 91.
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of how government operation of the roads might work and to gain information with
which to assess the merits of such governmental stewardship. Allen felt more certainty
about the disposition of the telegraph system, which he would have the government come
to own and operate through a gradual transition. He had no doubt as to the government’s
legal right to acquire the railroads or the telegraph, should it deem it necessary to do so to
protect the common interest and provided that the displaced owners were given due 
81compensation.
Allen’s views on the nationalization of the railroads evolved rather quickly from 
moderate to radical. A few weeks after the aforementioned interview was conducted, 
Allen argued in the Senate that the depression o f crop prices in the West was largely due 
to exorbitant freight rates and the “root of the matter...the monopoly of transportation.”
In the same month in which the interview appeared, Allen introduced a resolution for the 
formation of a tripartisan Senate committee to examine the question of the “necessity and
• • • ooauthority for” public ownership of the railroad, telephone, and telegraph systems. Six 
months later, conveying that Populists condemned pooling, stock watering, and price 
discrimination by railroads (and telegraph and telephone companies), he announced that 
“If I had it in my power I should reduce every railroad company in this country to 
absolute Government ownership.” The following summer (September 1895) he
81 Shaw, 40-41.
82 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 6, pp. 5913 (for quotation), 5917.
83 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 7156.
84 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974, 979 (for quotation). In February 1895, during a 
discussion o f whether the government ought to purchase some rail cars for the postal service, Allen
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reaffirmed this position, saying that the people’s continued freedom required the
or
nationalization of the huge wire communication and railway companies.
The third category of the Populist reform triad was “Land.” The land section of 
the Omaha Platform called for an end to monopolistic land holdings and the forbiddance 
of alien land ownership. The land, “including all the natural sources of wealth, is the 
heritage of the people.” All land possessed by corporations “in excess of their actual 
needs ... should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only.”
In remarks to the Senate in June 1894, Allen denounced the major political 
parties for having given away huge tracts of the best land in the country to railroads and 
other corporations. He called for legislation forbidding the government to donate public 
land to any corporation, and argued that he would have “every acre of the public domain 
held sacred for actual settlement by actual settlers.”
In assessing Allen’s Populism it will be helpful to look at several subjects 
touched on in the preamble to the Omaha Platform, but not explicitly addressed in the 
platform proper. We have seen that Allen championed the rights of labor during the 
special session, and he continued to do so.
suggested that the idea was a positive step forward. The day was quickly coming, he said, when the 
government must not only assume management o f postal cars, but also “absolute ownership” o f the cars,
“as well as o f the engine that draws them and the track upon which they run.” (pt.3, pp. 2022-23)
85 “Tinged with Populism,” The Butte Miner, 3 Sep. 1895, AP.
86 Johnson, 91.
87 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, pp. 6713, 6714 (for quotation). On a related subject, the question 
o f what the rights o f debtors ought to be concerning mortgages and trust deeds in the District o f Columbia, 
Allen charged that the current form o f handling trust deeds was a “cutthroat” and “iniquitous” system that 
oppressed the poor and served the interests o f “money sharks.” In considering how the system should be
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The crux of the labor problem was an exploitative economic system. Pointing to 
the high incidence of men moving from country to city in search of opportunity but 
finding themselves unable to escape poverty, Allen contested the view that such migrants 
were lazy or lacked intelligence. Rather, their plight was the result of legislation 
allowing the capitalist to have not only that part of the wealth that was rightfully his, but 
also the just share of the worker who produced it. Such legislation flowed from a 
Congress which, consciously or not, was controlled by “baneful influences” which 
rendered impossible the passage of financial legislation that would create an inclusive 
prosperity. While it was possible for government to provide relief for labor through 
public works projects, government’s chief duty was to influence industrial conditions so
OQ
as to make remedial public employment unnecessary.
Ohio Populist Jacob Coxey was evidently convinced that the government was not 
going to fulfill this duty. In late March, he set out with his “industrial army” of 
unemployed men on a peaceful march to Washington to petition the Congress for the 
establishment of government-subsidized public works employment programs. According 
to historian Carlos Schwantes, “Populists, who seemed congenitally disposed to aid the 
underdog, overwhelmingly supported” the Coxey campaign, “although some would have 
preferred to see the men remain at home and ‘march on the ballot box’ instead.” While 
the lowly marchers also elicited sympathy or support from a significant portion of the
reformed, he took his cue from the “very humane homestead laws o f the different States.” Pt. 4, pp. 3080- 
83, 3089-93, 3166-71 (quotations on 3082, 3090).
88 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 973.
89 Shaw, 38.
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public, the reaction of most senators was closer to that of the many mainstream 
newspaper editorial writers who felt little but contempt for Coxey and the agenda o f his 
“Commonweal of Christ” organization. Not surprisingly, Senate Populists were among 
Coxey’s few supporters on Capitol Hill.90
In his history of the industrial army phenomenon of 1894, Populist journalist 
Henry Vincent wrote that, regarding their desire to ensure that in Washington Coxey’s 
free speech rights would be protected, “the friends of the Commonweal in the Senate are 
in earnest.” Early in the Senate’s consideration of the Coxey matter, Vincent noted 
Allen’s active support of Coxey’s constitutional rights and wrote approvingly that Allen 
was both resolute “in his convictions” and not readily thwarted by obstacles. Vincent’s 
account stops a few days prior to the Commonwealers’ arrival in Washington.91 Had he 
covered the remainder of the drama, Vincent may very well have related that Allen
QOworked as hard as anybody in Congress on Coxey’s behalf.
Readers of Allen’s initial comments on Coxey would have been surprised. In late 
March, as Coxey’s band was beginning its journey, Allen sounded more like an irritated
90 Donald L. McMurry, Coxey’s Army: A Study o f the Industrial Army Movement o f 1894 (1929; 
reprint, New York: AMS Press, Inc. 1970), 21-126; H.W. Brands, The Reckless Decade: America in the 
1890s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 160-76; Henry Vincent, The Story o f the Commonweal 
(1894; reprint, New York: Amo Press & The New York Times, 1969), 233-42; Josephson, 559-66; Carlos 
A. Schwantes, Coxey’s Army: An American Odyssey (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1985), 53,
56 (for quotation). Coxey was a self-made and moderately wealthy businessman, Greenbacker, and fiat- 
money advocate. The Commonweal was co-founded by Carl Browne, who converted Coxey to 
Theosophy.
91 Vincent, 224-28 (quotations on 228). “Without question,” Lawrence Goodwyn writes, “Henry 
Vincent has been the most overlooked and underrated warrior of the agrarian revolt.” See Goodwyn, 
Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 411.
92 McMurry, 104-126; Clanton, Congressional Populism. 69-72.
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conservative than a Populist. Coxeyism, he declaimed, is “absurd and useless. It is the 
work of a man who, if not a knave, is crazy,” and who is certainly not a Populist. 
Although one of Coxey’s core concerns, improving the nation’s roads, was "a fit subject 
for agitation,” Allen doubted that the government had the right to allocate funds for that
93purpose.
A mass protest such as this, he went on, “attracts to itself the worst elements, 
who are glad of a chance to pillage with the audacity that comes to a large mob.” He 
predicted the marchers would either give up before reaching Washington or that state 
authorities would “take proper measures” to stop them. As Congress was still accepting 
petitions in the usual manner (through the mail), he concluded that the march was a 
“hostile ... foolish, idiotic attempt to coerce congress.”94
Three weeks later, however, it was evident that he was beginning to view the 
situation very differently. On April 19, Allen spoke in support of a resolution by Peffer 
denouncing the prospect of using force against Coxey’s army and calling for the 
formation of a senatorial reception committee. Why, Allen asked, did the approach of 
unemployed petitioners, “every one of whom perhaps is as good as any Senator in this 
chamber,” call for military preparations while paid lobbyists, who caused more damage
93 “A Very Poor Brand,” unidentified newspaper clipping, dateline 28 Mar. 1894, AP.
94 Ibid. How to explain this early hostility to Coxey? Perhaps Allen shared the unfortunate but 
common tendency to indiscriminately equate peaceful physical protest with anarchy. Moreover, as 
Matthew Josephson wrote in his account o f the Coxey affair, Coxey’s methods were “novel.” See 
Josephson, 564. Allen seemed to be baffled as to why, given their right to petition (in the standard way), 
people would choose to march on Washington. Aware that Coxey’s bills had already been received by 
Congress, he probably thought “the petition in boots” superfluous. Finally, as we will see, Allen detested 
lobbyists. It appears that, at least initially, Allen viewed the Commonwealers as he did corporate lobbyists, 
as people attempting to circumvent the normal republican parliamentary process. See Shaw, 37.
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than all the industrial armies, were greeted warmly as a matter of course?95 On April 19,
he defended the right of the marchers to petition Congress in person:
When railroad lobbyists, tax lobbyists, bank lobbyists, and all the other lobbyists 
who infest this city and these Capitol grounds come here everything is thrown 
open to them from cellar to dome; there is no restriction upon them; but when 
Mr. Coxey comes marching along with his army of the commonweal to petition 
Congress for the redress and relief of the masses ... he is to be met and not 
permitted to enter the Capitol grounds, to say nothing of this sacred Senate 
chamber.96
r
The New York Times denounced Allen’s “violent propositions,” which it claimed were
♦ 07bound to “warm ... the heart o f every ragamuffin in Coxey’s outfit.” Senator Joseph 
Hawley (Republican, Connecticut) told the Senate that Allen’s statements “would have 
been received with tumultuous applause in a meeting of anarchists. It had in it, not 
requiring a microscope, but visible to the naked eye, the bacteria and bacilli of 
anarchy.”98
On April 25, in response to the military and police buildup initiated by federal 
and municipal authorities and to a proclamation of the commissioners of the District of 
Columbia urging Coxey’s men not to enter the city, Allen submitted a resolution 
expressing support for the commonwealers’ rights to petition, free speech, peaceable 
assembly, and to enter any part of the Capitol or its grounds normally open to the
95 McMurry, 107, 108 (for quote). Allen’s generally negative comments about the Coxeyites in an 
interview in the July issue o f The Review o f Reviews are not a repudiation o f his support o f  Coxey during 
the spring. References to events in the interview indicate that it was conducted in April, after Peffer’s 
resolution but before Allen had presented any of his own. See Shaw, 41.
96 Quoted in Clanton, Congressional Populism, 70.
97 ”No Welcome for Coxey Men,” The New York Times, 20 Apr. 1894, p. 6.
98 Quoted in Clanton, Congressional Populism. 70.
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public." Later in the day, at a meeting of the Populist congressional caucus, the 
resolution was ratified as the Populist position on the movement.100
Excepting its half-dozen supporters, the resolution was greeted in the Senate with 
responses ranging from cool to hostile. Senator Edward Wolcott (Republican, Colorado) 
doubtless spoke for many of his colleagues. He advised that it was time for public 
officials to “pander less to that miscalled portion of the labor vote whose labor is with 
their throats and never with their hands,” time, he continued, to stand for “the rights of 
American manhood, the right of a man to work if he wants to even if it takes the whole 
Army of the country to sustain him in doing it,” time, “we had the courage to stand 
together against socialism and populism and paternalism run amok.”101
Allen argued that the Commonwealers had just as much right to enter 
Washington on foot and be left alone as did the many other groups that regularly came 
from outside the district to lobby Congress, and that the unemployed men could not 
afford train fare ought to be considered irrelevant. He still saw the movement as 
“visionary and not likely to be fruitful of any good result,” but insisted that the marchers
"  CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4060. For the text o f the proclamation o f the D.C. 
Commissioners, see Vincent, 102-03.
100 McMurry, 110. In addition to Allen, the participants were Senator William Stewart o f  Nevada, 
People’s Party National Committee Chairman Henry Taubeneck o f  Illinois, and Representatives Lafayette 
Pence and John Bell o f  Colorado, William Baker and William Harris o f  Kansas, Omer Kem and William 
McKeighan o f Nebraska and Haldor Boen o f Minnesota. Peffer and Kyle were evidently not present, 
though both voted with Allen on the resolution. CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4111.
101 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4107. Celebrating the suppression o f  Allen’s resolution in the 
Senate, The New York Times called Allen and Peffer “Communists” and “representatives o f Anarchists.” 
Untitled editorial, 26 Apr. 1894, p. 4.
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• 109 •had a “perfect right” to come to Washington. The public ought to understand, Allen 
concluded, “though they have been misled in this respect, that every citizen in this land, 
white or black, high or low, rich or poor, stands under the protection of the American
103flag in this city as in any other portion of the land, absolutely sacred.”
In an April 29 newspaper column, Allen confessed that he had not studied Coxey 
or his movement until less than two weeks previously, and now believed the 
Commonweal leader to be “intelligent, honest, and thrifty,” and his followers “mechanics 
and laborers of more than ordinary intelligence; sober, honest, law abiding and 
industrious.” Having been a “common laborer” in his youth, Allen thought it “natural 
that I should sympathize with the laboring classes,” the members of which, he asserted, 
were more intelligent than was usually acknowledged. Their only alternative for 
economic relief “is a united effort on Congress such as will force that slow and over 
conservative body to act.”104
Contradicting his skeptical statement of just four days earlier concerning the 
movement’s potential to effect positive change, Allen predicted that the movement would 
bring forth results that could not be realized in ten years by the usual methods of 
agitation. The country was “most hopelessly in the grasp of the money power,” Allen 
wrote, and “[hjeroic efforts” were necessary to change the situation.105
102 Ibid., 4106-08, 4109 (for quotation), 4110.
103 Ibid., 4111.
104 “A Plea for Coxey,” New York Morning Journal. 29 Apr. 1894, AP.
105 Ibid. On May 9 in the Senate, Allen declared that regarding the substance o f the proposals 
Coxey had sent to Congress “I have not and never have had the slightest sympathy.” CR, 53-2, 1894, vol.
113
After Coxey’s legionnaires arrived in Washington, Allen and Peffer visited their 
camp to wish them well.106 Allen and Senator Stewart were eyewitnesses when Coxey
and two of his lieutenants were arrested on the grounds of the Capitol for carrying
1 •  • •banners and walking on the grass. When Coxey was arraigned in police court, Allen
assisted the defendants’ legal team and addressed the court “at considerable length” on 
what he saw as the unconstitutionality of the Capitol Grounds Act under which the men 
were being prosecuted.108
During the following week in the Senate, Allen described what he had seen when 
Coxey was arrested on May 1, accused the police of brutality, called the charges against 
Coxey and his men trivial, reproved Senator John Sherman (Republican, Ohio) for not 
coming to Coxey’s defense, read the address that Coxey was prevented from delivering 
at the Capitol, argued against the constitutionality of the Capitol Grounds Act, noted that 
prior to and after Coxey’s arrest thousands of people had walked on the grass at the 
Capitol and were not arrested, and submitted a resolution for the creation of a tripartisan 
senatorial investigating committee.109 The use of force to deny Coxey his right to speak,
26, pt. 5, p. 4511. According to Donald McMurry, Peffer, upon introducing Coxey’s bills in the Senate, 
stated that he did so as a courtesy and that he “was not in sympathy with their objects.” See McMurry, 41.
106 Brands, 173.
107 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4513, 4568; McMurry, 125.
108 “Coxey’s Defender a Senator,” The New York Times, 5 May 1894, p. 5; McMurry, 123; 
“Coxey, Browne, Jones: The Three Commonwealers Appear in Court,” unidentified newspaper clipping, 
n.d., AP (for quotation). Also assisting the defense were Populist Congressmen Lafe Pence, Thomas 
Hudson, Omer Kem, and Haldor Boen. According to Henry Tragle, the prosecutor, Arthur S. Bimey, in 
summarizing the charges “ridiculed not only the defendants but Senator Allen as well.” Henry I. Tragle, 
Coxey’s Army (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1974), Broadsheet V “The Trial o f  Coxey, ‘Coxeyism,’ 
and the Meaning o f the Movement.”
109 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4511-18, 4442-43, 4474, 4564-71, 4591.
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Allen asserted, was an assault on all Americans’ right to free speech and peaceful
assembly.110 Noting that some Senators were eager to resume the revenue debate, Allen
remarked that, while the tariff question was important
[i]t is a mere atom floating upon the ambient air as compared with the 
constitutional right of American citizens to peacefully assemble and peacefully 
speak their minds with reference to the public policy of the nation and to 
peacefully petition any branch of the Government for a redress of their 
grievances.
The transaction that took place on these Capitol grounds on [May 1] was a 
scene worthy to take place in St. Petersburg or in the capital of any Eastern 
monarchy, but was entirely out of place in an orderly, civilized Republic like 
ours.111
Allen fought for the rights of labor on several other fronts. He denounced the
importation of contract labor, which he believed capitalists pursued in order to lower
112workers’ pay to “starvation wages,” and called for new legislation against it. He 
presented a resolution requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to report statistics on the 
violation of current federal laws aimed at prohibiting the practice as well as the
113Government’s record of prosecuting violations.
The events of the Pullman strike prompted him to take action on behalf of 
railroad workers. The resolution referred to earlier regarding a study of the viability of 
government ownership of the railways also called for senators to explore whether 
legislation was needed in order to effect a “more equitable [and] just” arrangement of
110 Ibid., 4515.
111 Ibid., 4512-13.
112 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974.
113 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 5, p. 4310. See also pp. 4746-47.
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wages. He submitted a bill limiting the Government’s use of injunctions, protecting 
workers’ arbitration rights, and stipulating that the charge o f obstructing the mail could 
not be made in cases where mail cars were attached to trains that included passenger or 
non-postal freight cars.114 In late July 1894, he presented a resolution directing Attorney 
General Richard Olney to provide copies to the Senate of all correspondence that 
occurred after June 1 between his office and the officers and attorneys of the railroads 
involved in the Pullman affair.115
In a Labor Day speech in Montana in 1895, he lamented the dearth of attention 
given in historical works to the “cause of labor,” honored the contributions of the 
working men of the past, recalled the long history of the oppression and exploitation of 
workers, deplored the manner of the trial and sentencing of Eugene Debs, and accused 
President Cleveland of having violated the Constitution in dispatching troops to “invade” 
Illinois during the Pullman strike.116
In February 1894, before any o f the labor-related events discussed above, an 
Omaha assembly of the Knights of Labor honored Allen, saying he “has ever had at heart 
the best interests of the toiling masses,” for “the upright and manly stand he has taken in 
behalf of [them].. .as against the encroachments of capital, corporations, combines and 
trusts.”117 The issue of labor was, o f course, inseparable from the subject of the
114 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 7156. See also pt. 2, p. 1856; pt. 4, p. 3603; and Index p. 24.
115 Ibid., pt. 8, p. 7846. See also 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 1, pp. 153-57.
116 “Tinged with Populism,” The Butte Miner. 3 Sep. 1895, AP.
117 Untitled newspaper clipping, dateline 19 Feb. 1894, AP.
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corporation, and the latter was inextricably linked to politics. But not only linked: in fact 
the owners of the large corporations formed the plutocracy which the Omaha Platform 
charged with being the “controlling influence dominating” the Democratic and 
Republican parties which had allowed “the existing dreadful conditions to develop
1 | o
without serious effort to prevent or restrain them.”
For Allen, that the United States was a plutocracy was obvious. Congress had 
been dominated by “corporations and ... the money power for more than a quarter of a 
century.” During that time, he alleged, not a single important piece of legislation had 
passed Congress without the approval of the large corporations.119 In a charge that both 
echoed the Omaha Platform and prefigured the centerpiece complaint which a century 
later motivated the presidential campaigns of left-liberal Ralph Nader, Allen insisted that 
the mainstream political parties were both under the control of the plutocrats. If the large 
corporations can essentially pick the two presidential candidates, “the accession of either 
of whom would be to continue their institutions and their special privileges, such as they 
now enjoy without restraint, and afford them an opportunity to eat out the substance of 
the people, do you suppose” he asked, “they are concerned in the slightest degree
1 90whether you call the one a Republican or the other a Democrat?” Here Allen turned 
the tables on the many people who hurled the “anarchist” epithet at the Populists:
118 Johnson, 90.
uy CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6707.
120 CR. 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 975. See also “Toast a Senator: W.V. Allen Banquetted by 
his Admirers,” unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d. 1895, AP.
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Mr. President, none realize more fully than the Populists of this country the 
necessity for law and order. What, think you, is the difference between the 
anarchists who gather together in the back parlors of a countinghouse, or a bank, 
or some financial institution, and conspire to take forty or fifty million dollars 
from the people unlawfully, and the other anarchists who, driven by stress of 
circumstances, by hunger, by cold, by nakedness, and by want, commit, in their 
misery, some violation of the law to satisfy their natural desires? The one meets 
in a palace under circumstances most favorable to comfort. He is heralded to the 
country as a great financier; he is welcomed when he comes to Congress and 
finds fellowship in the different committee rooms, while the other poor fellow 
would be driven from the Capitol grounds as a criminal.121
Nor, he emphasized; were Populists out to destroy the corporation. So long as 
corporations refrained from attempting to corrupt the political process and acquire 
special privileges, the People’s Party would have no problem with their going about their 
legitimate business. The People’s Party took this position on big business because it 
believed “the rights of the humblest citizen of the land are as sacred in our form of
T 9Tgovernment as the rights of the most gigantic corporation.”
In his most recent book, Gene Clanton writes: “What exactly made one a 
Populist? No doubt a variety of factors came into play. Among them, none was stronger 
than the belief that people were, in the final analysis, of equal worth.” Allen, Clanton 
continued, “articulated that thought at various times more clearly” than other
121 Ibid., 981. To Allen, control o f  the press, or at least much o f it, was an essential condition for, 
and in the current situation a reality of, plutocratic dominance. Many o f the large eastern daily newspapers 
were “as much in the pay o f Wall street and its allied interests as ever a lawyer was in the pay o f his client; 
and it is not only their hired duty to form public sentiment on leading questions, which is reflected through 
the minor country press to a very great extent, but to abuse, scandalize and traduce senators and 
representatives, whose actions they cannot control.” “Letter from Senator Allen,” Fremont Herald, 27 July 
1894, AP.
122 CR. 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6708. See also ibid., 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974.
123 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6706. See also ibid., 6709. On Populists and the corporation, 
see R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins o f  Modem American Political Theory, 1890-1920 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1982), 39-56, 69-77.
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124congressional Populists. Clanton was looking at evidence from 1896 and later, and we 
have seen that Allen stressed this theme throughout the 1894-1895 period. All men were 
equal under the law, Allen thought, and to assertions and insinuations that the political 
opinions of some men were of greater import than others he responded that “I did not 
suppose that a man was required to possess a bank account before he could read Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations and understand it.”125
Those whose egalitarian sensibilities were weak or dormant could benefit from 
turning to the Constitution, “that great charter o f our liberties ... the most marvelous 
work of a free and enlightened people of ancient or modem times.” It ought to be 
remembered, Allen told the Senate, that it was the intent of both the architects of the 
Constitution and those who ratified it that this be “a popular Government in the highest 
sense conceivable with safety, in which every citizen, however humble, or whatever his 
station in life might be, should enjoy an equal part in its management as well as the
•  •  196blessings to flow from its administration.”
So if a perverted political system was a key part of what was keeping many 
people down, it was time to clean it up. A good first step, Allen might have said, would 
be to get rid of all the lobbyists. As Peter Argersinger has written, because Populists saw 
lobbyists as furthering the “interests of the privileged at the expense” of the general 
public, they “were alarmed by the presence and activities of lobbyists, whom they found
124 Clanton, Congressional Populism. 91.
125 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 977 (for quotation), 978, 971.
126 CR. 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 2, p. 1376.
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197‘haunting every crypt and comer of the Capitol.’” Tme to Populist form, Allen
thought lobbying wholly unjustifiable. A newspaper reporter recorded some of Allen’s 
thoughts on it:
[It] is an intolerable nuisance to men in Congress. I have not been here long, but 
these lobbyists are like pet birds; they hop about at will, and it doesn’t take them 
long to get familiar. Unquestionably, the moral tone of Washington is not what 
it should be. Conditions and practices prevail here which would not be tolerated 
anywhere else in the country. Here, as nowhere else, the man who can see must 
see that without a radical change in the existing order of federal affairs there is 
no escape from one of the two evil fates before us, a monarchy or an oligarchy. 
No, the discouragements I have found here have not in any way affected my 
ideals. Because I find the enemy in a mud puddle, that’s nothing to hinder my 
reaching down and strangling him.128
In August 1894, Allen offered a bill to outlaw “professional lobbying.” It was referred to 
the Senate’s Education and Labor Committee, where presumably it died of neglect.129
On 6 June 1894, Allen submitted a bill “to preserve the purity of national
1 T A
legislation.” It forbade any member of Congress from buying, owning, or selling any 
speculative stock the value of which could be affected by a vote of Congress, and 
prohibited members of Congress to be a member of, or have any financial interest in, any 
organization in which speculative stocks were bought or sold. Judges were expected to
127 Peter H. Argersinger, “No Rights on this Floor: Third Parties and the Institutionalization o f  
Congress,” in Argersinger, The Limits o f  Agrarian Radicalism: Western Populism and American Politics 
(Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1995), 213-45. See specifically 234-35.
128 Untitled newspaper clipping, Washington Times. 17 Jan. 1894, AP.
129 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 8, p. 8293.
130 Ibid., pt. 6, p. 5833. See also vol. 26, Index, p. 41; Frank Leslie, “Relief for Inadvertent 
Senators,” unidentified newspaper clipping, 21 June 1894, AP.
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recuse themselves from cases in which they had some interest, Allen noted, so why
i^i
should the same standard not apply to legislators?
He also sought electoral reform. Allen insisted that “the absolute purity o f the 
ballot” could only come with new legislation protecting voting rights and ensuring the
1 'Xr)integrity o f contested-election and ballot fraud investigations. After receiving dozens 
of letters and affidavits from Populists, Republicans, and Jeffersonian Democrats in 
Alabama, along with numerous requests to initiate a senatorial investigation of election 
fraud there, Allen presented a resolution for the formation of a tripartisan committee to
investigate whether during the previous two-and-a-half years, “a republican form of
•  •  1 •government [had existed] in the State of Alabama.” Moreover, he favored election of
United States Senators, President and Vice-President by direct popular vote, and a one- 
term limit on the presidency.134
131 William Vincent Allen, “How to Purify National Legislation,” The North American Review  
159 (Aug. 1894): 159-64; Shaw, 37-38.
132 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974. See also CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 1, pp. 928-31.
133 CR, 53-3, 1894-1895, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 428; pt. 2, p. 1201; pt. 3, pp. 2012, 2022-36, 2071-78,
2112, 2151, 2319. See also William Allen, letter (reprint) to Colonel Warren S. Reese, 4 Apr. 1895, AP. 
An interesting sidelight: Among the materials Allen received from Alabama was a preamble and set o f  
resolutions, jointly adopted by a caucus o f “the People’s Party and the Republican members o f the general 
assembly o f  Alabama,” thanking Allen for his work in the Alabama matter, requesting him to continue his 
“unselfish, patriotic, and noble efforts” on their behalf, and praising him for his “broad-minded 
statesmanship” and “that devotion to duty which has ever characterized all his public efforts.” (2023-24) 
The communication was signed by “A.T. Goodwin,” presumably mistyped shorthand for Populist Albert 
Taylor Goodwyn, United States Representative (1896-1897) and great-grandfather o f historian Lawrence 
Goodwyn. Readers will recall that, in his history o f the movement, Lawrence Goodwyn dismisses Allen as 
a “shadow Populist.” On Albert Goodwyn, see Clanton, Congressional Populism. 177.
134 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 974-76. The first (o f ten) resolutions adopted by the 1892 
Populist National Convention calls for “a free ballot and a fair count in all elections.” The eighth calls for 
one-term limits on the President and Vice-President, and direct popular election o f  United States Senators. 
See Hicks, 443-44. Allen also wanted popular election o f  federal judges: “Where in the history o f the 
modem world can be found a more perfect autocrat or one equal to the ordinary Federal judge? The Czar
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By the end of the fifty-third Congress, Allen was no longer optimistic that the 
People’s Party would soon rise to political predominance, predicting instead that its time
ITT
would come in 1900. At the moment, the forces of plutocracy were still entrenched. " 
That this was so he might have attributed, in part, to the observation he once made that 
the American people take to change slowly and reluctantly, preferring to “suffer small 
evils” rather than adjust to the unfamiliar.
The conservatism of the plutocrats was something else. Here was an antisocial 
conservatism in which policies aimed at advancing the interests of the elite few were 
promoted and implemented aggressively while those which had as their object the 
promotion of the commonweal and the pursuit of economic justice were either ignored or 
vigorously fought against, depending on the situation. This could be seen in the way the 
Senate conducted its affairs, which Allen thought was calculated to hinder the
I nn
consideration of public business. He argued in rather anti-intellectual fashion that if 
members of Congress would cooperate with each other, all laws essential to the public 
good could be passed in three months and both houses could “adjourn for two years if the 
Constitution would permit it.” More plausibly, he believed that much of what transpired
•  •  •  # t ' l Oin Congress served primarily a partisan function. Such conservatism, Allen held,
o f all the Russias never possessed half the power he possesses. He is an absolute unrestrained autocrat, so 
far as the masses o f the people are concerned.” (976)
135 “Toast a Senator: W.V. Allen Banquetted by his Admirers,” unidentified newspaper clipping, 
n.d. 1895, AP.
136 “A Plea for Coxey,” New York Morning Journal. 29 Apr. 1894, AP.
137 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 4, p. 3610.
138 Ibid., pt. 3, p. 2507.
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“means rust; it means decay; it means stagnation; it means let things go as they will 
regardless of the consequences.” “I have no patience,” he concluded, with professed 
conservatives “who hide injustice and cupidity under assumed conservatism.”139
Populism was conservatism too, but of a very different sort.140 Instead of being 
controlled by, and directed in the interest of, those at the top of society, Populism was by 
and for the people. This was a progressive conservatism in which popular participation 
was a crucible whence beneficial social change came. Reforms had always percolated up 
from the common people, Allen told the Senate, and more change would come: “The 
backs which have been bowed to the yoke of oppression and injustice ... [for] so long 
will eventually be straightened, and man will stand forth in the light of the life that God 
intended he should stand.”141 The People’s Party was a party o f “enlightened and just 
individualism,” founded on, and seeking to bring the nation back to, the political 
principles proclaimed by Thomas Jefferson and the other “great statesmen of his age.”142
But if taking the country back to Jeffersonian principles while adapting those 
principles to the industrial age can be construed as conservative, what was being 
conserved, or, more accurately, resurrected, were the liberal traditions of Jeffersonian 
communitarianism and Jacksonian democracy. Hence Robert McMath’s caution against 
being deceived by Populists’ frequent professions of conservatism. The economic
139 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6714.
140 “A Plea for Coxey,” New York Morning Journal. 29 Apr. 1894, AP.
141 CR, 53-3, 1895, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 973.
142 Ibid., 971 (for second quote), 981 (for first quote).
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democracy they advocated “locates them in the same spot on the social spectrum as the 
Knights of Labor, who occupied, according to Bruce Laurie, ‘a middle ground between 
the individualistic libertarianism of bourgeois America and the collectivism of working- 
class socialists.5”143 So Allen, proud member of a party he called conservative, reflected 
that “[a]gitation, rightly interpreted, means life, energy, progress, justice eventually, if 
pursued in the proper spirit and with the proper motives and intelligence.55144
Midway through the period covered in this chapter, Henry Vincent's mid-road 
Populist newspaper The American Nonconformist, opined that “Allen's career in the 
Senate has been brilliant and valuable.”145 That the paper would express such a view 
ought not to be surprising, as Allen had thus far indisputably been a Populist Senator. It 
remains to be seen whether he would remain one through the rest o f his Senate tenure.
143 McMath, 72-73.
144 CR, 53-2, 1894, vol. 26, pt. 7, p. 6714.
145 The American rindianapolisl Nonconformist, 21 June 1894, newspaper clipping, AP. In 
August 1894, Allen attended the Nebraska People’s Independent Party State convention at Grand Island. 
The Platform promulgated there read in part: “We heartily approve the course o f Senator William V. Allen 
... for [his] fidelity and loyalty to our entire interests.” University o f Nebraska, Nebraska Party Platforms. 
1858-1938 ed. John G.W. Lewis (Works Projects Administration, 1940), 192. For a brief note on Allen’s 
attendance, see Addison Erwin Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People, vol. 1 (Chicago: Lewis 
Publishing Company, 1931), 748.
CHAPTER FOUR
Politics and Radical Legislation, 1895-1901
Wall Street owns the country. It is no longer a government of 
the people, by the people and for the people, but a government 
of Wall Street, by Wall Street and for Wall Street, The great 
common people of this country are slaves, and monopoly is the 
master.
Populist orator Mary Elizabeth Lease of Kansas, 18901
Our country is coming to the point where the government is to 
be made a government of the banks, by the banks, and for the 
banks, and the people are to disappear except as the mere 
producers of wealth at a very low standard of civilization.
William V. Allen, 18962
Beginning this chapter with the foregoing statements is useful for our analysis in 
two ways. First is their obvious similarity. While Allen’s is the less audacious (and less 
hyperbolic) of the two, it is a thoroughly typical expression of Populist radical 
producerism. Second, their juxtaposition provides an opportunity to contrast the 
development of Lease’s and Allen’s political thinking in a way that provides a better 
picture of Allen’s place in the Populist revolt. By the mid-summer of 1896, the firebrand 
Populist from Kansas, whose (possibly apocryphal) exhortation to farmers to “raise less 
com and more H e ir  has always been one of the more famous elements of Populist lore,
1 Quoted in John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f the Farmers’ Alliance and the 
People’s Party (1931; reprint, Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1961), 160.
2 William V. Allen, The Financial Policy (Washington, 1893), 8, reprint o f  Congressional Record 
(hereafter CRT 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1896, vol. 28, pt. 7, Appendix, pp. 310-20.
3 Producerism, (“artisanal republicanism” in the antebellum period) was a name used by Populists 
for the general philosophical position that the wealth created by workers was rightfully theirs, and that 
capitalists who would unjustly lay claim to it were economic parasites. Robert C. McMath, Jr., American 
Populism: A Social History. 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 51; Norman Pollack, The Just 
Polity: Populism. Law, and Human Welfare (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1987), 84-85, 190-92.
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had become, as fellow Kansan William Peffer would four years later, a supporter of 
Republican William McKinley.4 On the other hand, as the decade wound down Allen 
became more rather than less radical.
That the sincerity of Allen’s Populism was apparent to contemporaries explains a 
comment made by the Maine Populist in December 1895. An editorial writer, seeing the 
long debate over the Wilson-Gorman Tariff bill as a “fake fight from beginning to end,” 
criticized Allen for having “thrown his great abilities into that sham contest.” So 
displeased was he that he chose to classify Allen as a Democrat in terms of the role that 
he played in the wrangling over the tariff bill.5
Still, the writer held Allen in the highest esteem. While he did not accept Allen’s 
explanation for his approach to the tariff, he was convinced that the Nebraska Senator 
would never “willingly betray the principles of the People’s party.” Noting that Allen’s 
recent letter to the paper indicated that he did not wish to seek the People’s Party 
presidential nomination in 1896, this writer asserted that that decision “will be read with 
regret and sorrow by thousands of earnest reformers in every section of our land.” Allen, 
the writer continued, “is the most gifted, brilliant and magnetic of our national leaders,” 
and whatever his future course “as long as his matchless abilities are used to defend the
4 Hicks, 160 (for quotation); William A. Peffer, Populism. Its Rise and Fall, ed. Peter H. 
Argersinger (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1992), 21; Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane 
Preference in America, 1890-1900 (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 44.
5 Untitled editorial, Maine Populist. 5 Dec. 1895, Allen Papers, Nebraska State Historical Society 
(hereafter AP).
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principles of the People’s party he will have no warmer supporter or more ardent admirer 
than the Maine Populist and its editor.”6
Three months later, in March 1896, Populist Richard Goldman wrote a long letter 
to the Maine Populist on the subject of who the party ought to nominate for president. 
After considering several oft-mentioned possibilities, including Senator Peffer, Ignatius 
Donnelly, and Eugene V. Debs, Goldman came to Allen, whom he said had the “most 
complete qualifications for the standard bearer o f our party.” “A more eloquent speaker” 
than Allen, Goldman averred, “does not live....He is able; he is honest; he is
• •  7experienced. He is young.. .and intellectually superb.”
During late 1895 and early 1896 Allen was the leading favorite among many
* •  ♦ •  •  f tPopulists for their party’s 1896 presidential nomination. In 1895, Populist Congressman 
Jerry Simpson (Kansas) predicted that Allen would be the party’s presidential candidate.9
6 Ibid.
7 Richard Goldman, letter, Maine Populist. 12 Mar. 1896, AP.
8 References to the Allen-for-President phenomenon in the published literature are few and brief. 
According to historian Addison Sheldon, who knew Allen personally and presumably recalled the 
groundswell o f  support that arose among Populists for an Allen candidacy, by 1896 Allen was the Populist 
Party’s “strongest candidate” for president and was “widely regarded” as the likely Populist nominee. 
Addison E. Sheldon, “Nebraskans I Have Known,” Nebraska History 19 (1938): 197 (for first quotation)); 
Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People, vol. 1 (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1931), 761 (for 
second quotation). Ronald Fahl writes that contemporaries saw Allen as, “were it not for Bryan’s 
mercurial rise, the probable [Populist] standard-bearer in 1896.” Ronald J. Fahl, review o f Western 
Populism, by Karel Bicha, Pacific Northwest Quarterly 69 (1978): 138. Unfortunately, the neglect o f the 
effort to draft Allen for a presidential run includes Robert F. Durden’s otherwise insightful and informative 
The Climax o f Populism: The Election o f 1896 (Lexington: University o f Kentucky Press, 1965).
Evidently, the only other scholar to notice the effort to draft Allen was Mittie Y. Scott, who, unfortunately, 
provides no details. The evidence cited in the present study, though, seems to justify her comment that, 
had Allen so desired, “it is very probable that he could have had the nomination.” Mittie Young Scott,
“The Life and Political Career o f William Vincent Allen,” (M.A. thesis, University o f Nebraska, 1927), 69.
9 Unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d., AP; Red Cloud Argus, n.d., AP.
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A Populist newspaper in Nebraska observed approvingly that Allen was likely to head 
the “populist and bimetallic tickets in this year’s contest against Toryism and English 
rule.”10 In April 1896, the Topeka Advocate noted that the potential selection of Allen 
had been “discussed freely by the press, and the majority of those giving a public 
expression in regard to the matter have declared for him.”11
The boom for Allen was nationwide among Populists. The Dakota Farmers’ 
Leader of Canton, South Dakota, preferred Allen, whom it saw as “a magnificent
•  • 1 *7example of the American patriot— a second Lincoln.” The Reformer of Oklahoma
called for the nomination of Allen, who, its editorialist wrote, “represents Populism in its 
1 ^  •best sense.” Populists in Zaneville, Ohio wrote to a Nebraska newspaper to declare that 
“We are all for Allen.”14 In Texas, a full month after Allen’s official announcement 
removing himself from consideration, a correspondent to the Southern Mercury wrote 
that in Smith County the nomination of Allen “seems to be the popular idea.”15 During 
the late winter or early spring of 1896, the Missouri World polled its readers as to their
10 [David City, Nebraska] People’s Banner, n.d., 1896, AP.
11 “Not a Candidate,” Topeka Advocate. 22 Apr. 1896, AP. Discussion o f Allen as a presidential 
prospect occurred as early as July 1894. In his flattering profile o f Allen, editor Albert Shaw wrote that 
were the Populists to win the presidency in 1900 (Allen had told him he was skeptical o f  the party’s 
prospects in 1896), it would be with Allen leading the ticket. Albert Shaw, "William V. Allen: A Populist. 
A Character Sketch and Interview," Review o f Reviews 10 (July 1894): 31.
12 Editorial, Dakota Farmers’ Leader, 27 Mar. 1896, AP. See also 9 Feb. 1894 and 22 June 1894,
AP.
13 The [Kingfisher, Oklahoma Territory] Reformer. 23 Jan. 1896, AP.
14 Nebraska Independent 5 Mar. 1896, AP.
15 Southern Mercury, 26 Apr. 1896, AP. See also the [Texas] Real Republic, 30 Jan. and 5 Mar. 
1896, AP.
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preferences specifically for the Populist presidential nomination. Of 2887 votes cast, 
Allen received 1481 or fifty-one percent, with Tom Watson of Georgia coming in second 
with 368 votes.16 In January 1896, Populist Senator Marion Butler (North Carolina) 
stated that Allen “is the strongest man in the party, and if he permits his name to be used
17in the convention he will have a good following.”
Many Nebraska Populists saw Allen as a veritable paladin of Populism and they 
overwhelmingly supported him for President. Populist newspaper editorials calling for 
Allen’s selection were widespread. The O’Neill, Nebraska Beacon Light regarded Allen 
as the foremost figure in American politics, “the bulwark of the reform cause.” The 
paper thought him “the Abraham Lincoln of the common people” and believed he 
“would lead the toiling masses up out of the mortgage and bond slavery as Lincoln led 
the people in I860.”18 The Wahoo, Nebraska New Era thought Allen, the “leading man 
in American politics,” possessed “the ability and integrity to lift the people from the mire 
and deliver them from the hands of our British oppressors.”19 After Allen had removed
16 “Result o f  the Vote,” Missouri World, n.d. clipping, AP. Rounding out the top five were James 
B. Weaver o f Iowa, 216; Eugene V. Debs o f Indiana, 209; and Jacob Coxey o f Ohio, 190. See also ibid.,
18 Mar. 1896, AP. The paper reported that ballots were received from every state and territory save 
Delaware and Rhode Island. The National Watchman, the Populist newspaper published at Washington, 
D.C., also conducted a nationwide poll. A preliminary, impressionistic report o f the results, published at 
an unknown date in 1896 and present in the Allen Papers in the form o f  a newspaper clipping, shows Allen
in first place “by a few votes.” Ibid., AP.
17 Quoted in the Beatrice [Nebraska] Tribune, 17 Jan. 1896, AP.
18 “Presidential Timber,” Editorial, [O’Neill, Nebraska] Beacon Light, 13 Mar. 1896, AP. The 
paper’s choice for vice-president was Eugene Debs. The two men had the qualities needed to “lift a 
downtrodden and almost crushed people from the mire o f bankruptcy, despond and suicide, and again raise 
them to the exalted plane o f manhood, and free them from the yoke o f  British oppression and Wall street 
task masters.”
19 The [Wahoo] New Era, n.d., quoted in the Exeter [Nebraska] Enterprise 21 Mar. 1896, AP. See
also the Wahoo New Era, n.d. and 27 Feb. 1896, AP.
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himself from consideration, the Nebraska Independent, the official newspaper of the state 
People’s Party, asked whether he was “at liberty to decline a nomination which seems to 
be the desire of the whole party, and which the interests of the common people of the
90whole nation demands that he shall accept?”
Such sentiments were widespread among Nebraska Populists. In March 1896, the 
Trenton, Nebraska People’s Sentinel conducted a poll of its readers to ascertain their 
preference for president, regardless of the candidates’ party affiliation. Allen received 69 
o f the 104 votes cast or 66 percent.21 On 9 March, when Populist Governor Silas A. 
Holcomb indicated that he did not wish to be considered for the presidency, part of his 
statement read
I believe, however, in standing up for Nebraska, and am of the opinion that she 
has an illustrious citizen well qualified to perform the functions of this most 
important office of the government more satisfactorily to the great masses of the 
people than any president since the days of Abraham Lincoln. I am for Senator 
Allen and believe him to be the choice of the people of Nebraska and I predict 
his unanimous nomination at St. Louis July 22 next.22
In mid-March, J.A. Edgerton, Chairman of the People’s Party State central committee, 
predicted that Allen would receive a unanimous endorsement from the delegates at the
20 Quoted in “Not a Candidate,” Topeka Advocate. 22 Apr. 1896, AP. For other Nebraska 
Populist papers calling for Allen’s nomination, see the following newspaper clippings in the Allen Papers: 
the Exeter Enterprise, n.d.; the Polk County [Osceola! Independent, 13 Feb. 1896; the Greeley Citizen. 13 
Mar. 1896; the David City People’s Banner, 28 Feb. and 23 Apr. 1896; the Schubert Citizen, n.d.; the 
Madison Reporter, n.d.; the Madison Star, (dateline 3 Apr. 1896), n.d.; the Beatrice Tribune, 20 Mar. and 
17 Apr. 1896; the [Chadron] Signal, 11 Apr. 1896; [Clay Center] Patriot, 13 Mar. and 3 Apr. 1896; [Grand 
Island] Free Press, n.d. See also the Saint Paul [Nebraska] Phonograph, 20 Mar. 1896, AP.
21 “The Presidential Contest,” [Trenton] People’s Sentinel, 13 Mar. 1896, AP. Democrat 
Benjamin Tillman o f South Carolina was second with twelve votes.
22 “Holcomb Not a Candidate,” Lincoln Journal, 10 Mar. 1896, AP. See also the Butler County 
rDavid City] Press, 20 Mar. 1896, AP.
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upcoming state convention. “There is no division among Nebraska populists on that 
question,” he told a reporter, and he went on to predict that at the national party 
convention Allen would be nominated on the first ballot."
On 24 March, Allen wrote to Governor Holcomb to relate that he did not wish to
be considered for the nomination. The forty-nine year-old Senator indicated that his
request was due in part to family considerations, and added:
I do not feel that my experience has been such as to warrant me in being a 
candidate for the nomination, or in accepting it if it should be tendered me.
There are many older and abler men in the party than I am, highly well qualified 
to make the race, and I feel confident that I can do the cause greater good by 
remaining where I am and fighting in the ranks for success....The welfare of the 
party, and therefore the welfare of the country, is to be consulted at all times; 
principles count for everything, and men for nothing, in our struggle.24
Yet the publication of this letter in the press did not immediately put an end to 
efforts to draft Allen. On 14 April, Populists met in Omaha and created the William V. 
Allen Club, with an initial membership of 269, for the purpose of promoting an Allen 
presidential candidacy. The resolutions adopted at its first meeting included the 
following tribute:
Senator Allen owes his exalted place in the esteem and respect of his countrymen 
to his high character, to his intelligent appreciation of the needs of the people, to 
his courageous defense of popular rights against the encroachments of purchased 
privilege and organized wealth, to his steady opposition to the substitution of the 
power of a greedy and irresponsible aristocracy for the liberty of the citizen, to 
his continuous protest against the transfer of the property of the masses to the 
few who have not earned it.25
23 “Mr. Edgerton’s Views,” unidentified newspaper clipping, 19 Mar. 1896, AP. Also on 19 
March, the Nebraska Independent published the enthusiastic endorsement o f an Allen presidential bid by a 
fraternal society called the Eureka Spring Council o f  the United American Constitutional Brotherhood, AP.
24 Quoted in “Not a Candidate,” Topeka Advocate. 22 Apr. 1896, AP.
25 “To Boom Senator Allen,” [Omaha] Western Laborer, 18 Apr. 1896, AP; “Nebraska Populists 
Organize,” Washington Post, 14 Apr. 1896, AP.
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Many of Allen’s Populist contemporaries considered him a true Populist. In 
Nebraska, Populist newspaper assessments of Allen typically sounded like that of the 
Allen News, which thought he was performing “more and better work for the people than 
all the rest of the Senate put together,” or that o f Creighton-based The People’s News, 
which considered Allen the leading “champion of American principles,” or that of the 
Nebraska Independent, which opined that he was on a “masterly course in dealing with 
great political questions.” The platform adopted at the August 5 Nebraska state 
Populist convention endorsed Allen’s Senate performance because “he has so ably stood 
for the rights of the people against the insolence of organized wealth,” and subsequent
97People’s Party platforms in 1897 and 1898 praised him in similar terms. In 1899, after 
Allen’s successor in the Senate died before taking office, Populist Governor William A.
90
Poynter appointed Allen to fill the vacancy.
26 Undated quotations from the [Creighton, Nebraska] The People’s News and the Allen 
[Nebraska] News are in “William V. Allen: Former United States Senator from Nebraska[,] Candidate for 
District Judge 9th District o f Nebraska,” campaign pamphlet, 1911, AP. This source includes similar 
expressions o f opinion from the Populist newspapers Blair [Nebraska] Republic, 31 May 1894, and [David 
City, Nebraska] People’s Banner, n.d. The Nebraska Independent, n.d., clipping, AP. For an example o f  
how the minority o f Allen’s critics among Nebraska Populists saw him, see “The Itch for Sham 
Respectability,” [North Platte] Independent Era. 24 Dec. 1896, AP. A writer for the paper argued that 
Allen had performed “well so far as his knowledge o f the principles o f the People’s party goes.” However, 
by emphasizing free silver rather than fiat money, and by participating in tariff debates, Allen had shown 
himself to be “too much a cringer before Eastern sentiment to earn the title o f leader or he is as yet too 
unlearned in the principles o f the People’s party to give correct expression to them.”
27 University o f Nebraska, Nebraska Party Platforms. 1858-1938, ed. John G.W. Lewis (Works 
Projects Administration, 1940), 213 (for quotation), 223, 236. The 1899 convention occurred after Allen’s 
Senate term had expired and before he was appointed to fill the vacancy opened by the death o f his 
successor. In 1900 Allen served as chairman o f  the state convention but his political course was 
denounced as “unpopulistic” and “dishonorable” by the splinter middle-of-the-road faction at a separate 
convention. Ibid., 258, 259 (for quotations).
28 Paolo E. Coletta, “A Tempest in a Teapot? —  Governor Poynter’s Appointment o f William V. 
Allen to the United States Senate,” Nebraska History 38 (1957): 155-63. Holcomb (1895-99) and Poynter
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On the movement’s national stage, Allen was generally regarded as a genuine 
leader of the Populist fraternity. In July of 1896, in a vote that under the delegate system 
likely reflected the sentiments of the party rank and file, Allen was elected permanent 
chairman of the People’s Party National Convention at St. Louis. In 1897, he was a
O A
member of the National Committee o f the People’s Party.
The results of an 1898 survey of Allen’s peers in the Senate indicate that he had 
earned the admiration of his party’s highest elected officials. Senator James H. Kyle 
(South Dakota) thought Allen had “few superiors” among the nation’s “public men”. 
Senator Henry Heitfeld (Idaho) wrote that Allen had “no superior and few equals” in the 
United States Senate, and characterized him as a “legislator o f untiring energy and sound 
patriotic views.” For Senator William A. Harris (Kansas), Allen was “a man of splendid 
information, and is always on the alert to help good legislation and to check that which is 
bad. . . [we Populists] are very proud of his ability.” And Senator George F. Turner 
(Washington) wrote that he had “the very highest opinion” of Allen, whom he thought
(1899-1901) were both elected through fusion with the Democrats. Nevertheless, Holcomb earned the 
approval o f no less a Populist figure than Senator Peffer, who in March 1896 stated, regarding the selection 
o f the People’s Party presidential nominee, “I incline strongly to the opinion that Governor 
Holcomb.. .would make an acceptable and a strong candidate.” “Holcomb Not a Candidate,” Lincoln 
Journal. 10 Mar. 1896, AP. As to Poynter, Coletta writes that he was “elected as a Democratic-Populist 
(mostly Populist) fusionist.” Coletta, 155. The deceased Senator was Republican Monroe L. Hayward. 
Republicans elected him after gaining a majority in the legislature in 1899. Ibid., 155-56.
29 Hicks, 361-62.
30 CR, 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 2618. The period o f Allen’s membership on the committee is 
not known, but given his many contacts with party leaders during the election year o f 1896, it is likely that 
he was on the committee for most or all o f  that year.
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“is sound on all the great political questions of the day. He is a tribune of the people, and
n i
lives up to that position in his every word, thought and deed.”
Allen had no doubts about his commitment to Populism. In a letter of February 
1896, he wrote “It must be distinctly understood that I am a Populist at all times and 
under all circumstances.” About a year later, he related that he agreed completely with 
the Omaha Platform excepting its subtreasury proposal, and that he supported the 1896
'l'l m
People’s Party Platform in its entirety. In a farewell speech at the end of his elected 
term, he reminded his peers that he had come to the Senate as a Populist, and that 
throughout his tenure he had been committed to the party’s principles as proclaimed in 
its national platforms and had given these his “undivided allegiance.”34
As Allen saw it, the People’s Party was based on the beliefs that all citizens are 
equal before the law and that government ought to enact and enforce “just laws in an
o c
honest manner for the advancement o f society.” Personally, he espoused a philosophy
31 “Judge Allen: Flattering Tributes to His Ability as a Lawyer and Statesman,” collected 
transcript o f letters written to W.E. Reed o f Madison, Nebraska, n.d., AP. The Kyle and Heitfeld letters are 
undated. Harris’s letter is dated 22 Mar. 1898, and Turner’s 1 Mar. 1898. Peffer was out o f  the Senate by 
this time. Little is known concerning his view o f Allen or the nature o f their relationship. Peffer did write, 
concerning Allen’s early months in the Senate, that the two o f them, along with Kyle, held periodic 
meetings and that they “were in the main agreed upon a line o f policy.” He also wrote that Allen “stood 
head and shoulders above all the rest in both Houses in point o f physical and intellectual power,” and 
added rather cryptically that Allen, “when not goaded to extremes, was a conservative man.” William A. 
Peffer, Populism. Its Rise and Fall, ed. Peter H. Argersinger (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1992), 
96, 97 (first quotation), 185 (subsequent quotations).
32 William V. Allen, letter to W.W. Mullens, 4 Feb. 1896, published in the Utah Democrat. 28 
Feb. 1896, AP.
33 CR, 54-2, 1897, vol. 29, pt.l, p. 539.
34 CR. 55-3, 1899, vol. 32, pt. 3, p. 2617. See also ibid., 2618; 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 6, pp. 
5614-17; Gene Clanton, Congressional Populism and the Crisis o f  the 1890s (Lawrence: University Press 
o f Kansas, 1998), 99.
35 “The Cause o f Labor,” Journal o f the Knights o f Labor. 4 June 1896, AP.
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of “enlightened and just individualism, accompanied by proper cooperation.” The 
“opportunities of life,” he thought, ought always to remain “open to every man, woman 
and child, and not foreclosed by legislation, or by neglect to properly legislate." This 
outlook is fundamentally the same as that of Peffer, who once wrote that “the one great, 
basic principle underlying... [Populism] is the equality of human rights— first, to the 
rights of the people as individual persons, and second, to the rights, powers, and duties of
'XH • ♦ ♦the people as a whole.” As Gretchen Ritter writes, antimonopolists, including the 
Populists, endeavored to hinder “the emergence of a financial conservative society in 
which the few held power over the many, and to preserve a nation in which economic
Q O
opportunity was available to all and political power was held by each.”
Allen likened Populism to Anglo-American Whiggery, specifically that of the 
American colonial revolutionaries and the nineteenth-century British Whigs, Liberals, 
and Radicals. Populism was opposed to what he saw as the Hamiltonian ideology of the 
Democrats and Republicans, which stood squarely in the tradition of Whiggery’s 
opponents such as Royalists, Tories, and other groups which sought to look after the
OQ
interests o f a select few rather than the welfare of the many. The consistent failure of
36 “Allen Tired o f its Harping: Populist Pretender, Published at Lincoln, is Given a Knockout 
Blow,” Omaha World-Herald. 15 May 1895, AP. Allen stated elsewhere that the People’s Party was “a 
party o f enlightened and just individualism.” “The Cause o f Labor,” Journal o f the Knights o f  Labor. 4 
June 1896, AP. For more on Allen’s commitment to equality see CR. 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 3, pp. 2547- 
48; 56-2, 1900, vol. 34, pt. 3, p. 2001; “Senator Allen for Nebraska,” Omaha Enterprise. 19 Dec. 1896, AP; 
Clanton, Congressional Populism. 91.
37 Quoted in Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 227 (italics in original).
38 Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics o f 
Finance in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 194.
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Republicans and conservative Democrats to act in the interests o f the people was 
bringing the country to a grievous state. Some people had become imprudent enough, 
Allen told the Senate, to suggest that the American republican experiment was a failure 
and thus oligarchy was called for. While the common people would be allowed the vote, 
their votes would be irrelevant. “The great masses of the people are simply to be hewers 
of wood and drawers of water, to earn that the few may reap the reward from their toil.”40 
Thus he rebuked attempts by critics of the People’s Party to link it with either of 
the main parties, with which the People’s Party had “no kinship.”41 Emphasizing the 
independence of the Populists from the Democrats, Allen later insisted that the difference 
between the two organizations was “as marked and plain as the distinction between the 
sun and the moon.” 42 There is no contradiction here with Allen’s support of fusion with 
the Democrats. His view of the matter seems to have been that while the People’s Party 
was a distinct organization with a policy agenda superior to that o f the main parties, its 
interests were at times best served through coalition. In the case of the national election 
of 1896, while the differences between the Populists and Democrats were substantial, the 
considerable degree o f commonality between the Populists and Bryan Democrats was
39 “The Cause o f Labor,” Journal o f the Knights o f Labor. 4 June 1896, AP; CR. 55-2, 1898, vol. 
31, pt. 3, p. 2547; CR, 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. l ,p .  980.
40 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 3, p. 2547 (for quotation), 2548.
41 CR, 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 5, p. 4667.
42 CR, 56-1,1900, vol. 33, pt. 3, p. 2376.
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sufficient to make fusion the best course of action under the less than ideal
43circumstances.
In 1898, although he complimented the Democrats on their support of free silver 
and for having “advanced” to the Populist position on national banks, he insisted that the 
two parties still differed substantially.44 The Democracy was preferable to the 
Republicans’ “party of plutocracy,” the “bond servant of the gold aristocracy of the 
money power of America and Europe.”45 Still, the Democratic Party “falls short of 
reaching the high plane of Populism.” Populists, Allen told the Senate, believe that 
“natural monopolies” like railroads, telegraphs, and telephones, “must be owned and 
operated by the Government” in the public interest. They believed as well in reforms 
such as the direct popular election of United States Senators and the use o f the initiative 
and referendum “when practicable.” In these and other ways the People’s Party “differs 
widely and wisely” from the Democratic Party.46
So Populists, he once remarked, found labels such as “ ’republican populists,’ or 
‘democratic populists’” to be repugnant.47 Allen always cooperated fully with his
43 For the 1896 platforms o f the People’s Party, the Democrats (for free silver and an income tax, 
against the note-issuing power o f the National Banks, interest-bearing government bonds, and government 
by injunction) and the Republicans (which shares none o f the above positions), see National Party 
Platforms: Volume 1 1840-1956. compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 
1978), 97-100, 104-106, 107-09.
44 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 419, 420 (for the quotation).
45 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 419 (for the first quotation), 420; (for the second quotation); 
Allen. The Financial Policy. 15.
46 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 420. Direct election and the initiative and referendum were 
among the ten resolutions “expressive o f the sentiment” o f the 1892 Omaha Populist convention. See 
Hicks, 443-44.
47 “Senate Reorganization,” Washington Star. 30 Dec. 1895, AP.
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Populist colleagues in refusing to ally with either of the main parties in the organization 
of the Senate. In May 1896, responding to allegations that the Populists had negotiated 
with the Republicans in reorganization, Allen replied that between the Populists and 
representatives o f the major parties there had been no more discussion than had occurred 
“between the Populists and the Czar of Russia.”48
Two historians have suggested that during the two years leading up to the 1896 
presidential election Allen advocated a step back from the Omaha Platform so as to draw 
more voters into the Populist orbit. Lawrence Goodwyn argues that Allen displayed “no 
visible qualms” about jettisoning most of the Omaha Platform, for his only interest lay in 
enhancing his own political prospects.49 Peter Argersinger contends that Allen favored 
trimming the Populist reform agenda down to the sole issue of free silver, and notes that 
prior to a December 1894 Populist conference in St. Louis, Allen expressed his wish that 
the conference would dispense with “’all questionable doctrines and non-essentials.’”50
Yet Allen consistently asserted his commitment to the entire Omaha Platform. In 
early 1895, he cosigned an open letter to the members of the People’s Party that 
encouraged Populists to enlist the support and cooperation of anyone who thought it
48 CR, 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 5, p. 4667; Peffer, Rise and Fall. 96-97, 143, 185; Peter H. 
Argersinger, “No Rights on this Floor: Third Parties and the Institutionalization o f Congress,” The Journal 
o f  Interdisciplinary History 22 (1992): 655-690; reprinted in Argersinger, The Limits o f  Agrarian 
Radicalism: Western Populism and American Politics (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1995), 213- 
45. See specifically 217-18; “Senate Reorganization,” Washington Star. 30 Dec. 1895, AP. In the upper 
chamber the People’s Party wielded the balance o f  power twice during the 1890s (1895 and 1897).
Seeking to preserve their autonomy, in both instances they refused interparty cooperation, thereby leaving 
the organization o f the Senate to the Republicans, David J, Rothman, Politics and Power: The United 
States Senate. 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 70-71.
49 Goodwyn, 426-27, 440.
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imperative to focus politically on the financial question, “the mightiest and most 
fundamental controversy evolved during the present century.” The letter of course 
referred to free silver, but it also asserted the necessity o f terminating both the issue 
power of the national banks and interest-bearing government bond issues, and lamented 
the early post-Civil War conspiracy to eliminate the Greenbacks. It did not call for 
discarding any part of the Omaha Platform.51
Allen did think a rhetorical focus on the money problem in general, and free 
silver in particular, good politics, but no evidence has come to light showing that he 
wanted to discard any of the explicit demands of the Omaha Platform. In February 1895, 
Allen told the Chicago Times that the People’s Party ought to limit its agitation to “the 
three great issues before the people—namely, land, money, transportation.” The people, 
“are ready for reform” in these areas, “and upon a strong platform, clear and rational,” it 
“could carry the country were it to confine itself to these three issues.” Six months 
later, Allen told a reporter that while in 1896 the subtreasury scheme was likely to be 
dropped from, and some of the minor details would be revised in, the Omaha Platform, 
“its cardinal principles will be maintained.” When asked by a reporter whether the 
People’s party “could well afford to drop its other planks, temporarily at least, and make
50 Argersinger, Populism and Politics. 204-05.
51 “A Card to the People’s Party,” unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d., Feb. 1895, AP. In 
addition to Allen, the letter was signed by People’s Party Chairman Herman E. Taubeneck, 1892 Populist 
presidential candidate James B. Weaver, Senators Kyle and Harris, Congressmen Lafe Pence and John Bell 
(Colorado), Omer Kem and William McKeighan (Nebraska), Haldor Boen (Minnesota), and Thomas 
Hudson, William Baker, John Davis, and Jerry Simpson (Kansas). The letter probably had its origins in 
the conference Argersinger refers to above.
52 “Senator Allen,” quoted in the Chicago Times, reprinted in the Fremont [Nebraska] Leader, 1 
Feb. 1895, AP.
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the fight in 1896 on free silver alone?” Allen answered: “I don’t think so. I have given a 
great deal of attention to that subject, and I don’t see any reason why we should drop 
everything but silver, for there are reforms that are almost as necessary and important as 
free coinage.” While he was against making any concessions to single-issue silverites, 
because doing so would ultimately “disrupt our party,” he thought it wise to emphasize 
the financial question, for “[n]o party ever came into power with more than one great 
issue.” A newspaper characterized Allen’s attitude on the electoral politics of Populist 
reform by writing that he “had simply adopted the policy of hauling as many logs up the 
hill at a time as was possible,” and he would return “after the others when he got those
What then, did Allen mean by “questionable doctrines and non-essentials?” Most 
likely he had in mind the subtreasury plan, which as we have seen he had always 
opposed.55 The term “non-essentials” is likely a reference to one or more of the
53 “He’s Out for Silver,” The Butte [Montana] Anaconda Standard. 2 Sept. 1895, AP. The reader 
may notice a seeming contradiction between Allen’s assertion that the people were “ready for reform” in 
all three main areas o f the Populist program and his belief in the need to emphasize silver and the national 
bank issue. I believe he meant that political and economic conditions were such that the people would 
accept Populist remedies, but that they were not radicalized enough to embrace all o f them at once. Most 
likely he agreed with Senator Butler’s view that because, unhappily, the majority o f voters were not 
prepared to accept the whole People’s Party Platform, the prudent course was for opponents o f the money 
power to “’join hands on what we do agree on.’” Quoted in James L. Hunt, Marion Butler and American 
Populism (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 2003), 96.
54 “Toast a Senator: Hon. W.V. Allen Banquetted by His Admirers,” unidentified newspaper 
clipping, n.d., 1895, AP. For an interesting defense o f Allen’s position by a Populist newspaper see “Stop 
Your Kicking,” Beatrice [Nebraska] Tribune, n.d., AP. Incidentally, this source quotes Henry Vincent 
defending Populists’ free silver agitation.
55 Allen’s statements on intrinsic value and fiat money remained consistent with his past record. 
See CR. 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, p t 1, pp. 254, 907; pt. 5, p. 4669; pt. 6, pp. 5608, 5618-19; 55-2, 1898, vol. 
31, pt. 1, p. 419; pt. 2, pp. 1676-78; 56-1, vol. 33, pt. 2, pp. 1620, 1640; pt. 3, p. 2583; 56-2, vol. 34, pt. 3, 
p. 2002; “The Cause o f Labor: Senator W.V. Allen’s Great Speech in Boston,” Journal o f the Knights o f  
Labor. 4 June 1986, AP. Populist historians will no doubt find these statements particularly interesting:
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supplemental resolutions passed by the Omaha convention but which were not 
technically parts o f the Platform.56
In his long speech to the 1896 People’s Party National Convention, Allen 
defended fusion with the Democrats on the grounds that doing so would promote the 
Populist reform agenda. In making his case Allen focused primarily on the threat that 
rejecting fusion posed to the prospects for an income tax, the withdrawal of the money 
issue power o f the national banks, and the nationalization of the railroads, telephones,
c n
and telegraphs—arguably the three most radical planks in the Populist platform.
“The Democratic party, as I understand, believe in the constant redeemability o f all forms o f paper money.
I do not believe in that; and my party does not believe in it in the popular sense.” He went on: “I do not 
believe it is necessary to redeem a limited volume o f full legal-tender money in anything. I believe every 
time it is paid for a debt and every time it is exchanged for property it is redeemed in the full sense; and in 
that sense I believe in redeemability, and in no other. The Democratic party does not believe in that.” CR, 
56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 3, p. 2376.
56 As this study indicates, Allen supported, at least, most o f  the Omaha resolutions. While he 
supported the initiative and referendum, he thought it nonviable above the municipal level. No evidence 
has been found that Allen absolutely opposed any o f the resolutions, although after his Senate service he 
may have changed his mind about the wisdom o f the direct election o f  Senators. An undated source shows 
that he did not favor the reform, but in a speech written in 1905 he expressed his support o f  it. “Is This 
Treason?” unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d. but after Allen’s Senate service, AP; William V. Allen, 
“The Advancement o f  Constitutional Doctrines,” typed speech draft, p. 38, AP. For Allen’s earlier support 
o f direct election, see “The Cause o f Labor”; CR. 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 420; 55-3, 1899, vol. 32, pt. 
2, p. 1678. For his support o f other Omaha resolutions, see (initiative and referendum) 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, 
pt. 1, p. 420; (eight hour law for workers) CR, 54-2, 1897, vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 645-46, 710-11; 56-1, 1900, 
vol. 33, pt. 7, pp. 6534-35; (fair pensions) CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 926-32, 960; pt. 5, p. 4293; 56- 
1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 1, pp. 676-683; pt. 3, pp. 2527, 2588.
57 For critical views o f Allen’s role at the convention, see Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and 
Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s Party (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 
1974), 260-65; and Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 480-81, 487-92. An interpretation that does not hold Allen to have 
been a corrupt influence at the convention is in Durden, 42-43. For a persuasive defense o f  the Populists’ 
fusion strategy in 1896, see Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern 
Populist Thought (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), 103-43. For a transcript o f Allen’s 
speech see William J. Bryan, The First Battle: A Story o f the Campaign o f  1896 (Chicago: W.B. Conkey 
Company, 1897), 264-70. That Allen’s support o f fusion was in the mainstream o f the Populist movement 
is evidenced by the sentiment o f the delegates to the 1896 Nebraska State Populist convention, who voted 
699 to 34 to endorse the Democratic presidential ticket. Clifford Ernest Bowman, “The Local Nebraska 
Press and National Politics, 1896-1908” (M.A. thesis, University o f  Nebraska, 1964), 116. According to
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As to the explicit demands of the Omaha Platform, Allen continued to support 
and fight for all o f them.58 In examining his record during this period (1895-1901), the 
following pages will focus on two planks: the demand lor a graduated income tax, and 
the call for the nationalization of the railroads, telephone and telegraph. Responses to 
these planks are perhaps particularly instructive, for they are among the most radical in
John Hicks, Allen favored, at least initially, the nomination o f Democrat Arthur M. Sewall o f Maine for the 
Populist vice-presidential nomination. See Hicks, 362-63.
58 For Allen’s support o f the platform demands, see:
For a “national currency” (see note 55 above) and termination o f the money-issue power o f the 
National Banks: CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 418-19; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 3, pp. 2581-83; Allen,
The Financial Policy, 7-8; “Allen Roasts Morton,” Madison Star, 21 July 1899, AP; “The Cause o f Labor,” 
AP; William V. Allen, “The Populist Program,” The Independent 52 (Feb. 1900): 475; “The Leader o f the 
Populists,” New York Journal, 2 Dec. 1895, AP.
For free silver: CR, 54-1, 1895, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 240, 254-55, 338-41, 412, 452, 863, 907-08; pt 
2, p. 1043-45, 1047-48, 1204, 1207, 1209, 1215, 1825-26; 1896, vol. 28, pt. 3, p. 2102-04, 2149-51, 2368; 
pt. 4, p. 3218; 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 36; 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 310-11, 418-19; pt. 2, pp. 
1675-79; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 2, pp. 1616-21; 1639-41; “The Leader o f the Populists,” AP; “He’s Out 
for Silver,” The Butte [Montana] Anaconda Standard. 2 Sept. 1895, AP; “Allen on Silver: The Nebraska 
Senator Speaks to a Large Audience [in Minneapolis],” unidentified newspaper clipping, 4 Oct. 1896, AP.
For an increase in the volume o f  the currency to fifty dollars per capita: CR, 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, 
pt. 6, p. 5615, 5617; 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 36; 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 418-19; pt. 2, pp. 1675- 
76; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 3, p. 2583; “The Cause o f Labor,” AP; “Allen on Silver,” AP.
Against bond sales and consequent government debt (not itself a plank, but inextricably entangled 
with the subjects listed above; for this reason it was included as a plank in the Party’s 1896 Platform): CR,
54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 489, 534; pt. 5, pp. 4045, 4774; pt. 6, pp. 5286, 5456, 5512-13, 5557-58, 
5561-5563, 5608-19, 5781-82, 5941-44; 5983; 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 418-19, 749-50; pt. 5, 4089;
55-3, 1899, vol. 32, pt. 3, pp. 2617-18; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 2, p. 1378-85, 1436-38, 1618, 1621; pt. 3, 
2581-82, 2581-84; 56-2, 1901, vol. 34, pt. 3, p. 2002; Allen, The Financial Policy, 3-8; “It Will be 
Interesting,” Topeka Advocate, 15 Jan. 1896, AP.
For the limitation o f national revenues to necessary governmental expenditures (i.e. tariffs for 
revenue only): CR. 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 907-08; 54-2, 1896, vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 41-45, 202-03; 55- 
1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 464-69; Allen, Financial Policy. 11-16; “Allen on Silver,” AP; “The Cause o f  
Labor,” AP. For a brief reference to Allen’s opposition to an amendment aimed at providing senators with 
useful information on tariff-related issues, see Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, John Coit Spooner: Defender o f  
Presidents (New York: University Publishers, 1961), 207-09.
For postal savings banks: CR, 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 1, p. 667; “The Cause o f Labor,” AP;
“Allen Roasts Morton,” AP. In February 1899, Allen read to the Senate a recent speech by Democrat John 
P. Altgeld, in which the former Illinois Governor expressed the view that the people were ready for, among 
other reforms, “postal savings banks and widening the functions o f  the postal department.” CR, 55-3,
1899, vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1540.
For the reclamation by the Government o f monopolized and alien-owned lands for the purpose o f  
allocation to legitimate settlers: CR, 54-2, 1897, vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 494-95, 538-44, 714-19, 724, 791-92, 
795; 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 6548; “The Cause o f Labor,” AP.
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the Omaha Platform, and because they are among those Omaha demands which during 
the 1890s were never supported by either major party.59
Of the income tax plank it may be said, as Gene Clanton has written concerning 
the Omaha Platform as a whole, that it “merits more careful attention than it has 
received.”60 We cannot take up that gauntlet here, even for just the income tax plank. 
However, three points warrant brief discussion.
First, although Populist historiography includes very little discussion of the 
income tax plank, it was not, as an early student of the People’s Party assumed, merely 
an “incidental scheme.” This assertion was based on the fact that a Democratic congress 
passed an income tax provision in 1894, and presumably because the income tax was less 
conspicuous in Populist rhetoric than many of the other Omaha demands.61 But the call 
for a graduated income tax had been part of the 1889 Northern Alliance Platform and 
was among the demands of the 1890 Ocala Convention. As one o f the Omaha 
demands, the idea of a graded income tax was part o f a Platform which, as Robert 
McMath writes, “reflected decades of thought and debate.” Among that which 
emerged from this ideological evolution, as we saw in chapter three, was Senator Peffer’s
59 Given the context in which they were drawn up, all o f  the Omaha demands were radical to some 
degree. For example, the termination o f the money-issuing power o f the national banks was very radical. 
However, in 1896 the Democratic Party also supported it. See Johnson, 98.
60 Clanton, Congressional Populism, 20.
61 Frank L. McVey, “The Populist Movement,” Economic Studies 1 (1896): 164.
62 Fred A Shannon, American Farmers’ Movements (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 
1957), 148, 152.
63 McMath, 168. For brief but useful discussions o f the platform see Goodwyn, 593-96; and 
Norman Pollack, The Just Polity, 339-42.
143
introduction in 1894 of a graduated income tax amendment, which all three Populist 
senators voted for, including Allen.
Second, the Democratic and Populist taxes differed profoundly. The Democratic 
tax was a proportional tax, the purpose of which was simply to compensate for revenue 
losses under the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act. The Populist tax was progressive, and as 
such redistributive. The difference lay in the Populists’ considered commitment to make 
economic fairness and social justice part o f the revenue-raising calculus. In 1896, 
Populists expanded the Omaha income tax plank in order to underscore that the point of 
progressivity was “that aggregated wealth shall bear its just proportion of taxation.”64 In 
June 1896, Allen told a Populist audience in Boston that one of the “cardinal principles” 
o f the People’s Party was a graduated income tax.65
Third, Allen’s position on the income tax was closely related to his Populistic 
interpretation of other issues. Prominent among these was his belief in a financial 
conspiracy directed against the people by the money power and in the degradation of the 
Supreme Court. In 1896, expanding on his running account of the plutocrats’ designs for 
usurping most of the wealth produced the people, Allen asserted that, since 1892, two 
men who were nominated for the Supreme Court possessed no qualifications for the 
position aside from having been corporate attorneys. He argued that “by some
64 Johnson, 105. The only previous federal income tax, the Civil War tax (1862-1872, including its 
various amendments), was a progressive tax. However, the tax and its graduated structure were politically 
possible only because o f the huge demand for revenue during the war emergency. See Steven R. Weisman, 
The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson— The Fierce Battles over Money and Power That Transformed the 
Nation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 26-50, 75-104.
65 “The Cause o f Labor,” AP.
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mysterious process” the money power was responsible for the Supreme Court’s 1895 
decision {Pollock versus Farmers ’ Loan and Trust Company) declaring the federal 
income tax unconstitutional.66 During the Pollock proceedings, Allen charged, the 
majority justices ignored the Constitution and rendered their decisions simply on the 
basis of their own (upper) class interests and the heavy and corrupting influence of 
representatives of the money power. Allen thought the court’s decision not only wrong, 
but also suspicious and highly unusual.
It was also understandable. The plutocrats needed to have the income tax 
invalidated, for until that and an increase in tariff duties were accomplished the “highly
AO
protected industries could never have the people completely by the throat.” If they
could impel the Supreme Court to nullify the tax, the rich would avoid tax liabilities on 
their vast fortunes. “Then they would put the final nail in the political coffin of the 
industrial slave and make him bear the full burden for all time.”69
Allen clearly understood the connection between the income tax and the tariff. 
The debate over schedules as conducted by the major parties was “a false issue,” of little 
consequence “compared with the great issue of monetary reform.” Yet outside of the 
debate over free trade versus protectionism, the tariff was important. It was a regressive 
tax paid disproportionately by the poor. The progressive income tax sought to correct the
66 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 1895. Allen, Financial Policy, 9, 10 (for 
quotation). For a recent overview o f  the context and disposition o f the case, see Weisman, 146-61.
67 Ibid., 10-11.
68 Ibid., 9.
69 Ibid., 10.
145
imbalance by bringing the tax obligations of the wealthy more in line with their ability to
pay. The shared core of these issues was whether the rich or the poor would finance the
1 1necessary expenses of the federal government. Allen’s references to the excessive tax 
burden carried by the people, along with his support for the graded income tax, suggests 
that like other Populists such as Thomas L. Nugent of Texas, he saw the tax as the proper 
alternative to the protective tariff.72 Put the country “on a sound financial basis, where it 
is able to meet taxation successfully, and the tariff question will disappear.”
Referring to American Populists in general as well as Texas Populists in 
particular, Roscoe Martin writes that Populists became “bitter critics” of the Supreme
• 7 A.Court when it handed down the Pollock decision. As Norman Pollack observes, 
Populists lamented the Court’s growing solicitude for the interests of business and 
criticized the Court for its rightward shift. “They did so not out of cynicism or a 
disregard for the Court’s function, but because they had a deep respect for its potentiality 
as the bulwark of popular rights.”75 In his remarks to the Senate on the Pollock decision, 
Allen asserted that the people had “lost confidence” in the nation’s highest judicial
70 Ibid., 11.
71 Ibid., 9-11; Susannah Camic, review o f The Great Tax Wars, by Steven Weisman, the yale 
review o f books 6 (winter 2003):
http://www.yalereviewofbooks.com/archive/winter03/review04.shtml.htm
72 Pollack, The Just Polity. 272.
73 Allen, The Financial Policy, 11.
74 Roscoe Martin, The People’s Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics (1933; reprint, 
Austin: University o f  Texas Press, 1970), 52.
75 Pollack, The Just Polity. 63, 64 (for quotation).
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body.76 Three weeks later (May 1896), Allen introduced a bill for a constitutional 
amendment that would necessitate a unanimous ruling of the Supreme Court to nullify 
any federal law.77 In March 1897, he resubmitted the proposal, and at the same time 
offered a bill to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and another “to prevent the
* 7Rabuse of legal processes by United States courts and judges thereof.”
Speaking in the Senate in March 1898, Allen averred that, unless adequately
79restrained, the railroad companies would come to “own” the Federal Government. 
Supposedly state governments and the Interstate Commerce Commission regulated the 
railroads, but Allen declared the effort to rein in railroad abuses through public oversight 
a failure. “I would be willing here to wait half an hour,” he said, “for any Senator in this 
Chamber to point out where a railroad has ever been controlled by legislation, State or 
national.”
We have Interstate Commerce Commissioners. We are paying them large 
salaries. They have a large retinue o f clerks and subordinates under them. Pray, 
what are they doing for the country and for the shipper? Absolutely nothing. 
They do not make an order that is obeyed by a railroad company unless the 
railroad company sees fit to obey it. They are as powerless and impotent as a
76 Allen, “Financial Policy,” 11. Dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court, which some Alliance 
newspapers in Nebraska had taken to calling the “’American Bastille,”’ had been growing for at least 
twenty years and was fairly widespread even before the Pollock case. The income tax ruling exacerbated 
it. See Alan Furman Westin, “The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement and the Campaign o f  1896,” 
The Journal o f Politics 15 (Feb. 1953): 3-41 (for quotation, ibid., 20).
77 CR. 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 6, p. 5441. For more on Allen’s criticism o f  the courts, see chapter
three above, pp. 17 (fh. 44), 50 (fh. 129).
78 CR, 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. l ,p .  36.
79 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 3, p. 2460.
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babe in its cradle to control these corporations, which run riot over the people 
and over the commissioners.80
The only workable solution, as he said on at least ten separate occasions between 
1895 and 1901, was government ownership.81 In 1900, he emphasized that he favored 
“not control simply, but Government ownership—of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and 
all natural and exclusive monopolies.”
Allen argued that nationalization o f the railroads would solve several significant 
problems. First, it would put an end to the dual problem of overcapitalization of the 
railway companies and the excessive rates they charged. Because the railroads were 
valued at less than half o f their actual worth, the freight and passenger rates designed to 
reflect the fictitious value of the companies were higher than justified. Under 
government ownership the watering o f stock would be impossible, as there would be no 
shares to overvalue and no debt to finance. In order to highlight the idea that railroad 
owners practiced “a wholesale system of spoliation,” Allen described a hypothetical 
scenario. Were the government to experiment with owning one transcontinental line,
80 Ibid., p. 2462. In 1897, two U.S. Supreme Court decisions severely restricted the rate- 
regulating powers o f the Interstate Commerce Commission. Harold U. Faulkner, Politics. Reform and 
Expansion: 1890-1900 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 78-79.
81 Ibid., pp. 2416, 2461-62. See also CR, 54-1, 1896, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 738-39; 55-1, 1897, vol. 
30, pt. 3, pp. 2609-32 (especially 2618-19, 2632); 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 420-23; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, 
pt. 3, p. 2376; “Allen Tired o f  its Harping,” AP; “Allen Roasts Morton,” AP; “The Leader o f the 
Populists,” AP; “Tinged with Populism,” The Butte Miner, 3 Sept. 1895, AP. Significantly, before a 
Populist audience just seven weeks prior to the 1896 People’s Party National Convention, Allen made a 
special point o f emphasizing the need to nationalize the railroads. Needless to say, this hardly fits with the 
usual image o f  Allen as a one-plank Populist. “The Cause o f Labor,” AP.
82 CR- 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 3, p. 2376. For other expressions o f  Allen’s support for the 
nationalization o f the telephone and telegraph systems, see CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 420; pt. 3, p. 
2461; 55-3, vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 359; “The Cause o f  Labor,” AP; “Allen Roasts Morton,” AP; “Tinged with 
Populism,” AP.
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either through appropriation of a private railway or its own construction, and setting its 
passenger and freight rates, after competitive rate adjustments by the private carriers, the 
entire railroad rate problem would be rectified. Then, Allen claimed, “you would see the
• •  •  87water jumping out of the railroad stocks higher than the geysers of the West.” 
Government ownership would also put an end to the “deplorable” state o f affairs in 
which large numbers of railroad employees were coerced into voting for political
04
candidates as dictated by their employers. Finally, it would solve the dilemma of what 
to do about railroads, such as the Union Pacific, that had defaulted on Federal loans.85
Allen defended the viability o f nationalization by reading a long list o f countries, 
including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Australia, that had implemented 
government ownership. Many countries owned their entire railroad system and the vast 
majority o f nations owned at least some o f their railways. Allen claimed that European 
governments operated their roads more cheaply and at less cost to the public than private 
companies did in the United States. Moreover, several states in the United States had or
• • • • 8Awere currently experimenting with government ownership. This trend was occurring 
because a railroad is “a great natural monopoly” in which everyone had an interest.
83 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 3, p. 2462. See also CR, 54-2, 1897, vol. 29, pt. 2, p. 1291; CR, 55- 
1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 2625; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 1, p. 763. For a brief and interesting discussion that 
shows one Populist’s perspective on the railroad overcapitalization problem, see William A. Peffer, “The 
Mission o f the Populist Party,” The Review o f Reviews 9 (Jan. 1894): 76, reprinted from the North 
American Review.
84 CR. 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 3, p. 2462. For an example o f Allen’s support o f  efforts to prevent 
the cheating o f railroad workers out o f  their pay by their employers, see ibid,, p. 2416.
85 CR, 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 3, pp. 2612-25, 2630-32. See also Clanton, Congressional 
Populism. 123-125.
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Therefore, the government “not only has the right, but it [has] a duty to its citizens” to
o n
nationalize the industry. There is, Allen asserted, no possible counter-argument 
“except that prompted by greed, except that argument that is all-powerful and all-potent 
in the Congress...that a few corporations must have an opportunity to fleece the people at 
their will.”88 During an 1898 consideration of a grant o f a railroad right-of-way in 
Alaska, a committee amendment reserving the right of the Federal Government to 
assume ownership of railroads falling under the larger legislation was voted down forty- 
eight to seven. Populists, Allen among them, accounted for four o f the seven votes in the 
minority.89
On the important foreign policy matters surrounding the Spanish-American War, 
Allen, like most congressional Populists, nearly always took positions consistent with 
anti-imperialism and the observance of human rights.90 He staunchly advocated Cuban 
independence, accused American bondholders and business interests of opposing Cuban 
independence for their own financial gain, supported the war against Spain, bitterly 
opposed the annexation of Hawaii, affirmed the ability of Cubans and Filipinos to govern 
themselves, and condemned the American war against the Filipinos.91
86 CR, 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 2617.
87 Ibid., 2618.
88 Ibid., 2619.
89 55-2, vol. 31, pt. 3, p. 2463. Senator Kyle did not vote. By this time he might not have 
still considered himself a Populist. See chapter one above, p. 10, fh. 20.
90 On Populists as typically anti-imperialist, see Clanton, Congressional Populism, 137-162.
91 CR, 55-2, 1897, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 40; 1898, vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3410-3413; pt. 5, pp. 4108-10; pt. 
7, pp. 6634-51; 55-3, 1899, vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 563; pt. 2, pp. 1481-83, 1731; 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 4, pp.
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Perhaps it is best to end this chapter (and with it our analysis of Allen’s Senate
record) as we began it, with Allen echoing Lincoln in Populist fashion. We cannot
ignore, Allen told the Senate in 1898, “the fact that the money power dominates every
branch of the Government, while the people are deceived into believing that this is a
popular government, in which they have a full share.” Rather, it is “a government by the
few and for the few.” The mission of the People’s Party is
To call back the spirit o f departed patriotism as it existed a century ago; it is its 
aim and purpose to have a government o f the people, for the people, and by the 
people, in which all invidious class distinctions shall be put aside, and where 
men and women shall be known and respected for their character and 
intelligence and not for the paltry dollars they carry in their pockets.92
3037-38, 3269, 3272, 3554-59; pt. 7, pp. 6670-71, 6674. Although he argued that the principles o f  the 
Declaration o f Independence applied to “all men, under whatever sun they might be bom or on whatever 
soil they might live,” Allen’s foreign policy views revealed a considerable racist streak. Among his major 
objections to Hawaiian annexation in particular, and American imperialism in general, was the prospect 
that they would lead to the immigration o f “15,000,000 people belonging to alien races, the most o f them 
ignorant, brutal, hostile, and savage, and reduce the standard o f our home civilization to that o f a low and 
brutal Asiatic population.” His racist comments, it needs to be said, very often emphasized what he saw as 
the likely detrimental effects on American workers o f immigrant labor. CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 4, p. 
3412; pt. 7, 6634, 6642-43. See also CR, 56-1, 1900, vol. 33, pt. 1, p. 847. On the issue o f  race, Allen’s 
attitude toward Native Americans appears to have been relatively enlightened. Allen knew many Indians 
in Nebraska, seems to have been genuinely concerned for their welfare, and on a number o f occasions in 
the Senate defended the treaty rights o f Native Americans. On the other hand, he voted for at least one 
proposal to open part o f a tribal reservation to white settlement, and his comments concerning Native 
Americans were sometimes unmistakably, though apparently unintentionally, condescending. CR, 54-1, 
1896, vol. 28, pt. 3, p. 2585; 54-2, 1897, vol. 29, pt. 3, p. 2047; 55-1, 1897, vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 37; 55-2, 1898, 
vol. 31, pt. 2, p. 1618, pp. 2658-60; 55-3, 1899, vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 649; pt. 2, pp. 1603-05; 56-1, 1900, vol. 
33, pt. 4, 3879-82.
92 CR, 55-2, 1898, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 419.
CONCLUSION
The Populism of William V. Allen: An Assessment
Movements of “the people” against “the special interests” take 
many forms. It will no longer do for us to dismiss as “false 
consciousness” or “shadow movements” those aspects of 
populism that fail to meet our expectation for the populist 
legacy.
Robert McMath, “Populism in Two Countries”1
Throughout his tenure as a United States Senator, William Allen professed to 
being committed to the principles and goals of the People’s Party. In the Senate he made 
vigorous attempts to bring about every reform explicitly demanded in the Omaha 
Platform. While his political activities and relationships outside the Senate require 
further study, nothing we have seen in that area undermines the only plausible conclusion 
suggested by the evidence examined here: that Allen was undeniably a principled 
Populist.
He was also a persistent one. After the conclusion of his Senate service in 1901, 
Allen returned to the practice of law in his hometown of Madison, Nebraska. Thinking 
he could juggle two careers, he started a weekly newspaper, The Madison Mail. While 
the inaugural issue of the Mail (17 January 1902) is now lost, it is clear that Allen
1 Robert C. McMath, Jr., “Populism in Two Countries: Agrarian Protest in the Great Plains and 
Prairie Provinces,” Agricultural History 69 (1995): 546. Norman Pollack: “In a diverse movement such as 
Populism, any standard o f orthodoxy proves mischievous.” The Humane Economy: Populism. Capitalism, 
and Democracy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 95.
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intended it as a Populist organ. On local matters, the paper was a forceful critic of the 
Republican administration of Nebraska Governor Ezra P. Savage.3 Allen conferred with, 
supported, and universally endorsed Populist and Fusionist office-seekers, offered print 
space to People’s Party officials, and worked to persuade rural voters, the majority of 
whom were presumed to be receptive to Populist proposals, to go to the polls at election 
time.4
Speaking to the nexus between local conditions and national issues, Allen warned 
his readership about the likely outcome of the farmers’ current planting efforts. He 
predicted that, come harvest time, farmers would not see the benefits of their labor 
because trusts would usurp the profits, “leaving the farmer enough to keep soul and body 
together so he can plant a crop next year.”5
The evils of the trusts, as well as the failure o f Theodore Roosevelt’s 
administration to adequately constrain them, were consistent themes in the Mail.6 So 
were the injustices o f the protective tariff, the need to expand the money supply, and 
sympathy for the striking anthracite coal workers in Pennsylvania.7 Allen continually
2 The Madison Mail, 24 Jan., 31 Jan., 1902. The cost o f  a yearly subscription was $1.50, but an 
alternative plan offered three months o f the Mail and one year o f William Jennings Bryan’s The 
Commoner for $ 1.00.
3 Ibid., 29 Aug. 1902.
4 Ibid., 2 May, 9 May 1902, 27 June-14 Nov. 1902. In Nebraska, Fusionist candidates were 
backed by temporary coalitions o f Populists and Democrats. Robert W. Cherny, Populism. Progressivism. 
and the Transformation o f Nebraska Politics. 1885-1915 (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1981), 
87-88, 96.
3 Ibid., 16 May 1902.
6 Ibid., 24 Jan., 26 Sept. 1902.
7 Ibid., 24 Jan., 4 July, 19 Dec. 1902; 9 Jan., 16 Jan. 1903.
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railed against the “money power,” which, true to its plutocratic values, employed corrupt
Q
and evil tactics aimed at furthering “the commercial interests of the eastern seaboard.”
Convinced that America's problems required decisive action, Allen called for 
government ownership of “all public utilities, such as railroads, telegraphs, telephones, 
water works, electric light systems, and ... coal mines.”9 He repeatedly denounced 
administration policy in the Philippines and argued that the people of that archipelago 
should be granted political independence.10
Despite claiming to have more subscribers than either of his two local 
competitors, Allen quickly determined that the paper was a luxury he could not afford to 
maintain. Citing the “exacting” demands of his legal practice, on 20 February 1903, he 
announced the consolidation of the Mail with the Bryanite-Democratic Madison Star.11
In 1903, Allen published an article in The Arena titled “Necessity for the People’s 
Party.” The party was needed, he wrote, because of the innumerable “evils” which 
neither o f the major parties were capable of eradicating. These included the issue power 
of the national banks, the oppression of laboring people, government subsidies to 
corporations, government bond issues, price-fixing in the railroad and ocean 
transportation industries, excessive railroad and telegraph rates, widespread absentee 
ownership of land, and the monopolization of the press and censorship of news. Such
8 Ibid., 16 May, 17 Oct. 1902.
9 Ibid., 31 Oct. 1902.
10 Ibid., 9 May-19 Sept. 1902.
11 Ibid., 9 Jan., 20 Feb. 1903.
154
evils, Allen wrote, nullify republicanism and prop up monarchism and aristocracy,
“while enriching privileged classes and giving to wealth the power to debauch or corrupt 
government and enchain the people.” Only through immediate reforms, including 
government ownership of the railroads and telegraph systems, could the iniquities be 
arrested.12
Long after most Populists had returned to their former parties, Allen stayed with 
the People’s Party. In 1903, he participated in a Populist mid-roaders conference in
1 3Denver. In 1904, Allen attended two Nebraska state Populist conventions. At the first, 
where he was “the leading figure,” he introduced a resolution, which passed soundly, 
calling on the national party to nominate its own candidates for president and vice- 
president.14 At the second, he served as chairman.15 At the party’s national convention 
held July 5-6 at Springfield, Illinois, Allen was runner-up for the presidential nomination.
12 William V. Allen, “Necessity for the People’s Party,” The Arena 30 (Oct. 1903): 410-14 
(quotation on 413). Under government ownership, Allen later wrote, the railroads “would not be a menace 
to the public; but in private hands they are.” William V. Allen, letter, The [Nebraska] Independent. 4 Aug. 
1904.
13 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), 558. Goodwyn writes that Allen had concluded “the policy o f fusion had 
been a mistake.” Ibid. There is no compelling reason to believe this, however. Doubtless Allen was 
paying close attention to the takeover o f the Democratic Party by conservatives. On the steadily declining 
fortunes o f William Jennings Bryan and his followers between 1900 and 1904, see Louis W. Koenig, 
Bryan: A Political Biography o f  William Jennings Bryan (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971), 366-74.
14 Addison E. Sheldon, “Nebraskans I Have Known,” Nebraska History 19 (1938): 202. The 
convention was held 21 June 1904 at Fremont, Nebraska. Ibid.; University o f  Nebraska, Nebraska Party 
Platforms, 1858-1938 ed. John G.W. Lewis (Works Projects Administration, 1940), 287.
15 Nebraska Party Platforms. 287-88. This convention was held on 10 Aug. 1904 at Lincoln, 
Nebraska.
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On the first (and apparently only) ballot Allen received 308 votes and Thomas Watson of 
Georgia 333 votes.16
According to Nebraska historian Addison Sheldon, Allen’s place in the 
movement “was rather over on the conservative side.” Allen was selected to chair state 
conventions of the party “in order to use his prestige and ability to quiet the outbreaks of 
the radicals and secure union of discordant elements.” The ultimate aim, Sheldon writes, 
was “the election of W.J. Bryan as president and the union of all elements in a reborn and 
reinspired Democratic Party” advancing to the accomplishment of “great social reforms
1 7in the interest of the people.”
Sheldon, himself formerly a mid-road Populist, reflects that in the final analysis
Allen was “an outstanding contribution to the people’s cause in an epic period of
American history.” Allen “was not an advance scout nor the leader of a forlorn hope in
the attack upon vested wrong or class privilege.”
But he w as a tow er o f  strength in the main battle. H e had breadth o f  v ision  and 
balanced judgm ent. H e w as a conservative leader in a radical cause. H is 
presence upon the floor o f  the United States Senate gave the representatives o f  
the selfish  ruling class the greatest shock o f  those embattled years. H e w as 
sim ple and dignified  in conduct, open in m ind to the poorest citizen, a firm  
friend and fearless cham pion.18
That Allen was a Populist has been established. Was he, as Sheldon and other historians 
have thought, a “conservative” one?19
16 Sheldon, 202.
17 Ibid., 200-01.
18 Ibid., 203.
19 See Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist 
Thought (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), 51; Ronald J.Fahl, review o f  Western
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The evidence shows that he was not, and that in fact he was in the mainstream of 
the movement. Let us explore the question from several perspectives. First, consider 
John Hicks’ interpretation of the essence of Populism. Its philosophical core consisted of 
two basic principles: that the government ought to check the exploitation of the poor by 
those seeking to profit thereby, and that the polity must be republican rather than 
plutocratic.21 As we have seen, Allen was a consistent and emphatic proponent of
political equality and economic justice. The many arguments he made for the Omaha
22demands reveal a devoted antimonopolist and dedicated republican.
Populism, Pacific Northwest Quarterly 69 (July 1978), 138. For other post-Senate views o f Allen, see the 
long newspaper article by Richard L. Metcalfe, “A Glowing Tribute to Senator Allen,” unidentified 
newspaper clipping, n.d. with dateline 4 Oct. 1911, AP; “Notes from the Capital: William V. Allen,” The 
Nation, 2 Dec. 1915.
20 Allen did hold conservative and, in some respects, regressive views in two areas o f  interest.
One, as we have seen, was with regard to race. His racist attitude regarding non-white peoples grew worse 
after his return to private life. The man who, in 1898, had quoted the Declaration o f Independence in 
arguing for the rights o f  the Cuban people to self-government, in 1902 called for the annexation o f  the 
island in order to make it “the dumping ground for the surplus negro population o f the country.” Blacks 
were “a menace to the peace, order and civilization o f many o f the southern states.” Madison Mail, 4 July 
1902. The other was his apparent lack o f enthusiasm for woman suffrage. Although many Populists 
supported woman suffrage, particularly in Kansas, North Dakota, Colorado, and the West, the national 
party’s unwillingness to formally support it made a mockery o f  its professed commitment to equality. 
Research for this study found only the following report o f Allen’s views by journalist Albert Shaw: he 
supported the current limited suffrage in Nebraska whereby women were eligible to vote in school 
elections. Regarding full suffrage, Allen had always believed that “women ought to be allowed to vote if  
they desired the ballot, while on the other hand it ought not to be forced on them against their wishes.” 
Albert Shaw, "William V. Allen: A Populist. A Character Sketch and Interview," Review o f Reviews 10 
(July 1894): 41. For brief accounts o f  the Populists and the woman suffrage question, see Gene Clanton, 
Populism: The Humane Preference in America. 1890-1900 (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 137-38, 
141-42; Robert C. McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1993), 170-71.
21 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History o f  the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party 
(1931; reprint, Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1961), 406.
22 On the Populists as “only the largest and most successful o f  a series” o f Gilded Age “egalitarian 
movements that shared a common spirit rooted in the republican ideology o f  the American Revolution,” 
see Worth Robert Miller, “The Republican Tradition,” in American Populism, ed. William F. Holmes 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1994), 209-214. By “republicanism,” Miller refers 
to the founding fathers’ ideal o f  a society based on personal liberty, in which the function o f government 
was to further those “social conditions that would aid the individual’s God-given right to self-
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Second, he favored without qualification all of the definite demands of the 
Omaha Platform, including the radical national bank and graduated income tax 
proposals, as well as all of the supplemental resolutions. Significantly, Allen’s initial, 
hesitant acceptance of the call for nationalization of the railroads occurred the same year 
(1894) as the beginning o f the silver craze, and his commitment to this socialistic reform 
solidified during the period (1894-1896) when agitation for silver and the support of 
fusion grew to their ultimate heights. Moreover, like many Populists, Allen was deeply 
concerned about the plight of labor (the largest subject in the Platform without a 
corresponding plank), and he made many efforts to improve conditions for workers.
Regarding free silver, Allen understood, as Elizabeth Sanders has written
O'Xconcerning the silver program in general, that it was “more than an empty panacea.”
Like many Populists, Allen saw silver as an effective remedy for deflation and tight
money. And perhaps he was right. According to Sanders, the general price stability that
free silver coinage likely would have produced
might have saved many thousands of farmers from crushing debt loads and 
descent into tenancy and sharecropping. The ‘automatic’ aspect of coinage on 
demand also promised to wrest control of money creation from banks and
fulfillment....It dictated the rejection o f any social development that encouraged the debasement o f  any 
human.” Such an outlook “naturally had special appeal to those who saw themselves as victims o f the 
contemporary system.” Ibid., 210. Miller apparently has in mind that strain o f Revolutionary era thought 
that emphasized both equality o f opportunity and the recognition o f talent. As Gordon Wood writes, the 
Revolutionary leaders hoped for the realization o f the “beautiful but ambiguous ideal” o f  a fair and roughly 
egalitarian society “where none would be too rich or too poor,” and whose people, it was thought, “would 
readily accede to such distinctions as emerged as long as they were fairly earned.” Gordon Wood, The 
Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill : University o f  North Carolina Press, 1969), 
70-75 (quotation on 73). On the Populists as ideological descendents o f  Revolutionary republicanism, see 
Charles Maurice Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (1935; reprint, New York:
Hill and Wang, Inc., 1960), 250-55 (Allen is discussed briefly on 254).
23 Elizabeth Sanders, Roots o f  Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 
(Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1999), 137.
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bondholders and their allies in the Treasury Department. These were no small 
aims.24
As ’’hard” money, silver “could accomplish many of the purposes of greenback printing 
without the ‘fiat money’ ideological baggage.”
After the mixed results of the 1894 elections, in which the Populist vote increased 
overall but declined significantly in Kansas, North Dakota, and several western states, 
the majority o f Populists reasoned that the best thing to do was to “raise the flag o f silver 
to broaden [the party’s] electoral base.” Because silver and fusion seemed to open the 
possibility for the realization of some of the Omaha demands, in 1896 Allen embraced 
this pragmatic position. However, in doing so he did not find it necessary to discard the 
rest of the Omaha Platform.
Third, Allen carried the Populist standard well after most Populists had laid it 
down. That a marginally-committed, conservative Populist would stay with the party 
through its long twilight seems doubtful.
Fourth, employing Norman Pollack’s informal but useful left/center/right 
typology of Populism, we see that Allen falls squarely in the middle category. Among 
the features of “right Populism” were a “narrow construction of antimonopolism because
24 Ibid., 137-38.
25 Ibid., 138.
26 Ibid., 137. For a recent summary o f Allen’s political career that is sympathetic to his support o f  
fusion, see Scott Steven Swingle, “Allen, William Vincent,” in John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, eds., 
American National Biography, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) ,351.
27 Populist and labor leader Eugene Debs supported William Jennings Bryan for President in
1896, because free silver “gave us not only a rallying cry, but afforded common ground upon which the 
common people could unite against the trusts, syndicates, corporations, monopolies— in a word, the money 
power.” Quoted in Sanders, 139.
15 9
of its mistrust of the powers of government,” a “cursory treatment of...the problems of
labor,” and a “valuing of authority [that] encouraged deference, not only to law and
18order, but also to the class system.”" These do not apply to Allen.
Two other “right” characteristics require a bit of elaboration. According to 
Pollack, “right Populism” felt a strong “respect for the past” and refrained from a serious 
critique of industrialism.29 Allen did revere the past, but it was less the Gilded Age than 
the early national and antebellum eras, the period of working republicanism, that he 
hearkened back to.30 In this regard he was a typical Populist. And while Allen 
apparently never conducted a penetrating critical analysis of the industrial structure, the 
initiation of such critiques was not a characteristic feature of the Populist center but of
• • • t .  ^Ithe small Populist left epitomized by Henry Demarest Lloyd of Illinois.
The Populist center or “centrist reformism,” which for Pollack includes James 
Weaver, William Peffer, and Ignatius Donnelly, emphasized commitments to a 
Constitutional focus where political rights and obligations were concerned, and a 
“balance [of] the claims of capital with the needs of the community” and the expansion 
of opportunity for the middle and lower classes in the economic realm. It rejected
28 Pollack, The Humane Economy. 97-98.
29 Ibid., 97, 98 (for quotation).
30 Allen revered the Declaration o f  Independence and the Constitution, and what he sought was a 
return to what we might call his political first principles as he interpreted them from those documents. One 
does not find in Allen a belief in, or wish to return to, a past agrarian utopia. On the agrarian myth, see 
Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f  Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 23-59.
31 On the Populist left see ibid., 96-98. On Populism and industrialism, see Pollack, The Populist 
Response: Samuel Emlen Walker, “Populism and Industrialism: The Ideology o f the Official Organ o f the 
Nebraska Populist Movement,” (M.A. thesis, University o f  Nebraska at Omaha, 1970).
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♦ • T9socialism, but demanded a “publicly based ...political economy.” Allen’s support of 
the platform demands, and his arguments justifying them, put him squarely in this 
category.33 This makes sense too, given that, when one considers what Allen and Peffer 
stood for, the similarities are far greater than the differences.34
It also makes sense, finally, in terms of how Allen viewed conservatism. As we
saw in chapter three, as a Constitutionalist and republican he thought of Populism, as
other Populists did, as conservative in a qualified sense. He utterly rejected the
conservatism characteristic of the other parties. In February 1900, during a speech in
which he implored the Senate not to destroy the remaining greenback currency, he said
I understand in some sections o f the country it is held to be a crime to be an 
agitator. They look upon a man who is called an agitator as a man who is fit to 
be expelled from society and deprived o f his citizenship.
I thank God I am an agitator. I delight in being called an agitator. Agitation is 
life, motion, energy, and success. If you point me to a man who is called 
conservative, I will point you to a man whose powers, mental, moral, or 
physical, are on the road to decay. A man who does nothing and never thinks 
except when provoked by abnormal circumstances, who is satisfied with 
himself...is of no value in this world and will not be in the next.
32 Ibid., 96.
33 A more elaborate typology is offered in James M. Youngdale, Populism: A Psvchohistorical 
Perspective (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975) 119-49. With important differences, its 
categories (“Tory Populism,” “Radical Neomercantilism,” and “Socialist Populism”) roughly correspond to 
Pollack’s right/center/left division. Radical neomercantilism, a halfway point between the Tories and the 
Socialists, sought “the regulation o f business and [was] for interfering in the free market with a leveling 
intent rather than simply with an intent o f  rationalizing and smoothing out the economy in the interests o f  
corporate business, which was the chief aim o f the progressives.” Ibid., 141. Youngdale’s 
neomercantalist category, which otherwise fits Allen perfectly, includes espousal o f the subtreasury plan. 
As we have seen, however, it had relatively little support among Populists after 1892. See Hicks, 186-204.
34 This conclusion is based on the findings o f  this study and the information and insights available 
in the following works: Gene Clanton, Congressional Populism and the Crisis o f the 1890s (Lawrence: 
University Press o f Kansas, 1998); William A. Peffer, Populism. Its Rise and Fall, ed. Peter H. Argersinger 
(Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1992); Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William 
Alfred Peffer and the People’s Party (Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1974).
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A great many such men...have not had an intelligent thought pass through their 
minds in a third of a century. They are mere inert matter, a drag, a dead weight. 
They desire to be called conservative. It is more polite to be a conservative than 
an agitator, you know. Every evolution in mental and physical science, every 
disoovery in the various departments of progress...has been through agitation and 
investigation....So, Mr. President, I am an agitator.35
35 Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, vol. 33, pt. 2, pp. 1618-19.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival Materials
William V. Allen Papers. Nebraska State Historical Society.
William V. Allen Pension File. National Archives. Washington D.C.
Government Documents
Congressional Directory, 46th Cong., 3rd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1881.
Congressional Record. 53rd Cong., 1st sess., 1893. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1893, through Congressional Record. 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900-1901. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901.
Nebraska House Journal, 23rd sess., 1893.
Nebraska Senate Journal, 23rd sess., 1893.
Official Congressional Directory. 56th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1902.
Newspapers
Alliance-Independent. 9 Feb. 1893.
Madison Mail. 24, 31 Jan. 1902; 2 May 1902; 9 May -  14 Nov. 1902; 19 Dec. 1902; 9, 
16 Jan. 1903; 20 Feb. 1903.
Madison Star Mail. 12, 25 Jan. 1924; (Historical Edition), 19 Mar. 1925.
Nebraska State Journal. 8, 10, 13 Feb. 1893.
New York Times. 8 Feb. 1893.
163
Omaha Bee. 8, 10, 11, 12 Feb. 1893.
Omaha World-Herald. 4 Feb. -  15 Feb. 1893.
The (Nebraska") Independent. 4 Aug. 1904.
The New York Times. 20, 26 Apr. 1894; 5 May 1894.
The Wall Street Journal. 12 Oct. 1893.
Other Primary Sources
Allen, William V. “How to Purify National Legislation.” The North American Review 
(Aug. 1894): 159-64.
________ . “Necessity for the People’s Party.” The Arena (Oct. 1903): 410-14.
________ . National Bank Interests. Washington, 1893.
________ . The Financial Policy. Washington, 1893.
Appleton’s Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1893.
New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894.
Argersinger, Peter H., ed. Populism. Its Rise and Fall. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1992.
Bryan, William J. The First Battle: A Story of the Campaign of 1896. Chicago: W.B. 
Conkey Company, 1897.
Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the Upper Iowa University. Editions for 1860- 
62 and 1871-1872. Upper Iowa University Archives.
Hinman, Ida. The Washington Sketch Book: A Society Souvenir. Supplement. 
Washington, D.C.: Hartman & Cadick, Printer, 1895.
Holst, H. von. “Shall the Senate Rule the Republic?” Forum (Nov. 1893): 263-81.
National Party Platforms: Volume 1 1840-1956. Ed. Donald Bruce Johnson. Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1978.
Peffer, William A. “The Mission of the Populist Party.” The Review of Reviews 157 
(Jan. 1894): 665-678.
164
Scott, John. Story of the Thirty Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers. Nevada, Iowa: self­
published, 1896.
Shaw, Albert. "William V. Allen: A Populist. A Character Sketch and Interview." 
Review of Reviews 10 (July 1894): 31.
“The Senate in the Light of History.” Forum (Nov. 1893): 263-81.
The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 1st ed. 1907.
Tracy, Frank Basil. “Rise and Doom of the Populist Party.” Forum 16 (Oct. 1893): 240- 
250.
University of Nebraska. Nebraska Party Platforms, 1858-1938. Ed. John G.W. Lewis. 
Works Projects Administration, 1940.
Secondary Sources
Books
Argersinger, Peter H. Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s 
Party. Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1974.
________ . The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism: Western Populism and American
Politics. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Bell, John Fred. A History of Economic Thought. New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1967.
Bensel, Richard F. Sectionalism and American Political Development. 1880-1980. 
Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1984.
Bicha, Karel D. Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism. Lawrence, 
Kansas: Coronado Press, 1976.
Blouet, Brian W. and Frederick C. Luebke, eds. The Great Plains: Environment and 
Culture. Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1979.
Brands, H.W. The Reckless Decade: America in the 1890s. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995.
165
Burdette, Franklin L. Filibustering in the Senate. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1940.
Chamberlain, Lawrence H. The President, Congress and Legislation. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1946.
Cherny, Robert W. A Righteous Cause: The Life of William Jennings Bryan. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1985.
________ . Populism, Progressivism. and the Transformation of Nebraska Politics. 1885-
1915. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981.
Clanton, Gene. Congressional Populism and the Crisis of the 1890s. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998.
________ . Populism: The Humane Preference in America. 1890-1900. Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1991.
Destler, Chester McArthur. American Radicalism. 1865-1901: Essays and Documents. 
New London: Connecticut College Press, 1946.
Dewey, Davis Rich. National Problems. 1885-1897. New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1907.
Durden, Robert F. The Climax of Populism: The Election of 1896. Lexington: 
University Press o f Kentucky, 1965.
Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds. The New Pal grave: A
Dictionary of Economics. 4 vols. London: The Macmillan Press Limited, 1987.
Faulkner, Harold U. Politics. Reform and Expansion. 1890-1900. New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1959.
Fellows, Stephen Norris. History of the Upper Iowa Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church. 1856-1906. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Laurence Press Co., 1907.
Fine, Sidney. Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in
American Thought. 1865-1901. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956.
Fowler, Dorothy Ganfleld. John Coit Spooner: Defender of Presidents. New York: 
University Publishers, 1961.
Goodwyn, Lawrence. Democratic Promise: The Popuiist Moment in America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
166
Hicks, John D. The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's 
Party. 1931. Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961.
Hoffman, Charles. The Depression of the Nineties: An Economic History. Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1955.
Holmes, William F., ed. American Populism. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1994.
Hunt, James L. Marion Butler and American Populism. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003.
Josephson, Matthew. The Politicos: 1865-1896. 1938. Reprint. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc., 1966.
Koenig, Louis W. Bryan: A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan. New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971.
Lasch, Christopher. Revolt of the Elites: and the Betrayal o f Democracy. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.
Lustig, R. Jeffrey. Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modem American Political 
Theory, 1890-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Lewis, Edward R. A History of American Political Thought: From the Civil War to the 
World War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.
Marcus, Robert D. Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880-1896. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Martin, Roscoe. The People’s Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics. 1933. 
Reprint. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970.
Matthews, Donald R. Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the United States 
House of Representatives. New York: Wiley, 1975.
Mayer, George H. The Republican Party. 1854-1964. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964.
McMath, Robert C., Jr. American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898. New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1993.
167
McMurry, Donald L. Coxey’s Army: A Study of the Industrial Army Movement of 
1894. 1929. Reprint. New York: AMS Press, Inc. 1970.
Morgan, H. Wayne, ed. The Gilded Age. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970.
________ . The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Nevins, Allan. Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage. New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1948.
Noyes, Alexander Dana. Thirty Years o f American Finance : A Short Financial History 
of the Government and People of the United States Since the Civil War. 1865-
1896. 1900. Reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969.
Olson, James C. History of Nebraska. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974.
Ostler, Jeffrey. Prairie Populism: The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas. Nebraska, 
and Iowa. 1880-1892. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993.
Parsons, Stanley B. The Populist Context: Rural Versus Urban Power on a Great Plains 
Frontier. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973.
Peck, Harry Thurston. Twenty Years of the Republic: 1885-1905. New York: Dodd, 
Mead & Company, 1917.
Pedersen, James F. and Kenneth D. Wald. Shall the People Rule?: A History of the 
Democratic Party in Nebraska Politics, 1854-1972. Lincoln, Nebraska: Jacob 
North, Inc., 1972.
Pollack, Norman. The Just Polity: Populism. Law, and Human Welfare. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1987.
________ . The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962.
________ . The Humane Economy: Populism. Capitalism, and Democracy. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990.
Rader, Benjamin G. The Academic Mind and Reform: The Influence of Richard T. Ely 
in American Life. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1966.
Reeves, Winona Evans. The Blue Book of Nebraska Women. Mexico, Missouri: 
Missouri Printing & Engraving Co., 1916.
Ritter, Gretchen. Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the
Politics of Finance in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
168
Rothbard, Murray. Classical Economics: An Austrian Perspective on the History of 
Economic Thought. 2 vols. Brookfield, Vermont: E. Elgar Pub., 1995.
Rothman, David J. Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
Sanders, Elizabeth. Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877- 
1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Schwantes, Carlos A. Coxev’s Army: An American Odyssey. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1985.
Shannon, Fred A. American Farmers’ Movements. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., 1957.
Sheldon, Addison Erwin. Nebraska: The Land and the People, vol. 1. Chicago: Lewis 
Publishing Company, 1931.
Steeples, Douglas and David O. Whitten. Democracy in Desperation: The Depression of 
1893. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998.
Tindall, George Brown and David Shi. America: A Narrative History. 3rd ed., vol. 2. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.
Tipton, Thomas Weston. Forty Years of Nebraska: At Home and in Congress. Lincoln: 
Nebraska State Historical Society, 1902.
Vincent, Henry. The Story o f the Commonweal. 1894. Reprint. New York: Amo Press 
& The New York Times, 1969.
Watkins, Albert. History of Nebraska: From the Earliest Explorations to the Present 
Time, vol. 3. Lincoln: Western Publishing and Engraving Company, 1913.
Weisman, Steven R. The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson—The Fierce Battles over 
Money and Power That Transformed the Nation. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2002 .
Wiebe, Robert H. The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.
Wiebe, Robert H. and Grady McWhiney, eds. Historical Vistas: Readings in United
States History. Vol. 2: 1865 to the Present. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964.
Williams, R. Hal. Years of Decision: American Politics in the 1890s. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1978.
169
Wiltse, Charles Maurice. The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy. 1935. 
Reprint. New York: Hill and Wang, Inc., 1960.
Wood, Gordon. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
Woodward, C. Vann. Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel. 1938. Reprint. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970.
Youngdale, James M. Populism: A Psychohistorical Perspective. Port Washington, 
N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975.
Articles
Argersinger, Peter H. “No Rights on This Floor: Third Parties and the
Institutionalization of Congress.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 22 
(1992): 655-690.
Camic, Susannah. Review of The Great Tax Wars, by Steven Weisman. the vale review 
of books 6 (winter 2003): http://www.yalereviewofbooks.com/archive/winter03/ 
re vie w04. shtml. htm.
Cherny, Robert W. “Lawrence Goodwyn and Nebraska Populism: A Review Essay.” 
Great Plains Quarterly 1, 3 (Summer 1981): 181-94.
Clanton, Gene. “Hayseed Socialism on the Hill: Congressional Populism, 1891-1895.” 
Western Historical Quarterly 15, 2 (Apr. 1984): 139-62.
Coletta, Paolo E. “A Tempest in a Teapot? — Governor Poynter’s Appointment of
William V. Allen to the United States Senate.” Nebraska History 38 (1957): 155- 
63.
________ . “Greenbackers, Goldbugs, and Silverites: Currency Reform and Policy,
1860-1897.” In The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal. Ed. H. Wayne Morgan. 
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
________ . “William Jennings Bryan and the Nebraska Senatorial Election of 1893.”
Nebraska History 31 (1950): 183-203.
Ellis, Elmer. “Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900.” In Historical Vistas:
Readings in United States History vol. 2: 1865 to the Present. Eds. Robert Wiebe 
and Grady McWhiney. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964.
170
Fahl, Ronald J. Review o f Western Populism  ^by Karel Bicha. Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 69 (1978): 138-39.
Gould, Lewis L. “The Republican Search for a National Majority.” In The Gilded Age. 
Ed. H. Wayne Morgan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970.
McMath, Robert C., Jr. “Populism in Two Countries: Agrarian Protest in the Great 
Plains and Prairie Provinces.” Agricultural History 69 (1995): 517-46.
McVey, Frank L. “The Populist Movement.” Economic Studies 1 (1896): 133-209.
Miller, Worth Robert. “The Republican Tradition.” In American Populism. Ed.
William F. Holmes. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1994.
Nichols, Jeanette Paddock. "The Politics and Personalities of Silver Repeal in the United 
States Senate." American Historical Review 41, 1 (Oct. 1935): 26-53.
Nugent, Walter T. K. “Money, Politics, and Society: The Currency Question.” In The 
Gilded Age. Ed. H. Wayne Morgan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970.
Ostler, Jeffrey. “The Rhetoric of Conspiracy and the Formation of Kansas Populism.” 
Agricultural History 69 (1995): 1-27.
Sheldon, Addison E. “Nebraskans I Have Known.” Nebraska History 19 (1938): 191- 
206.
Trask, David S. “Nebraska Populism as a Response to Environmental and Political
Problems.” In The Great Plains: Environment and Culture. Eds. Brian W. Blouet 
and Frederick C. Luebke. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
________ . Review of Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism, by
Karel Bicha. Nebraska History 59 (1978): 151-53.
Westin, Alan Furman. “The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement and the Campaign 
of 1896.” The Journal of Politics 15 (Feb. 1953): 3-41.
Williams, R. Hal. “‘Dry Bones and Dead Language’: The Democratic Party.” In The
Gilded Age. Ed. H. Wayne Morgan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970.
Unpublished Materials
Bowman, Clifford Ernest. “The Local Nebraska Press and National Politics, 1896- 
1908.” M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1964.
171
Briel, Ronald. “Preface to Populism: A Social Analysis of Minor Parties in Nebraska 
Politics, 1876-1890.” Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1981.
Kottman, Richard N. “An Analysis of the People’s Party Delegation in Congress, 1891-
1897.” M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1954.
Roberts, Clarence Nelson. “A Congressional History of the Populists.” M.A. thesis, 
University o f Missouri j 1936.
Scott, Mittie Young. “The Life and Political Career of William Vincent Allen.” M.A. 
thesis, University of Nebraska, 1927.
Walker, Samuel Emlen. “Populism and Industrialism: The Ideology of the Official 
Orage of the Nebraska Populist Movement.” M.A. thesis, University o f 
Nebraska, 1970.
Reference Works
Bacon, Donald C., Roger H. Davidson and Morton Keller, eds. The Encyclopedia of the 
United States Congress, vol.4. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
Biographical Directory of the American Congress. 1774-1971. document 92-8, 92nd 
Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1971.
Century Cyclopedia of Names. 1954.
Congressional Guide to U.S. Elections. 3rd ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc., 1994.
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Congress. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1991.
Garraty, John A. and Mark C. Carnes, eds. American National Biography, vol. 1. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Grand Larousse Encvclopedique. 1960.
Guide to Congress. 4th ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991.
Johnson, Allen, ed. Dictionary of American Biography, vol. 1. New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1928.
172
Mai, Ludwig H. Men and Ideas in Economics: A Dictionary of World Economists Past 
and Present. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1975.
McLaughlin, Andrew C. and Albert Bushnell Hart, eds. Cyclopedia of American 
Government. New York: Peter Smith, 1949.
Stephen, Leslie and Sidney Lee, eds. The Dictionary of National Biography, 22 vols. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921-22.
